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ARTICLES
U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: A DECADE OF
FLUX AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
CINNAMON P. CARLARNE*
Climate change is a defining feature of contemporary existence. It also poses
fundamental challenges to the rule of law. As the scale of the climate crises swells, so
too do efforts to develop innovative strategies for addressing climate change at the local,
state, and national levels. This innovation is driven by necessity and is fueled by
creative and determined actors from across the public and private sectors. But the pace
of legal innovation is uneven, and the consistency of political leadership is erratic.
Nowhere is this more evident than at the federal level in the United States, where
presidential politics vividly demonstrate the degree to which we still lack a collective
national vision for how to respond to climate change.
In this Article, I argue that as important as presidential leadership is, lawmakers and
scholars should not focus myopically on the vagaries of presidential climate politics and
federal climate law. Between 2009 and 2019, the United States elected the most climatefriendly president in U.S. history and then replaced him with the most climate-skeptical
president in U.S. history. Within this dramatic decade, notwithstanding the fluxes and
flows in legal development at the federal level, there has been a steady stream of legal
innovation by subnational and non-state actors. The interactions between national,
subnational, and non-state climate governance efforts are one of the most under-explored
dimensions of domestic climate change law. This Article addresses this gap by examining
key developments in U.S. climate change law and policy over the period 2009 to 2019,
to reveal how subnational and non-state initiatives complement and constrain the
development of national climate change law and policy over time.
* Alumni Society Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State
University. For their essential research assistance, I want to thank Sarah Siewe, Matthew
Dowiatt, and Michael McGuire and for their valuable assistance, inspiration, and feedback
I want to thank Martha Chamallas, Marc Spindelman, Mohamed Helal, and Paul Rose.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is the inescapable backdrop and impending horizon
for contemporary existence. The reality of anthropogenic climate
change is no longer subject to scientific debate. Greenhouse gases are
accumulating in the atmosphere and the climate is warming. The
question is not whether anthropogenic forcing of the climate system is
occurring, but rather, what do we want to do about it and what is the
role of law in this regard.1
The experienced and anticipated effects of climate change are
pervasive. All states, from the greatest superpowers to the tiniest, lowest
lying islands, are affected by climate change. The resulting political
debate over how to limit and respond to climate change is ubiquitous.
Yet the substance and outcome of this debate continues to vary widely
across and within states. The nature of the debate and the contours of
legal responses vary not only as a result of the usual socio-legal factors
that shape legal systems,2 but also because climate change poses
unique challenges that test the ingenuity of lawmakers and the capacity
of the rule of law.3 As Fisher, Scotford, and Barritt explain, “[c]limate
change gives rise to disputes and problems not easily addressed by
existing legal doctrines and frameworks.”4 Consequently, creative legal
efforts to respond to climate change have proliferated and so, too, has
the body of climate law scholarship exploring these anticipated,
avoided, and actual legal responses.

1. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. FIELD ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE [IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY:
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 3, 12 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/
2018/02/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/N379-AYHU].
2. See, e.g., CINNAMON PINON CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY: EU AND
US APPROACHES 16 (2010).
3. See Elizabeth Fisher, Environmental Law as ‘Hot Law’, 25 J. ENVTL. L. 347, 347–
48, 352 (2013) (“[W]hat we commonly understand as ‘environmental law’ is directly
concerned with ‘hot situations’ in which the agreed frames, legal and otherwise, for
how we understand and act in the world are in a constant state of flux and contestation.
As such, environmental law stands in stark contrast to those areas of law where actors,
interests, preferences, and thus rights and responsibilities, can be easily identified and
thus workable frames of legal action can operate.” (footnote omitted)).
4. Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford & Emily Barritt, The Legally Disruptive Nature
of Climate Change, 80 MOD. L. REV. 173, 173 (2017); see also J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman,
Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for
Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 72–78 (2010) (describing the “massive” nature of
climate change and the challenges to which it gives rise).
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In common with the legal system itself, even as climate law
scholarship has matured,5 it has struggled to conceptualize and
respond to the disruptive nature of climate change. Climate law
scholarship has expanded to consider increasingly numerous and
complex questions related to everything from deforestation,
adaptation, loss and damage to renewable portfolio standards, feed-intariffs, carbon sequestration, and solar radiation management. This
scholarship contributes to efforts to conceptualize and respond to the
discrete drivers and consequences of climate change, and it advances
the “inevitably incremental and fragmented hard work of whittling
away at the challenges climate change poses.”6 Even as scholars unravel
and parse the multitude of legal challenges to which climate change
gives rise, there is a continuing need for more comprehensive analyses
of how the multitude of multi-level, multi-scale efforts to respond to
climate change add up, how they are evolving or, eroding, as the case
may be and what this means for conceptualizing our ability to use law
to create societies capable of minimizing the extent of climate change
and thriving within an inevitably warmer and more variable climate.
This Article builds on past work to help advance this line of analysis.
Just over a decade ago, in a 2008 article, Notes from a Climate Change
Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet National
Resistance in the USA,7 I examined the state of U.S. climate change law
and policy during the waning hours of President George W. Bush’s
Administration. At the time, the article offered one of the earliest
reviews of U.S. climate change law at multiple levels of governance and
provided insight into how federal abdication of leadership was
prompting a variety of efforts on the part of subnational and non-state
actors to respond to climate change. In particular, the article explored
the extent to which local, national, and international law were being
used to “overcome federal resistance” and “force legal transformations
in climate change policy-making in America.”8

5. For a discussion of the challenges environmental law scholars confront as the
field matures, see Elizabeth Fisher et al., Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate
About Environmental Law Scholarship, 29 J. ENVTL. L. 213, 215, 250 (2009).
6. Cinnamon P. Carlarne, The Space Between Grand Optimism and Grim
Determination: Finding a Pathway Forward in International Climate Change Law, LOY. U.
CHIC. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
7. Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal Attempts
at Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1351 (2008).
8. Id. at 1351.
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In 2008, the state of U.S. climate change law at the federal level
looked bleak, but there were glimmers of hope. Progressive states, such
as California, were developing comprehensive strategies to address
climate change and, in the process, were pressuring Congress and the
President to act on climate change. States, cities, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) were drawing on a long history of social activism
and adversarial legalism9 to find political, common law, and statutory
footholds to prompt climate action. Equally, efforts to restructure the
historically entrenched, vertically integrated, monopoly-driven U.S.
electricity system so as to allow greater competition and more entry points
for clean energy were picking up pace.10 It was a tumultuous period. The
United States lacked any form of federal climate legislation and, really,
any firm basis for crafting a national legal response to climate change, but
diverse and creative efforts were afoot to create the foundations for a
federal climate change policy by hook or by crook. In the ensuing decade,
much has changed, but much remains the same.
Between 2009 and 2019, the United States elected the most climatefriendly president in U.S. history and then replaced him with the most
climate-skeptic president in U.S. history. Within this dramatic decade,
notwithstanding the fluxes and flows at the federal level, there has been
a steady stream of social, technical, and legal innovation spurring the kind
of dispersed, persistent, multi-level change necessary to build the backbone
for a society that is capable of persisting, if not ultimately thriving, in a
warmer world. These ongoing transformations, alone, are not enough to
limit long-term changes in the climate system.11 Much more is needed. Yet

9. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (2001)
(defining Kagan’s concept of adversarial legalism as “policymaking, policy
implementation, and dispute resolution by means of lawyer-dominated litigation”).
10. For an overview of regulatory change in the context of federal energy law, see
Jim Rossi & Hannah J. Wiseman, Constrained Regulatory Exit in Energy Law, 67 DUKE L.J.
1687, 1688–90 (2018). For a helpful discussion of the complex and still poorly
understood and conceptualized relationship between energy regulation and climate
change law and policy in a comparative context, see Lincoln L. Davies et al., Climate
Regulation of the Electricity Industry: A Comparative View from Australia, Great Britain, South
Korea, and the United States, 13 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 109 (2017).
11. See, e.g., MYLES ALLEN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5˚C: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (Valérie Masson Delmotte et
al. eds., 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/YFF8-SH6E]. This report details the varying risks of keeping warming to 1.5˚C versus
2˚C above pre-industrial levels and outlines the steps that would need to be taken to
keep warming to 1.5˚C above pre-industrial levels, as well as the short timeframe
remaining in which to take the steps to do so. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5˚C: HEADLINE STATEMENTS FROM THE
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the changes taking place are significant, and the aggregate impact of
ongoing legal developments requires more rigorous assessment.
This Article contributes to that work. It complements the maturing
body of climate scholarship12 by tracing the key trends in U.S. climate
change law and policy over the period 2009 to 2019 to reveal how legal
developments by subnational and non-state actors intersect with and
influence national climate policy. In doing so, it examines the extent to
which the “complicated picture of pushes and pulls—of stagnation and
resistance to change at the top” and “innovation and pressure for progress
from below”13 that characterized the state of play in 2008 has spawned
legal change and innovation that could enable the emergence of a multidimensional rule of law14 around climate change in the United States.
The objective of this Article is not to create a granular picture of
every legal development that directly or indirectly intersects with
climate change. Perhaps as testament to the rapid growth of climate
law, that exercise would be too discursive to be helpful. Instead, the
objective is to explore the dominant trends that characterize climaterelated legal developments within the federal, subnational, and nonstate contexts in order to better understand and advance efforts to
construct a network of complementary legal structures.
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/
2/2018/07/sr15_headline_statements.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ7F-GXRX].
12. See, e.g., Eloise Scotford & Stephen Minas, Probing the Hidden Depths of Climate
Law: Analysing National Climate Legislation, 28 RECIEL 67 (2019) (providing a three
part methodology for reviewing national climate legislation focused on: identifying
legislation that directly intersects with climate change; identifying laws and regulations
that indirectly intersect with climate change and identify linkages or tensions between
direct and indirect climate leg; and examining aggregated national climate change
legislation and regulation within the relevant legal context and culture).
13. Carlarne, supra note 7, at 1353.
14. For a discussion of the importance of the rule of law with respect to
environmental matters, see Environmental Rule of Law, U.N. ENV’T,
https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/environmental-rights-andgovernance/what-we-do/promoting-environmental-rule-law-0
[https://perma.cc/M98Q-JAY3]; see also U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 4, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug.
23, 2004) (“The ‘rule of law’ is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s
mission. It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well,
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness
and procedural and legal transparency.”).
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To this end, this Article commences in Part I by mapping out the
evolving terrain of climate change law in the United States. Parts II and
III, respectively, examine the rapid expansion and, subsequent,
dramatic contraction of federal climate change law during the Obama
and Trump Administrations. These legal fluxes provide context for
exploring the promise and perils of relying on executive power to
tackle a massive problem such as climate change. The ensuing
discussion of climate litigation in Part IV focuses on how litigation strategies
are evolving in response to federal policy fluxes, judicial precedent, and
advances in climate science.
Part V of this Article steps down from the federal level to explore how
subnational efforts to address climate change have expanded over the past
decade. Here, recognizing the seemingly infinite variety of instruments that
subnational entities are employing to address the causes and consequences
of climate change, this Article focuses on how the conduct of states, cities,
and non-state actors reveals emerging trends and provides opportunities for
legal experimentation and iterative learning. The goal is to provide a window
into the multitude of ways in which subnational and non-state actors
increasingly influence the state of play on climate change. In doing so, this
Article spotlights the swelling social movement around climate change,
including the escalating roles of individual and collective actors as varied as
the state of California,15 New York City,16 Michael Bloomberg,17 Unilever,18

15. See, e.g., Ann Carlson, Symposium on Climate Change Localism: The Trump
Administration’s Assault on California’s Global Climate Change Leadership, 112 AM. J. INT’L
L. UNBOUND 269, 271–72 (2018) (discussing the Trump Administration’s efforts to revoke
California’s special authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate automobile tailpipe
emissions more stringently than the federal government and the implications of this move
for state efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions and limit conventional pollutants).
16. See, e.g., Rebecca Bratspies, Protecting the Environment in an Era of Federal Retreat:
The View from New York City, 13 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 5, 10 (2018) (contrasting New York
City’s climate-protective response with the federal government’s undercutting of
environmental regulations after the 2016 election).
17. See, e.g., Press Release, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Michael Bloomberg Launches
Beyond Carbon, the Largest-Ever Coordinated Campaign Against Climate Change in
United States (June 7, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.org/press/releases/ michaelbloomberg-launches-beyond-carbon-the-largest-ever-coordinated-campaign-againstclimate-change-in-united-states [https://perma.cc/6RDP-LL9A] (announcing a $500
million investment in a campaign “to tackle climate change”).
18. See, e.g., Letter from Alan Jope, CEO, Unilever, on Responsible Engagement in
Climate Policy to Unilever, to Trade Ass’ns and Bus. Grps. (June 5, 2019),
https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/reducing-environmentalimpact/greenhouse-gases/global-climate-action/responsible-engagement-in-climatepolicy [https://perma.cc/UCX2-RGA8] (announcing Unilever’s aspiration to reduce
carbon emissions and expressing hope that its industry partners will join that commitment).
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Greta Thunberg,19 Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez,20 and the
“We Are Still In” collective.21
I. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: A CANVAS FOR CONSTANT CHANGE
A. The Global Context: International Climate Law Matures
The field of climate change law has exploded over the past decade
hand-in-hand with the growing body of knowledge about climate
change. At the international level, following two decades of meaningful
but frustratingly slow international climate negotiations, the parties to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)22 adopted a new international legal agreement on climate
change, the Paris Agreement (or “the Agreement”).23 The Paris
Agreement represents the maturing of the field. It frames the urgency
of the challenge, calls upon all state parties to act with the highest level
of ambition, prioritizes not only mitigation but also adaptation and loss
and damage, and creates increasingly sophisticated financial,
technological, and administrative support systems.24 Yet, for all of the
progress that it represents, whether the Paris Agreement can provide the
legal backbone for facilitating the extent of state-based efforts necessary
to avoid catastrophic climate change remains to be seen.25
Notably, at the time of adoption of the Paris Agreement, the
aggregate mitigation contributions to which the parties had
committed—even if fully implemented—would fail to keep warming
19. See, e.g., Greta Thunberg: The Swedish Teen Inspiring Climate Strikes, BBC NEWS (Feb.
14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-47231271/greta-thunberg-theswedish-teen-inspiring-climate-strikes [https://perma.cc/T55A-BAK6] (reporting that
Greta Thunberg’s climate activism has prompted many similar climate protests worldwide).
20. See, e.g., Matthew Daly, Ocasio-Cortez: No ‘Middle-Ground’ on Fighting Climate
Change, AP NEWS (May 13, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/4359d6588f9740aca
1ab24a9745f2c9d [https://perma.cc/S2QG-NGHJ] (describing Representative
Ocasio-Cortez’s stance on climate change as a “no middle ground” position).
21. WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com [https://perma.cc/B3URLSQH] (providing a platform whereby government officials, faith leaders, academics,
and business executives can affirm their commitment to achieving the United States’
objectives under the Paris Agreement).
22. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), May 9, 1992,
S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
23. UNFCCC, Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Annex (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
24. See, e.g., Cinnamon Carlarne & JD Colavecchio, Balancing Equity and
Effectiveness: The Paris Agreement and the Future of International Climate Change Law, 27
NYU ENVTL. L. REV. 107, 136–37 (2019).
25. See Paris Agreement, supra note 23, art. 2.
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below the 2°C target the Agreement establishes.26 Therefore, the
willingness of key state actors to move more aggressively to limit
domestic emissions is critical to efforts to keep warming within
internationally agreed limits. Yet, in the wake of the adoption of the
Paris Agreement, the rise of populist movements in the United States,
Europe, Brazil, and worldwide place additional pressures on the
already tenuous willingness of the great power states to be climate
leaders.27 Meanwhile, growing political and economic tensions28
between the two largest emitters,29 the United States and China,
further complicates efforts to build consensus among key state actors.
As the tides of populism, nationalism, and great power politics seem
to pull the already fragile fabric of the international community30
asunder, however, a countertide of subnational action and
transnational legal development and learning is taking place.31 The
countertrends of high-level political and legal fluctuations and steady
subnational and transnational legal developments create a complex
picture of pushes and pulls in both international and domestic efforts
to develop effective legal responses to climate change.
26. Id. ¶ 17.
27. See Dan Farber, Another Scary Election (But Not Here), LEGAL PLANET (Oct. 22, 2018),
http://legal-planet.org/2018/10/22/another-scary-election-but-not-here
[https://perma.cc/5JB3-DDSU] (describing Brazil’s then-candidate Bolsonaro’s
climate policies, including opening up indigenous lands for commercial development).
But see Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla & Louis J. Kotze, Living in Harmony with Nature? A
Critical Appraisal of the Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia, 7 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 397
(forthcoming 2018) (discussing the ways in which countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia
are pushing for a more progressive re-imagining of environmental law).
28. See generally Rachel Brewster, Analyzing the Trump Administration’s International
Trade Strategy, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1419 (2019) (arguing that the Trump
Administration’s trade policies are contrary to United States interests).
29. See Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/science/eachcountrys-share-of-co2.html [https://perma.cc/7LCH-6LXD] (showing that the
United States and China are the largest emitters of carbon dioxide).
30. See Cinnamon P. Carlarne & Mohamed S. Helal, A Conversation About Climate
Change and the ‘International Community’, 8 CLIMATE L. 229, 231 (2018).
31. See Kenneth Abbott, Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate
Change, 3 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 57, 60 (2014) (encouraging “innovative,
complementary approaches” by transnational actors to develop networks and
governance structures that can bypass recalcitrance states and contribute the
development of a multi-level climate governance regime complex); Sharmila Murthy,
States and Cities as “Norm Sustainers”: A Role for Subnational Actors in the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change, 37 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2019) (arguing that subnational actors are
“norm sustainers” that can help ensure the success of the Paris Agreement even if the
United States withdraws from the Agreement).
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Within this oscillating web of national flux, subnational innovation,
and transnational network building, the United States sits at the center
pushing and pulling the strings of the larger international trends.
B. The Political Malleability of Climate Change in the United States
The principal challenge facing any effort to analyze the
developmental arc of federal climate change law in the United States
over the past decade is that the basic concept of climate change
remains contested. Two of the United States’ past three presidents and
many of our sitting legislators have questioned both the legitimacy of
climate science and the desirability of the United States taking any
concrete legal steps to limit climate change.32 Sandwiched between
these two presidents and interacting with these skeptical federal legislators,
however, was a president who provided not only significant domestic
leadership but also important international leadership on climate change.
The development of federal climate law thus is a non-linear story of
extreme fluxes and flows riddled with, at times, dramatically contradictory
narratives of the reality and urgency of climate change.
As context for the discussion of federal climate law that follows, it is
helpful to understand the extent to which each of the three twenty-first
century U.S. presidents has had access to assessments of the scientific
basis of climate change and the manner in which they have used this
data to contextualize their political strategies on climate change.

32. See Ellen Cranley, These Are the 130 Current Members of Congress Who Have Doubted
or Denied Climate Change, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2019, 1:36 PM), https://www.
businessinsider.com/climate-change-and-republicans-congress-global-warming-20192 [https://perma.cc/43WA-2K9B] (highlighting the 130 members of Congress who
have made statements such as “the earth is currently in a natural warming cycle rather
than a man-made climate change”). In fact, as will be discussed, there has been a
persistent undercurrent of efforts focused on increasing domestic production,
consumption, and exportation of fossil fuels—particularly natural gas—and, more
recently, presidential efforts to prop up the declining coal industry in direct opposition
to market forces. See, e.g., The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil Producer,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy
/detail.php?id=37053 [https://perma.cc/9AHV-3EFS]; see also Jennifer A. Dlouhy,
Trump Prepares Lifeline for Money-Losing Coal Plants, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2018, 8:49
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-01/trump-said-to-grantlifeline-to-money-losing-coal-power-plants-jhv94ghl. For a more thorough, critical
discussion of President Trump’s energy policy, see generally Carol J. Miller, For a Lump
of Coal & a Drop of Oil: An Environmentalist’s Critique of the Trump Administration’s First
Year of Energy Policies, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 185, 194–95 (2018).
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As very brief background, since 1990,33 the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) has produced regular assessments of “the
scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, and
options for adaptation and mitigation.”34 Over time, the body of
climate science has expanded exponentially; in turn, the IPCC reports
have become increasingly comprehensive, with even the syntheses
running thousands of pages. Equally, despite inevitable areas of
uncertainty, each report has become increasingly confident and dire
with respect to the impacts of anthropogenic warming of the climate
system. The IPCC’s most recent report cautioned that “[w]arming of
the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The
atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice
have diminished, and sea level has risen.”35
The IPCC reports assess the work of thousands of scientists and
social scientists from around the world and provide a comprehensive
and reliable source of information for policymakers to use when assessing
potential responses to climate change.36 Over time, a body of domesticallyfocused assessments examining the ways in which climate change affects
the United States has grown as a complement to the IPCC reports.
When George W. Bush assumed office in 2001, the IPCC was in the
process of releasing its Third Assessment Report.37 In relevant part, this
report determined that there was “new and stronger evidence that
most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to
human activities,” and that “observed changes in regional climate have
affected many physical and biological systems, and there are
preliminary indications that social and economic systems have been

33. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC
1990 AND 1992 ASSESSMENTS 5 (1992).
34. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FACTSHEET: WHAT IS
THE IPCC (2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/FS_what_
ipcc.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARZ7-GY9P] [hereinafter IPCC FACTSHEET].
35. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014
SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch
/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [https://perma.cc/K63EKHBX].
36. See IPCC FACTSHEET, supra note 34 (emphasizing the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change’s role as a source for climate change assessments to provide policy
makers with the information without “tell[ing] policymakers what actions to take”).
37. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE
SCIENTIFIC BASIS (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/
uploads/2018/07/WG1_TAR_FM.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M3K-7WGP].
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affected.”38 In response to this report, international efforts to develop
a collective response to climate change intensified, leading to the
adoption of a new international agreement on climate change, the
Kyoto Protocol,39 and to the expansion of a plethora of state and
regional legal efforts to address climate change.
By the end of President Bush’s second term, the state of climate
science had advanced dramatically. By 2007, the IPCC had released its
Fourth Assessment Report (“AR4”),40 which added even greater
urgency to collective understanding of anthropogenic climate change.
In particular, AR4 concluded that “warming of the climate system is
unequivocal” and that “[m]ost of the observed increase in global
average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the
observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.”41
Even as collective understanding of climate change grew during the
mid-2000s, efforts to respond to climate change at the domestic level
floundered under President Bush’s leadership. Despite early assertions
that “[c]limate change, with its potential to impact every corner of the
world, is an issue that must be addressed by the world,”42 under
President Bush’s leadership, the United States questioned climate

38. Id. at ix; Dr. R.K. Pachauri, Chairman, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Address at the 11th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change and 1st Conference of the Parties Serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol (Dec. 7, 2005).
39. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, art. 12 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
40. See Reports, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/reports [https://perma.cc/JZL7-G89Z]
(containing links to and information about all of the IPCC reports released to date).
41. RICHARD B. ALLEY ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5, 10 (2007),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg1-spm-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5FZ-4ZSW]. In 2009, the United States released its Second
National Climate Assessment, determing that “[c]limate changes are underway in the
United States and are projected to grow” and that “[w]idespread climate-related
impacts are occurring now and are expected to increase.” U.S. GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE
RES. PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009 REPORT
12 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009), https://downloads.globalchange.gov/
usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N79X-MLJW].
42. See
Bush
Presser,
C-SPAN
(Nov.
28,
2016),
https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4632703/bush-presser [https://perma.cc/2ES9-Q5LA].
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science,43 impeded international negotiations,44 and thwarted efforts
to develop domestic climate change law.45 This questioning of climate
science and near total abdication of leadership on climate change shifted
abruptly in 2008 with the inauguration of President Barack Obama.
President Obama made it clear from the outset that he approached
climate science and thus, climate policy, very differently than his
predecessor. In the run-up to the election, then Senator Obama
reprimanded the sitting president and declared his commitment to
acting on climate change, noting:
Washington’s failure to lead on energy is the failure of a President
who spent most of his time in office denying the very existence of
global warming—a President who put more faith in the spin of a
science fiction writer than the science facts of real experts.46

He continued by declaring that “we cannot afford more of the same
timid politics when the future of our planet is at stake . . . . I will set big
goals for this country as President—some so large that the technology
to reach them does not yet exist. But that has not stopped us before.”47
Granted, this was a campaign speech, and the tone of the speech
reflected the grandeur of a presidential campaign. Nevertheless, the shift
in tone and in the resulting intent for policy change was clear.
Subsequently, President Obama’s commitment to scientifically informed
decision-making came to define his approach to climate change.48
President Trump has adopted a different tack. Even before taking
office, President Trump made it clear that he questioned the basic
premise of climate change, paid little to no respect for scientific
43. See, e.g., Manipulation of Global Warming Science, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
https://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/center-science-and-democracy-promoting-scientificintegrity/manipulation-of-global.html [https://perma.cc/745M-CUNN] (chronicling the
ways in which President Bush “consistently sought to undermine the view held by the
vast majority of climate scientists that human-caused emissions of carbon dioxide and
other heat-trapping gases are making a discernible contribution to global warming”).
44. Julian Borger, Bush Kills Global Warming Treaty, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2001),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming.usnews
[https://perma.cc/AY7Z-FL9C].
45. See Carlarne, supra note 7, at 1360–64 (discussing President Bush’s climate
change policies). See generally Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental
Policy Under Bush II, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363 (2004) (providing a critical
overview of President Bush’s environmental policies).
46. Senator Barack Obama, Real Leadership for a Clean Energy Future (Oct. 8, 2007).’
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., David B. Hunter, International Climate Negotiations: Opportunities and
Challenges for the Obama Administration, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 252 (2009)
(suggesting that President Obama’s appointments to environmental agencies signal a
“new and real commitment to science-based policymaking”).
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findings related to climate change, failed to understand the
elementary difference between weather and climate, and intended not
only to stop the advancement of U.S. climate law, but also to do all he
could to roll back existing legal provisions.49 President Trump’s
provocative statements on climate change are too many to mention,
but a quick review of his Twitter account edifies the general tenor of
his stance on climate change. Starting with his infamous declaration
that “[t]he concept of global warming was created by and for the
Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive,”50
and expanded upon by statements such as, “[w]e should be focused
on magnificently clean and healthy air and not distracted by the
expensive hoax that is global warming!”51, and “[i]t’s really cold
outside, they are calling it a major freeze, weeks ahead of normal.
Man, we could use a big fat dose of global warming!”52 President
Trump has clearly communicated his stance as a climate skeptic.
Throughout his presidency, President Trump has routinely attacked
and attempted to suppress science and science-based decision-making.
As Farber characterizes it, the Trump Administration has adopted an
unabashed “hostile attitude toward science” and “has used a triad of
strategies: efforts to defund research, suppression of scientific findings,
and embrace of fringe science” to accomplish these efforts.53
Between 2017 to 2018, at the height of President Trump’s attack on
climate science, the U.S. Global Climate Change Research Program
released The Fourth National Climate Assessment (“4th NCA”).54 Released
49. See, e.g., Chris Cilizza, Donald Trump Doesn’t Think Much of Climate Change, in 20
Quotes, CNN: THE POINT (Aug. 8, 2017, 11:17 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2017/08/08/politics/trump-global-warming/index.html [https://perma.cc/APV7-3B7B].
50. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385
[https://perma.cc/48F8-BTQ5].
51. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 6, 2013, 7:38 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/408983789830815744
[https://perma.cc/44G2-CL52].
52. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 19, 2015, 6:30 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/656100109386674176
[https://perma.cc/NFN4-63AK].
53. Dan Farber, Updates on the War on Science: The Trump Administration Continues Its
Campaign to Suppress Science, LEGAL PLANET (June 10, 2019), https://legalplanet.org/2019/06/10/updates-on-the-war-om-science [https://perma.cc/Q6EP-QU4S].
54. The first volume of the report was released in 2017. 1 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES.
PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (2017), https://science2017.
globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8XUHDNZ] [hereinafter 4TH NCA VOL. I]. The second volume of the report was released
in 2018. 2 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT,
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in two volumes, the 4th NCA provides an assessment of the foundational
science of climate change (“Volume I”) and explores “the human welfare,
societal, and environmental elements of climate change”55 at the national
and regional levels (“Volume II”) in the United States. The 4th NCA, in
essence, provides a federally mandated, domestically focused
complement to the IPCC reports.
Volume I sets the stage by confirming the anthropogenic patterns of
warming indicated by the IPCC AR5.56 Volume II then explores the
widespread threats climate change poses for the United States,
suggesting that “[c]limate change creates new risks and exacerbates
existing vulnerabilities in communities across the United States,
presenting growing challenges to human health and safety, quality of
life, and the rate of economic growth.”57
The findings of the 4th NCA paint a stark picture of the climaterelated risks facing the United States and highlight the degree to which
domestic responses continue to lag. Bringing together the lack of
ambition at both the international and national levels, the report warns
that “neither global efforts to mitigate the causes of climate change nor
regional efforts to adapt to the impacts currently approach the scales
needed to avoid substantial damages to the U.S. economy, environment,
and human health and well-being over the coming decades.”58
While the contents of the report came as no surprise to those versed
in climate science, in the wake of the release of the 4th NCA, there was
great anticipation as to how President Trump would respond to a
federal report that seemed to be in direct tension with his Administration’s
rhetoric and legal strategies.59 As one account bluntly suggests,

(2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FH72-ECC5] [hereinafter 4TH NCA VOL. II].
55. 4TH NCA VOL. II, supra note 54, at 1. The report also highlights the economic
dimensions of climate change, noting that “[w]ith continued growth in emissions at
historic rates, annual losses in some economic sectors are projected to reach hundreds
of billions of dollars by the end of the century—more than the current gross domestic
product (GDP) of many U.S. states.” Id. at 26.
56. 4TH NCA VOL. I, supra note 54, at 14.
57. 4TH NCA VOL. II, supra note 54, at 25.
58. Id. at 34.
59. See, e.g., Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, Major Trump Administration Climate
Report Says Damage Is ‘Intensifying Across the Country’, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/11/23/major-trumpadministration-climate-report-says-damages-are-intensifying-across-country.
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[t]he report, which was mandated by Congress and made public by
the White House, is notable not only for the precision of its
calculations and bluntness of its conclusions, but also because its
findings are directly at odds with President Trump’s agenda of
environmental deregulation, which he asserts will spur economic
growth.60

President Trump’s response to the report was rapid and direct.
When asked by reporters about the findings of the report, he simply
stated: “I don’t believe it.”61 The Trump Administration’s stance on
climate change thus remains one of skepticism about the science of
climate change and near absolute opposition to domestic action or
international cooperation on climate change.
In light of the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations’ shifting
interpretations of climate science, climate change continues to be treated
as a politically malleable concept in domestic law. The dramatic swings in
federal climate change law between 2008 and 2019 illustrate this malleability.
II. THE OBAMA ERA: CONSTRUCTING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Over his two terms in office, President Obama drew upon his
executive authority and political influence to take what was essentially
an empty lot and construct a foundation for federal climate law. These
eight years represented a period of incremental legal construction.
The Obama Administration, alongside key federal agencies, supportive
subnational leaders, and a wide-ranging group of non-state actors
worked cooperatively to craft a growing body of judicial precedent,
federal regulations, executive initiatives, and public-private
partnerships to combat climate change.62 By the end of President
Obama’s second term in office, the United States possessed the
scaffolding necessary to build a more robust system of climate law.
Being largely driven and supported by executive level actions, however,
this scaffolding proved vulnerable to demolition efforts. Demolition is
what President Trump set out to do.

60. Coral Davenport & Kendra Pierre-Louis, U.S. Climate Report Warns of Damaged
Environment
and
Shrinking
Economy,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
23,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/23/climate/us-climate-report.html.
61. See Trump on Climate Change Report: ‘I Don’t Believe It’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46351940 [https://perma.cc/V6AH-CP25].
62. See generally THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OBAMA ON
CLIMATE & ENERGY: A HISTORIC COMMITMENT TO PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT AND
ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/sites/obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files/achievements/theRecord
_climate_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7VX-HAKL].
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During the first two years of President Trump’s presidency, the news
was replete with stories about efforts to roll back President Obama’s
climate initiatives.63 The dominant theme of the Trump Administration’s
approach to climate law appears to be to reverse the steps that had been
taken over the preceding eight years to develop a legal framework for
combatting climate change and instead, to prop up, sustain, and nourish
greenhouse gas intensive industries and activities.
This saga of construction and demolition reveals the continuing,
emphatic power of the state—and, in particular, the President—to
enable or to cripple large-scale change and the profound legal
uncertainty this has created in the context of U.S. climate change law.
The discussion that follows explores the overarching approach that
the Obama Administration employed in its efforts to address climate
change. This is followed by a discussion of what steps the Trump
Administration has taken to dismantle the spirit and structure of
these efforts. The intent of the following section is not to provide an
exhaustive list of all of the legal initiatives. Instead, it seeks to
highlight key initiatives and important trends and to explore the
implications of these changes for future efforts to craft a
comprehensive system of climate law that facilitates change at the
scale needed to protect “the U.S. economy, environment, and human
health and well-being over the coming decades.”64
A. Obama Era Initiatives
In contrast to the caricature of climate skepticism that President
Trump has come to represent, President Obama is commonly
portrayed as a champion of climate policy.65 During his presidential
63. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Unveils Its Plan to Relax Car
Pollution Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02
/climate/trump-auto-emissions-california.html (Obama-era fuel-efficiency standards
for cars); John Flesher, Trump Scraps Obama Policy on Protecting Oceans, Great Lakes,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 21, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/57d405229ba844
f59f9f2d06c65c4318 [https://perma.cc/J5MJ-WB6G] (Obama-era ocean protections);
Lisa Friedman and Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Rolls Back Clean Water Protection,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept, 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 09/12/climate/trumpadministration-rolls-back-clean-water-protections.html (Obama-era limits on polluting
chemicals near bodies of water); Emma Newburger, Critics Rail Against Trump’s Methane
Proposal as an ‘Unconscionable Assault on Environment, CNBC (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/29/trump-to-roll-back-methane-climate-changeregulations.html [https://perma.cc/7A9W-HLH3] (Obama-era limits on methane emissions).
64. 4TH NCA VOL. II, supra note 54, at 34.
65. See, e.g., John Abraham, Barack Obama Is the First Climate President, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-
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campaign, he advocated for efforts to combat climate change and
diversify the domestic energy system.66 Once elected, he expended
significant political capital to develop a multifaceted response to
climate change. In addition, he reasserted U.S. leadership on climate
change at the international level. Over the course of his two terms in
office, President Obama laid the foundations for an ambitious,
economy-wide strategy for addressing climate change and combatted
a paralyzed Congress by using executive and regulatory authority “to
take a remarkable variety of steps to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.”67 Despite important successes, “President Obama’s climate
legacy is more complex and the results more fragile than are often
depicted.”68 While President Obama tackled climate change
aggressively during his second term, his failure to successfully pursue
federal legislative action during his first term,69 coupled with his
extensive reliance on politically malleable executive and regulatory
measures, limit his legacy of leadership on climate change.70
Despite these limitations, President Obama is, without doubt, the
president who has done the most to develop a domestic response to
climate change. In the wake of political change, the pressing question
is: what was he able to achieve that has lasting impact, either through
enduring changes to the rule of law or through influencing societal
and political shifts that perpetuate climate efforts even during a
climate-skeptic Administration?71

per-cent/2016/nov/02/barack-obama-is-the-first-climate-president
[https://perma.cc/KTR8-YE3U] (noting that that United States had “transitioned
from the worst climate president ever (Bush) to the best (Obama)”).
66. See, e.g., Obama, supra note 46.
67. David Bookbinder, The Obama Climate Legacy, NISKANEN CTR. (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://niskanencenter.org/blog/greenwashing-obama-climate-legacy
[https://perma.cc/BQ7V-W3UV] (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Climate Change,
2009–2016, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 270 (2018)).
68. Cinnamon Carlarne, On Localism and the Persistent Power of the State, 112 AM. J.
INT’L L. UNBOUND 285, 287 (2018).
69. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 67, at 245–47 (suggesting legislative defeats and
comparative executive inaction during President Obama’s first term are largely
attributable to the ongoing economic crises); see also Yumehiko Hoshijima, Note,
Presidential Administration and the Durability of Climate-Consciousness, 127 YALE L.J. 170,
172–73 (2017) (highlighting several significant environmental policy failures during
President Obama’s first term).
70. See JONATHAN CHAIT, AUDACITY: HOW BARACK OBAMA DEFIED HIS CRITICS AND
CREATED A LEGACY THAT WILL PREVAIL 123 (2017).
71. See Hoshijima, supra note 69, at 174–75 (explaining the connection between the
unveiling of the Obama Administration’s Climate Action Plan and Congressional gridlock).
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B. The Vision
Much has been written about the various steps President Obama
took to address climate change and the ways in which he leveraged a
combination of legal and political strategies and executive power72 to
advance these efforts. While the brunt of media and scholarly attention
has focused on the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) efforts to
develop a regulatory regime for greenhouse gas emissions from new and
existing sources under the Clean Air Act (CAA),73 namely the Timing and
Tailoring Rules and the Clean Power Plan (CPP),74 these rules constitute
only pieces of a much larger, more ambitious policy effort.
Of particular import here is the comprehensive and far-reaching
approach that President Obama brought to bear in his efforts to
address climate change and the degree to which he sought to leverage
diverse actors and legal and extra-legal strategies to create a multifaceted climate change agenda.75 Many of these efforts escaped highlevel political scrutiny, being overshadowed, as they were, by the high
political drama surrounding the legal centerpiece of the agenda, i.e.,
the CPP.76 That the CPP is legally significant is uncontroversial. It
would have provided the cornerstone tool for ratcheting down
emissions from existing coal-fired power plants, the most singularly
significant and difficult to regulate source of greenhouse gas emissions
72. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of
Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. REG. 549, 580
(2018). Mashaw and Berke suggest that “[o]ur look at climate policy highlights both
the power and perils of presidentialism. Bold action is possible, but it may not be durable.”
Id. at 587. This is true in terms of the durability of “bold [legal] action,” but arguably less
true of the lasting effect of the sweeping use of executive power in elevating the floor of the
debate and mobilizing sub-federal and non-state actors even when the bold legal action
that formed the centerpiece of a President’s strategy has been dismantled.
73. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
74. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (establishing final emission guidelines for states for fossilfuel fired power plants).
75. See generally Gabriel Pacyniak, Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism: What the
Clean Power Plan Has Already Achieved, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 301 (2017) (examining
state-based policy engagement with federal greenhouse gas rulemaking in a
cooperative federalism context and exploring the benefits of dynamic, iterative
federalism processes even where the final rule is rejected).
76. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Obama’s Climate Plan May Hinge on a Clerical Error in
a 1990 Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2016, at A17 (explaining that the focus was on the
CPP because it played a key role in the negotiation of the Paris Agreement but was
simultaneously subject to judicial challenge).
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in the United States.77 Equally, the CPP emerged from and stretched
the outer edges of administrative authority under the CAA, a statute
already the subject of great contention not only with respect to its
applicability to climate change but also with respect to fundamental
questions of administrative and constitutional law.78 Hence, the
attention paid to the birth and eventual demise of the CPP is
warranted. It also, however, masks the variegated landscape of climate
policy that the Obama Administration helped nurture and which,
ultimately, evidences early efforts to cultivate the type of layered and
integrated governance regime necessary to tackle the massive
challenge that climate change poses.79
In his first week in office, President Obama followed up on campaign
promises to take action on climate change. On January 26, 2009—six
days after his inauguration—President Obama issued two presidential
memoranda intended to initiate a new era of executive leadership on
climate change.80 Drawing on federal legal authority to regulate
77. See Frequently Asked Questions: What Are U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide
Emissions by Source and Sector?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 15, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=75&t=11 [https://perma.cc/2KGC-SZ8F]
(finding, in relevant part, that with respect to domestic carbon dioxide emissions,
“[t]he electric power sector is the largest source, accounting for 40 percent of all
energy-related CO2 emissions. The electric power sector consists of those entities
whose primary business is the production of electricity”); see also Bruce R. Huber,
Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 93, n.8 (2011)
(describing the grandfathering of coal-fired power plants under the 1977 CAA
Amendments as one of the most “egregious missteps” in environmental law, largely
because it allowed these old facilities to continue operating subject to much more
lenient environmental standards than new power plants would be subject to).
78. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 13, 20–43 (2014) (explaining “how federal agencies coping with new regulatory
challenges often encounter problems of ‘fit’ with older statutes, which require them
to make delicate legal and political judgments in the face of congressional silence,”
including in the context of the CAA and climate change); Jody Freeman & Adrian
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52
(exploring the implications of the case with respect to “increasing worries about the
politicization of administrative expertise”). See generally David M. Driesen et al., Half a
Century of Supreme Court Clean Air Act Interpretation: Purposivism, Textualism, Dynamism,
and Activism, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1786–87 (2018) (offering a comprehensive
review of CAA Supreme Court jurisprudence in the wake of Justice Scalia’s death).
79. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 72–78 (contextualizing climate change as
a “massive problem” and exploring the legal challenges this poses).
80. See State of California Request for Waiver Under 42 U.S.C. 7543(b), the Clean
Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,905, 4,905 (Jan. 28, 2009); The Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,907, 4,907 (Jan. 28, 2009); see also
Regulation Database—Executive Orders, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
L., https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/regulation-database-executive-orders

2019]

U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LAW

407

greenhouse gases pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA,81 these memoranda, in turn, directed the EPA to
reconsider a March 2008 decision that denied California a CAA
preemption waiver that would have allowed it to set greenhouse gas
(GHG) emission standards for motor vehicles82 and directed the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to develop increased
fuel economy standards for automobiles.83 Together with the
subsequently announced National Fuel Efficiency Policy,84 these
memoranda created a platform for what would become historically
ambitious and substantively effective efforts to ratchet down GHG
emissions—and conventional pollutants—from new automobiles. The
transportation sector is the second largest source of domestic carbon
emissions behind the energy sector, so this was an ambitious first move.85
Building on this momentum, many climate activists hoped to see a
decisive shift in national climate policy during President Obama’s first
term. As the President and Congress grappled with the pervasive
impacts of the economic crisis, however, this decisive shift seemed
more and more evasive. Following a failed push for congressional action
on climate change and the resulting “demise of federal legislation as a
realistic option for addressing climate change,”86 President Obama’s first
term slipped by without the hoped-for sea change.
If President Obama’s first term was characterized by promising but
ultimately abortive legislative initiatives and fledgling efforts to develop
a political strategy on climate change, his second term was
characterized by a full-fledged re-direction of executive energy towards
creating a robust national climate agenda. On a sweltering day in June

[https://perma.cc/C47M-P8AH] (listing Presidential Executive Orders related to
climate change).
81. 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also infra text accompanying note 198.
82. State of California Request for Waiver Under 42 U.S.C. 7543(b), the Clean Air
Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4,905. The EPA subsequently granted the waiver request on June
30, 2009.
83. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4,907.
84. See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Fuel Efficiency Standards, in 1 PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 672, 673–74 (2009) (announcing a
new policy that increases gas mileage and decreases emissions, that was developed by
a partnership of two agencies, ten companies, and fourteen states).
85. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE
UNITED STATES 2009 2 (2011), https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/
ghg_report/pdf/0573%282009%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8WS-D6FR] (comparing
greenhouse gas emissions from the electric power; transportation; and commercial,
residential, and industry sectors).
86. DANIEL A. FARBER & CINNAMON P. CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 151 (2018).
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2013, speaking before an audience at Georgetown University,
President Obama symbolically took off his jacket, rolled up his shirt
sleeves and unveiled his Climate Action Plan (“the Plan”).87
C. The Climate Action Plan
President Obama’s Climate Action Plan laid out a sweeping executive
strategy based on three core pillars: (1) cut domestic carbon pollution;
(2) prepare the United States for the impacts of climate change; and
(3) lead international efforts to address global climate change.88 The
agenda mirrored the international climate change regime with its joint
focus on mitigation and adaptation,89 its emphasis on the importance
of drawing on hard and soft law, and its efforts to leverage the public
and private sector to address climate change. In key part, President
Obama’s climate agenda envisioned developing a domestic climate
system with a core legal backbone centered on mitigating greenhouse
gas emissions from the energy and transport sectors, but then
surrounding and supporting that legal backbone with an extensive set of
executive-mandated and executive-facilitated initiatives to reconfigure
everything from federal energy efficiency standards, to international
energy investment, to agricultural emissions.90
87. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateacti
onplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RP7-W2PL] [hereinafter CLIMATE ACTION PLAN]; see also
Press Release, The White House: President Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s
Climate Action Plan (June 25, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/25/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-climate-action-plan
[https://perma.cc/92K7-B8SW]. For a narrative of President Obama’s announcement of the
plan, see President Obama Announces Climate Action Plan, ENV’T & ENERGY STUDY INST. (June 26,
2013), https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/president-obama-announces-climate-action-plan
[https://perma.cc/MJY7-PPQM]. For an early analysis of the plan, see Jennifer Morgan &
Kevin Kennedy, First Take: Looking at President Obama’s Climate Plan, WORLD RES. INST.
(June 25, 2013), https://www.wri.org/blog/2013/06/first-take-looking-presidentobama-s-climate-action-plan [https://perma.cc/XV56-UFNM].
88. Id. at 5.
89. See Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Rethinking a Failing Framework: Adaptation and
Institutional Rebirth for the Global Climate Change Regime, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
21–22, 32 (2012) (discussing the evolution of UNFCCC negotiations and the increased
focus on adaptation over time, as mitigation efforts languished and patterns of climate
change advanced and citing the Cancun Agreement’s determination that
“[a]daptation must be addressed with the same priority as mitigation and requires
appropriate institutional arrangements to enhance adaptation action and support,”
Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention Part
I(2)(b), FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2010)).
90. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 6, 8, 11, 14–15, 20–21.
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Viewing the agenda from the vantage point of history, and through
the lens of the Trump Administration, three aspects of President
Obama’s agenda stand out.
First, the climate agenda was serious, far-reaching, and ambitious,
but it was also smart and focused on incremental change. It neither
attempted to dramatically reconfigure the US energy and transport
sectors in one fell swoop, nor to position efforts to address climate
change in such a way as to put a brake on economic activity or threaten
core American values. It did, however, attempt to elevate climate
change as an economic and social priority and to infuse climate
considerations across all aspects of political decision-making.
Second, virtually all the legal components and executive initiatives that
provided the core of the climate agenda were susceptible to political rollback. This was an inevitable and fully understood element of attempting
to develop and implement an executive-led climate strategy during a
second presidential term with a largely unsupportive Congress.
Third, the climate agenda vividly demonstrates the degree to which
the Obama Administration understood the evolving role of federal
leadership on climate change. President Obama understood the
urgency and importance of national leadership. He recognized the
power of the state to facilitate extensive, enduring change by providing
vision, legal structure, high-level coordination, financial investment,
and general economies of scale. He also, however, recognized the
evolving role of subnational and non-state actors in shaping climate
law, policy, and consciousness.91 The agenda was designed to harness
the existing energy, initiatives, and infrastructure that subnational and
non-state actors had been steadily building for almost two decades.92
91. See Hoshijima, supra note 69, at 174–76. Hoshijima offers a helpful discussion
of the way in which President Obama’s climate agenda sought to develop and embed
climate consciousness at the federal level. Hoshijima suggests, in key part, that there
was a fourth pillar to President Obama’s climate agenda that included
a set of policies that advanced climate-consciousness in the executive
branch . . . the Obama Administration championed climate-consciousness
with tools that were deeply reliant on sound scientific, technical, and
economic information. In other words, the Obama Administration sought to
accomplish its objectives in a manner that enhanced bureaucratic rationality.
This focus on reasoned administration responded to a judicial demand for
scientifically rigorous government responses to climate change, while
sidestepping congressional hostility to climate change action by finding a
narrow zone of relative congressional inattention.
Id.
92. See generally Carlarne, supra note 7, at 1353–54 (examining state and local lawand policy-making efforts as well as civil society’s strategies for influencing climate
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The Obama Administration understood that both the short-term
success and long-term durability of the agenda would inevitably turn
on its ability to tap into and advance the increasingly widespread,
coordinated, and ambitious climate efforts of subnational and nonstate actors. Even as President Obama boldly erected the scaffolding
for U.S. climate policy seemingly from the ground up, he was drawing
upon the blueprints, expertise, and enthusiasm from subnational and
non-state actors to create a framework that could persist across the
waxes and wanes of presidential leadership.
In 2013, even as President Obama girded for extreme political and
legal backlash against his agenda, no one was anticipating the wrecking
ball that would swing directly at its core in 2017. But before proceeding
to examine the legacy of President Obama’s agenda in light of
President Trump’s subsequent demolition efforts, it is useful to briefly
examine each pillar of the Climate Action Plan in turn.
Providing the foundation for the Climate Action Plan, in 2009,
President Obama pledged that, by 2020, the United States would
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions in the range of 17% below 2005
levels.93 Subsequently, in 2014, in the run-up to negotiations for the Paris
Agreement, President Obama announced a new, more ambitious target
to cut greenhouse gas emissions 26% to 28% below 2005 levels by 2025.94
These commitments form the backdrop for the first pillar of the
Climate Action Plan, which laid out the President’s mitigation strategy.
The first pillar emphasized federal leadership both through pursuing
voluntary clean energy and energy efficiency initiatives and through
adopting binding legal measures.95 The centerpiece of President
Obama’s mitigation strategy focused on bolstering the evolving
regulatory regime for automobile emissions with a commitment to
establish national carbon pollution standards for power plants under
the CAA. To this end, on the same day that President Obama rolled
out his Climate Action Plan, he issued a Presidential Memorandum

policy); Murthy, supra note 31, at 17–19 (discussing the role of subnational actors as
norm sustainers during periods in which the state abdicates a leadership role).
93. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 4.
94. Press Release, The White House: President Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: U.S.China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation (Nov.
12, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/factsheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c
[https://perma.cc/969N-T5CT].
95. These include, for example, pursuing greater energy efficiency and increasing
the amount of electricity coming from renewable sources within the federal
government. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 6.
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directing the EPA “to issue standards, regulations, or guidelines, as
appropriate, that address carbon pollution from modified,
reconstructed, and existing power plants and build on State efforts to
move toward a cleaner power sector.”96 This Memorandum led to the
release, on August 3, 2015, of the CPP.97 The CPP was designed to cut
carbon emissions from power plants by 32% below 2005 levels by 2030. By
targeting power plant emissions that constitute the “the largest
concentrated source of emissions in the United States, together accounting
for roughly one-third of all domestic greenhouse gas emissions,”98 the CPP
provided the cornerstone for national efforts to begin ratcheting down
emissions and a critical tool towards allowing President Obama to achieve
domestic and international emissions reductions targets.99
Although the CPP and the automobile emissions standards provided
the legal backbone for carbon pollution reduction efforts, the Climate
Action Plan laid out a series of supporting executive-led strategies.100
The mitigation agenda reflected an effort to create a multi-sector,
multi-level governance strategy that drew upon the collective abilities
of the federal, state, and non-state sectors to advance public and
private regulatory and market-based strategies for reducing emissions
and sparking innovation.
In sum, the Climate Action Plan centered around developing an
ambitious legal mitigation core, consisting of the CPP and the fuel

96. Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,535, 39,535–36 (July
1, 2013) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,783, 3 C.F.R. 314 (2017)).
97. EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN CUTTING CARBON POLLUTION FROM
POWER PLANTS 2 (2015), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/201508/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSN2-FXL7].
98. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 6.
99. As a Party to the Paris Agreement, the United States had committed “to achieve
an economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26%–28% below
its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%.” U.S.A.
First NDC Submission, NDC REGISTRY (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.unfccc.int
/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of%20America%20Fi
rst/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2VS-9K6G].
100. See, e.g., CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 7–11. These included
everything from accelerating the permitting process for renewable energy facilities, to
increasing the federal budget and loan guarantee program for clean energy and
advanced fossil energy projects, to advancing partnerships between the private and
public sectors to deploy cleaner fuels and supporting state and city efforts to improve
transportation options, to cutting energy waste through new adopting new efficiency
standards for appliances and reduced barriers to investment in energy efficiency, to
tackling emissions from other greenhouse gases such as HFCs and methane, to
advancing efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation and
enhance carbon uptake through forestry management efforts. Id.
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economy standards, but then surrounding these regulatory pillars with
a suite of supportive measures. Recognizing the political vulnerability
of regulatory measures and the pressing reality that, even should these
regulatory initiatives persist, successfully tackling greenhouse gas
emissions in the long-term requires economy-wide transitions in how
we live, move, and above all, consume energy, President Obama used
the Climate Action Plan to sketch out a multi-layered strategy for
addressing climate change.
The second pillar of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, facilely
titled, “Prepare the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change,”
contained the adaptation and resiliency objectives of his climate
agenda.101 In contrast to the rule-oriented and executive driven
mitigation strategy, the adaptation strategy was less directive and more
facilitative of ongoing subnational efforts, while still recognizing the
important role of the federal government. President Obama framed
the federal government’s role as follows:
The federal government has an important role to play in supporting
community-based preparedness and resilience efforts, establishing
policies that promote preparedness, protecting critical infrastructure
and public resources, supporting science and research germane to
preparedness and resilience, and ensuring that federal operations and
facilities continue to protect and serve citizens in a changing climate.102

In common with evolving adaptation and resiliency strategies
worldwide, President Obama’s approach recognized that while there
may be no “optimal”103 adaptation strategy, the best level for adaptation
actions will often be at the local or regional levels.104 In contrast to
mitigation policy, where the focus is often on overcoming collective
action challenges and maximizing economies of scale in order to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions through sweeping top-down
decision-making, in the adaptation and resiliency planning context,
the challenges are more varied and location specific. Adaptation
101. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 5, 12.
102. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 12.
103. Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 39 (World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/480171468315567893/pdf/WPS5095.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72FK-4BJV]. Ostrom suggests that as a result of the complexity of the
challenges associated with responding to climate change, there are no “optimal” solutions.
Id. Within this context, a polycentric approach offers a variety of advantages in “that it
encourages experimental efforts at multiple levels, as well as the development of methods
for assessing the benefits and costs of particular strategies adopted in one type of ecosystem
and comparing these with results obtained in other ecosystems.” Id.
104. Id.
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planning, thus, requires greater nuance and specificity with respect to
the multitude of challenges to which climate change gives rise. This, in
turn, necessitates greater decentralization of decision-making authority
and, often, more bottom-up policymaking processes. As Adger, Arnell,
& Tompkins emphasize, “[a]dapting to climate change involves
cascading decisions across a landscape made up of agents from
individuals, firms and civil society, to public bodies and governments
at local, regional and national scales, and international agencies.”105
Governance in the adaptation context is therefore frequently
decentralized, multi-layered, and messy. Further, this is an area of law
and policymaking that is still young and evolving. There is a
tremendous amount of experimentation and an increasing amount of
cooperation and transnational learning taking place. There is,
however, still a dearth of knowledge about the range of governance
approaches being employed, the strengths of different strategies, and
the ability to translate and repeat successful strategies in diverse
geographical contexts. This is still an area ripe for development, legal
analysis, and iterative learning. President Obama’s plan reflected the
fragmentary and emergent nature of this field.
President Obama’s plan did not propose developing federal rules or a
comprehensive national adaptation strategy. Instead, the Plan envisioned
taking a variety of steps to maximize the role the federal government plays
in accelerating research, planning, and experimentation.
During his first term, President Obama laid the groundwork for his
plan by taking steps to create a federal presence in the adaptation and
resiliency planning space. Shortly after coming into office, he
established the first ever Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task
Force. Subsequently, in October 2009, President Obama signed an
Executive Order directing the task force to “recommend ways federal
policies and programs can better prepare the Nation for change.”106
This was followed by the first ever National Climate Adaptation
Summit, which brought together key stakeholders to identify pressing
challenges and opportunities.107
Building on these initial steps, in February 2013, just months before
the release of the Climate Action Plan, federal agencies began
105. W. Neil Adger, Nigel W. Arnell & Emma L. Tompkins, Successful Adaptation to
Climate Change Across Scales, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 77, 79 (2005).
106. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 12.
107. See, e.g., NAT’L CLIMATE ADAPTATION SUMMIT COMM., NATIONAL CLIMATE
ADAPTATION SUMMIT REPORT 4–5 (Sept. 29, 2010), http://vintage.joss.ucar.edu/
events/2010/ncas/ncas_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE55-4UEC] (including the
private sector, civil society organizations, and government decisionmakers as stakeholders).
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releasing their first ever Climate Change Adaptation Plans in which
they commenced the process of “outlining strategies to protect their
operations, missions, and programs from the effects of climate change.”108
Despite the tentative nature of these plans,109 the mainstreaming of
adaptation into federal agency planning harks back to the early days of
environmental law, when the first step towards more substantive
environmentally minded decision-making was the integration of
environmental considerations into federal decision-making processes.110
Drawing from this momentum, the Climate Action Plan proposed
strengthening federal support for adaptation in three core areas: (1)
“Building Stronger and Safer Communities and Infrastructure”;111 (2)
“Protecting our Economy & Natural Resources”;112 and (3) “Using
Sound Science to Manage Climate Impacts.”113 In each of these areas,
President Obama sought to harness federal powers and resources to
advance research, planning, investment, and cooperation.
Following the release of the Climate Action Plan, President Obama
took a number of steps to advance his agenda, including issuing an
executive order on climate preparedness.114 Stressing the need to
“improve the Nation’s preparedness and resilience,” the President
directed agencies to report on planned changes to their policies and
rules necessary to advance climate preparedness; he also established
both a federal Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience
consisting of key senior agency officials and a new Task Force on
Climate Preparedness and Resilience consisting of governors, mayors,
county officials, and Tribal leaders.115
From here, President Obama issued a number of complementary
executive orders and presidential memoranda addressing federal goals

108. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 12.
109. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43915, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PLANS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2015),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20150223_R43915_9b9a4bd5f4f793f04fe0e6fd
4cbac857e8187970.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT7Q-2ERF].
110. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Introduction, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 797, 804 n.28 (1986)
(recognizing the influence of NEPA’s “soft law” elements).
111. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 12–14.
112. Id. at 14–15.
113. Id. at 16.
114. See Exec. Order No. 13,653, 3 C.F.R. 330, 330 (2013) (modernizing federal
programs to support climate resilient investment and planning, managing federal
lands for climate change preparedness, and establishing a council on climate
preparedness and resilience) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,783, 3 C.F.R. 314
(2017)).
115. Id. at 330–36.
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and obligations with respect to a sweeping range of adaptation and
resilience-related topics including: advancing climate-resilient
international development;116 minimizing flood risks;117 minimizing
wildfire risks;118 improving drought resilience;119 understanding and
minimizing climate risks to the Arctic;120 and ensuring climate-related
risks are integrated into national security planning.121
President Obama’s agenda focused on leveraging federal resources
to facilitate adaptation and resiliency efforts in discrete sectors (e.g.,
water, fire, disaster, flooding, agriculture) in ways that built on existing
subnational momentum and advanced public-private partnerships.
Consequently, while the conspicuous federal research and funding
efforts under the second pillar provided easy targets for political rollback,122 many of the initiatives proposed in the Climate Action Plan
have proven less susceptible to sweeping political overhaul, with a
number of adaptation and resiliency-focused executive orders (thus
far) remaining on the books.123
The third and final pillar of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan
focused on reasserting U.S. leadership in the international arena.124
Under President Obama’s predecessor, President George W. Bush, the
116. Exec. Order No. 13,677, 3 C.F.R. 299, 299–300 (2014).
117. Exec. Order No. 13,690, 3 C.F.R. 268, 268 (2015) (revoked by Exec. Order No.
13,807, 3 C.F.R. 369 (2017)).
118. Exec. Order No. 13,728, 3 C.F.R. 460, 460 (2016).
119. Memorandum on Building National Capabilities for Long-Term Drought
Resilience, 81 Fed. Reg. 16,053, 16,053 (Mar. 25, 2016).
120. Exec. Order No. 13,689, 3 C.F.R. 264, 265 (2015).
121. Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1 (Sept. 21, 2016) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,783, 3 C.F.R. 314 (2017)).
122. For example, President Trump has revoked President Obama’s executive
orders related to climate preparedness and flood management. See Exec. Order No.
13,807, 3 C.F.R. at 376 (revoking Exec. Order No. 13,690 (Flood Risk Management));
Exec. Order No. 13,783, 3 C.F.R. at 316 (revoking Exec. Order No. 13,653, 3 C.F.R.
330 (2013) (Climate Change Preparedness), Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon
Pollution Standards, and Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security).
123. Benjamin Hulac, Key Obama Climate Orders Still on the Books, E&E NEWS (May 2,
2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060080615 [https://perma.cc/FQB7-KVC8].
124. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 5, 17, 21; see also Press Release, The
White House: President Barack Obama, U.S. Leadership and the Historic Paris
Agreement to Combat Climate Change (Dec. 12, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/12/us-leadership-and-historic-parisagreement-combat-climate-change [https://perma.cc/RC9U-DT9N] (discussing the
ambitious nature of the Paris Agreement’s commitment, including efforts to involve
private, subnational, and individual actors; to increase financing options for mitigation
and adaptation development programs; and to establish transparent reporting
processes for each country).
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United States did not merely abdicate leadership in international
negotiations, it actively opposed the Kyoto Protocol, leading to
significant delays in the Protocol entering into force.125 Following
multiple years of stalled negotiations and the United States dragging
its feet, in 2009, President Obama reasserted U.S. leadership in
international climate negotiations.
Seeking to advance his international leadership role, President
Obama used his Climate Action Plan to lay out a pathway towards
advancing multilateral and bilateral engagement on climate change.
In key part, the President highlighted the progress he had already
made toward building working relationships with key emerging
economies, including China, India, and Brazil,126 as well as multilateral
initiatives he has championed to reduce short-lived climate pollutants,
to address emissions from deforestation, and to promote the expansion
of clean energy worldwide.127 The Plan then stressed the importance of
liberalizing trade in environmental goods, increasing public sector
financing for clean energy, and strengthening global resilience to climate
change. Here, again, the Plan emphasized the Obama Administration’s
track record in advancing these goals, highlighting the billions of dollars
that the Administration had already mobilized for clean energy
investments and climate preparedness worldwide.128
The Plan then briefly chronicled the successes the Obama
Administration had achieved with respect to international negotiations,
asserting that “[t]he United States has made historic progress in the
international climate negotiations during the past four years.”129
Building on this narrative, the Administration laid out its vision for
what would ultimately become the Paris Agreement, stating that the
Agreement must be “ambitious, inclusive and flexible.”130
Across the three pillars of his Climate Action Plan—mitigation,
adaptation, and international leadership—President Obama was
drawing on a relatively clean slate. As detailed elsewhere,131 his
125. U.S. Rejection of Kyoto Protocol Process, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 647, 647–48 (Sean D.
Murphy ed., 2001).
126. These include bilateral partnerships such as the U.S.-China Clean Energy
Research Center, the U.S.-India Partnership to Advance Clean Energy, and the
Strategic Energy Dialogue with Brazil. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 87, at 17.
127. Id. at 18.
128. Id. at 20. The President also called for an end to U.S. support for public
financing of most new coal plants overseas.
129. Id. at 21.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 7, at 1360–63 (exploring President George W.
Bush’s climate policy as non-committal and based on deceptive metrics).
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predecessor, President George W. Bush, had done very little to
construct either a legal regime or a substantive policy approach to
addressing climate change. Consequently, as in the mitigation and
adaptation contexts, where President Obama sought to use legal (e.g.,
the CPP) and executive (e.g., the Task Force on Climate Preparedness
and Resilience) initiatives to lay the foundation for a multi-layered
approach to climate change, here, as well, he attempted to create a
comprehensive platform for action.
In the international context, however, President Obama not only
had to chart a course of action, he also had to overcome a legacy of
U.S. political opposition to climate negotiations. The obstructionist
attitude of the Bush Administration created a legacy of frustration and
ill-will that empowered other powerful polluting states, especially
China132 in such a way as to make it more difficult for President Obama
to reassert U.S. influence in climate negotiations. Congressional
opposition at home further complicated his international leadership
objectives.133 Despite these challenges, President Obama was able to
reassert U.S. leadership on climate change at the international level in a
way that enabled more fruitful bilateral and international negotiations that
ultimately proved instrumental to the adoption of the Paris Agreement.134

132. See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 89, at 10. Carlarne explains that:
The re-engagement of the United States was met with the emergence of China
and, to a lesser degree, India as dominant players in establishing the
parameters of climate governance. In the end, the Conference was neither
defined by the negotiating texts that diplomats had spent the past two years
refining, nor by the long heralded re-engagement of the United States in
global negotiations but by the new political paradigm that emerged.
The Copenhagen Conference revealed the degree to which power—
whether political, symbolic, or merely procedural—was dispersed among the
state participants. The Conference also demonstrated that there was no longer
one clear hegemonic power that could shape negotiations. Rather, states
grappled to hold the title of the hegemonic power.
Id. (footnote omitted).
133. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Votes in Congress Move to Undercut Climate Pledge,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2015, at A17.
134. Although President Obama actively engaged in international climate
negotiations beginning with the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, the firmness of his
rhetoric and the authoritativeness of his leadership on climate change increased
notably during his second term. As just one example of this, when addressing the UN
Climate Summit in September of 2014, he characterized climate change as the “one
issue that will define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other,
and that is the urgent and growing threat of a changing climate,” and declared:
[T]here should be no question that the United States of America is stepping
up to the plate. We recognize our role in creating this problem; we embrace
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Key to President Obama’s success in the international context was
his ability to wield his executive authority to engage China on climate
change and to negotiate an international agreement that the United
States could become party to without requiring legislative approval.135
As the two leading greenhouse gas emitters and two of the most
powerful states in global politics, U.S.-Chinese participation on climate
change was critical. Following President Xi Jinping’s assumption of
power in 2012, President Obama sought to improve U.S. relations with
China. In June 2013, President Obama and President Xi Jinping met
to discuss a range of shared concerns, including climate change.136
Subsequently, in 2014, President Obama and President Xi Jinping
jointly declared that the two countries “have a critical role to play in
combating global climate change, one of the greatest threats facing
humanity.”137 Accordingly, they reaffirmed their commitment to
bilateral cooperation and announced the relative post-2020 actions
they would commit to taking under the soon-to-be negotiated Paris
Agreement.138 This unprecedented level of cooperation gave a boost to

our responsibility to combat it. We will do our part, and we will help
developing nations do theirs. But we can only succeed in combating climate
change if we are joined in this effort by every nation—developed and
developing alike. Nobody gets a pass.
Remarks by the President at U.N. Climate Change Summit, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARRACK
OBAMA (Sept. 23, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-offic
e/2014/09/23/remarks-president-un-climate-change-summit
[https://perma.cc/SU3E-GP3C].
135. See DANIEL BODANSKY, IN BRIEF: LEGAL OPTIONS FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF A NEW
CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT 2–3, 5 (2015), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/
uploads/2015/05/in-brief-legal-options-us-acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PMH3-NWRB] (explaining the three constitutionally allowed pathways
for the president to ratify a treaty without the advice and consent of the senate: congressionalexecutive agreements, treaty-executive agreements, and presidential-executive agreements).
136. See Remarks Following a Meeting with President Xi Jinping of China and an
Exchange with Reporters in Rancho Mirage, California, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.
5 (June 7, 2013).
137. Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean
Energy Cooperation, supra note 94.
138. These commitments were as follows:
The United States intends to achieve an economy-wide target of reducing its
emissions by 26%–28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to
reduce its emissions by 28%. China intends to achieve the peaking of CO2
emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak early and intends to
increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to
around 20% by 2030. Both sides intend to continue to work to increase
ambition over time.
Id.
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international climate negotiations, with then UNFCCC Executive
Secretary, Christiana Figueres, declaring that:
[The] joint announcement provides both practical and political
momentum towards a new, universal climate agreement in Paris in
late 2015 that is meaningful, forward-looking and recognizes that
combating climate change is not a five or ten year plan—but is a long
term commitment to keep a global temperature rise under [two]
degrees throughout this century.139

President Obama achieved similar success in ensuring that the
contours of the subsequently negotiated Paris Agreement, and the
United States’ obligations thereunder, would allow President Obama
to accept the agreement on behalf of the United States without seeking
legislative approval.140 As a result, on September 3, 2016, the United
States formally accepted the Paris Agreement.141 Symbolically, the
United States and China submitted their respective instruments to join
the Paris Agreement on the same day, marking a defining moment in
international climate change law.142
Despite historic advances in international cooperation and
ambitious work to structure robust domestic legal and political
foundations for addressing climate change, President Obama’s climate
legacy is both flawed and fragile.143 At the end of his second term, the
future of his key legal initiative—the CPP—was tenuous at best given

139. Press Release, UNFCCC, US, China Climate Moves Boost Paris Prospects (Nov.
12, 2014), https://unfccc.int/news/us-china-climate-moves-boost-paris-prospects
[https://perma.cc/2VD8-S3JL].
140. For a discussion of different forms of executive agreements, see Daniel
Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 916–19
(2016) (explaining how the President can accept procedural aspects of international
agreements under the foreign affairs power to communicate with other nations under
the following three conditions: (1) “the core obligations . . . are procedural in nature”:
(2) the decision to join the agreement “finds significant support in the Senate’s prior
approval” in a prior agreement that “largely elaborates obligations contained in [the
prior agreement]”: and the agreement “is consistent with and can be implemented on
the basis of existing legal and regulatory authorities”).
141. Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters the Paris
Agreement, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Sept. 3, 2016, 10:41 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-unitedstates-formally-enters-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/GQ7E-VTAN].
142. Id.
143. For an informative overview and timeline of the progress the Obama
Administration made towards implementing the Climate Action Plan, see Fact Sheet:
Timeline of Progress Made in President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, ENV’T & ENERGY STUDY
INST. (Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-timeline-progressof-president-obama-climate-action-plan [https://perma.cc/MB72-MM35].
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that the Supreme Court had stayed implementation of the rule.144
Moreover, the Presidents’ efforts to facilitate a coordinated approach
to improving national adaptation and resiliency efforts remained
fragmented and in their infancy, and the ability of the Paris Agreement
to mobilize the level of commitments needed to limit dangerous
anthropogenic climate change hung in the balance.145 The success of
these initiatives depended on continuing efforts to strengthen the
foundations that the Obama Administration had laid. Instead, the 2016
election brought these legal construction efforts to a dramatic halt. By late
2016, the question was no longer how to advance existing initiatives, but
whether and how they could survive the impending swing of the wrecking
ball that President Trump had already threatened.
III. THE TRUMP ERA: INTERNATIONAL OBSTRUCTION AND DOMESTIC
DEREGULATION
President Obama was able to help bring about a relatively rapid set
of changes to climate change law and policy at the international and
domestic levels. He drew upon the full strength of his executive
authority to achieve a degree of change that could only be achieved
through the vehicle of the state. State power, of course, can be wielded
to constructive or destructive ends. With the transition from President
Obama to President Trump, we have witnessed President Trump wield
the power of the state to dismantle domestic rules, derail international
cooperation, deepen political polarization, and undermine sciencebased decision-making.
“They’re taking them down, one by one.”146 Thus did Janet McCabe,
the EPA’s top climate and clean-air regulator during the Obama
Administration, aptly sum up the Trump Administrations’ approach to
the suite of climate-related rules adopted during the Obama-era.
As discussed, President Trump ran on a platform of Tweet-based
mockery of climate science, flippant opposition to domestic and
international climate action, and resolute commitment to propping up

144. Even before President Trump declared his intent to revoke the CPP rule, the
Supreme Court had stayed implementation of the rule pending judicial challenge. See
Courtney Sobie, Supreme Court Stays EPA Clean Power Plan, A.B.A. (Feb. 27, 2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/environmentalenergy/practice/2016/021716-energy-supreme-court-stays-epas-clean-power-plan
[https://perma.cc/Z9FL-QKVP].
145. See, e.g., Paris Agreement, supra note 23, at 2 (summarizing the mitigation gap).
146. Coral Davenport, White House Set to Weaken Rules Curbing Methane Use, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2018, at A1.

2019]

U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LAW

421

domestic sources of fossil fuel energy.147 Accordingly, it came as no
surprise when President-elect Trump populated his energy transition
team with climate skeptics and energy lobbyists.148 Moreover, President
Trump organized his transition agenda around an “America First”
policy premised, in the case of energy and the environment, on
achieving energy independence; relieving burdens on the domestic
fossil fuel industry; and unraveling many Obama-era regulations such
as his “stupid” climate rule for power plants.149 President Trump’s
energy and environment plan sought to prioritize a suite of policies,
including: withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement;
increasing domestic production of natural resources; reviving the coal
industry; expediting environmental reviews of energy-related projects;
accelerating large energy infrastructure projects, such as the Keystone
XL Pipeline; reviewing subsidies for renewable sources of energy;
repealing the CPP; and relaxing fuel economy standards.150
Once President Trump assumed office, he immediately began the
promised process of deregulation by rolling back Obama-era rules
across the board. By 2018, the Administration boasted that “[s]ince
January 2017, a total of 2253 regulatory actions have been delayed or
withdrawn,”151 including the CPP, and highlighted priority areas for
further regulatory roll-back, including initiatives to freeze CAFE
standards and tailpipe carbon dioxide emission standards for
passenger vehicles and light trucks.152
147. See supra notes 50–52.
148. See, e.g., Robin Bravender, Trump’s Energy Team Overhauled, E&E NEWS (Nov. 21,
2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060046098 [https://perma.cc/7782-ZN6F]
(explaining that many lobbyists are stepping down and being replaced with former
lobbyists and climate change skeptics); Steven Mufson, Trump’s Energy Policy Team
Includes Climate Change Skeptic, Free-Market Advocate, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trumps-energy-policy-teamincludes-climate-change-skeptic-free-market-advocate/2016/11/29/86e52004-b5a411e6-b8df-600bd9d38a02_story.html (stating that President-elect Trump met with
former lobbyists and climate change skeptics for transition advice).
149. Timothy Cama & Devin Henry, Trump Outlines ‘America First’ Energy Plan, HILL
(May 26, 2016), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/281430-trumpoutlines-america-first-energy-plan [https://perma.cc/V5VW-Y6EA].
150. Id.
151. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE 2018 REGULATORY REFORM REPORT: CUTTING
THE RED TAPE, UNLEASHING ECONOMIC FREEDOM, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/2018-Unified-Agenda-Cutting-the-Red-Tape.pdf
[
https://perma.cc/2N7K-TQXN].
152. Id. (identifying additional further roll-backs to include freezing CAFE standards
and tailpipe carbon dioxide emission standards for passenger vehicles and light trucks); see
also Nadja Popovic et al., 85 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES
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In common with President Obama’s ambitious construction of
climate change laws and policies following the policymaking drought
during the Bush-era, the litany of changes that President Trump has
made to deconstruct Obama-era climate laws and policies are too many
to review. Here, this Article examines key steps the Trump
Administration has taken to alter the United States’ approach to
climate change. The primary objective here, as throughout this Article,
is to develop an understanding of how President Trump’s approach to
climate change shapes larger domestic efforts to develop an effective
system of climate law moving forward, particularly as we look ahead to
the presidential election of 2020.
A. The Domestic Death of the “Draconian” Paris Agreement
Keeping with his campaign-trail promise, on June 1, 2017, President
Trump announced that the United States would be withdrawing from
the Paris Agreement.153 More precisely, he declared that “as of today,
the United States will cease all implementation of the non-binding
Paris Accord and the draconian financial and economic burdens the
agreement imposes on our country.”154 In his speech he decried the
Agreement as “simply the latest example of Washington entering into
an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive
benefit of other countries,” as “handicap[ping] the United States
economy in order to win praise from the very foreign capitals and
global activists that have long sought to gain wealth at our country’s
expense” and, ultimately, as “very unfair, at the highest level, to the United
States.”155 The United States, therefore, would terminate all steps to
comply with the Agreement, including implementing domestic emissions
reduction efforts and contributing to climate finance initiatives.
The legal effect of President Trump’s announcement was limited by
the terms of the agreement, which prevent the United States from
formally withdrawing from the Agreement until November 4, 2020, the

(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environmentrollbacks.html (highlighting regulations that have been successfully repealed).
153. President Donald J. Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris
Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord [https://perma.cc/U9YF-9792]; see
also President Trump Announces U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, WHITE
HOUSE (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/president-trumpannounces-u-s-withdrawal-paris-climate-accord [https://perma.cc/3DBE-WMFZ].
154. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, supra note 153.
155. Id.
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day after the next presidential election.156 The symbolic and
substantive effects of President Trump’s announcement, however,
were significant. First, it set the tone for the Trump Administration’s
approach to climate change. This tone being total defiance of the idea
that the United States should be a cooperative actor on climate change
and an unapologetic intent to undo the work of the previous
administration to reassert U.S. leadership on climate change. Second,
the decision to cease implementation of the Agreement had
immediate effect on global mitigation and adaptation efforts, given
that it meant that the United States—the second largest-global GHG
emitter—would no longer commit to reducing its emissions in line
with the pledge that it made under the Agreement, thus undermining
cumulative global efforts to limit warming. Further, it also meant that
the United States would immediately stop providing the climate
finance that it had committed to under the Obama Administration,
with the effect of weakening global mitigation and adaptation efforts.
President Trump’s announcement, however, also had a side effect
that he may not have predicted. At the domestic level, his
announcement was met with an immediate outpouring of resistance
and widespread efforts to mobilize subnational and non-state actors to
step into the void to help keep the United States on track to pursuing
domestic and international commitments to address climate change.
On the same day that President Trump announced the United States’
de facto withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the governors of
California, Washington, and New York announced they had formed a
new partnership, the United States Climate Alliance, aimed at
advancing the goals of the Paris Agreement and fulfilling the United
States’ obligations thereunder.157 On the same day, eighty-four U.S.
mayors, representing forty million Americans, issued a joint statement
declaring their intention to “adopt, honor, and uphold the
156. Paris Agreement, supra note 23, at Annex, art. 28.1–.2 (“At any time after three
years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party [for
the United States, November 4, 2016], that Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving
written notification to the Depositary. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of
one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal . . . .”).
The United States status is, thus, “pending withdrawal.” See Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential
Power to Terminate International Agreements, 128 YALE L.J.F. 432, 468–70 (2018).
157. U.S. CLIMATE ALLIANCE, https://www.usclimatealliance.org [https://perma.cc
/G7F3-HR23]. By summer 2019, 25 governors were members. Press Release, U.S.
Climate Alliance, Montana Governor Steve Bullock Becomes 25th Governor to Join
U.S. Climate Alliance (July 1, 2019), https://www.usclimatealliance.org/publications
/2019/7/1/montana-governor-steve-bullock-becomes-25th-governor-to-join-usclimate-alliance [https://perma.cc/A6SP-J5KA].
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commitments to the goals enshrined in the Paris Agreement.”158
Complementing the state and city initiatives, in June 2017, a group of
mayors, governors, and business leaders launched the “We Are Still In”
initiative that brought together a bipartisan coalition of “mayors,
county executives, governors, tribal leaders, college and university
leaders, businesses, faith groups, cultural institutions, healthcare
organizations, and investors,” declaring their intent to continue efforts
to implement the United States international climate pledge.159 Also in
June 2017, California Governor, Jerry Brown, together with Michael
Bloomberg launched “America’s Pledge,” an initiative to “compile and
quantify the actions of states, cities and businesses in the United States to
drive down their greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the goals of the
Paris Agreement.”160 The swelling of support for climate action across the
public and private sectors has continued to intensify in the wake of
persistent presidential efforts to undermine U.S. climate actions.161
At the international level, President Trump’s announcement was
met with reactions varying from a symbolic shrug to exasperated
defiance. President Emmanuel Macron of France responded to
President Trump’s announcement by releasing a speech (in English,
and on Twitter) stating that:
Tonight, I wish to tell the United States: France believes in you. The
world believes in you. I know that you are a great nation. I know your
history, our common history. To all scientists, engineers,
entrepreneurs, responsible citizens who were disappointed by the
decision of the President of the United States, I want to say that they
will find in France, a second homeland . . . . I can assure you, France
will not give up the fight.162

158. Paris Climate Agreement: 407 US Climate Mayors Commit to Adopt, Honor and Uphold
Paris Climate Agreement Goals, CLIMATE MAYORS, http://climatemayors.org/
actions/paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/2WED-J7QB]. As of July 2019,
the pact included 407 U.S. Mayors representing 70 million Americans. Id.
159. “We Are Still In” Declaration, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/weare-still-declaration [https://perma.cc/5B55-AZPU].
160. Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, California Governor
Jerry Brown and Michael Bloomberg Launch “America’s Pledge” (July 12, 2017),
https://ca.gov/archive/gov39/2017/07/12/news19872/index.html
[https://perma.cc/K3U8-DYEE].
161. See infra Part IV.
162. Statement of Emmanuel Macron, President of France (June 1, 2017),
https://www.pscp.tv/w/1jMKgoodLyqKL;
see
also
Emmanuel
Macron
(@EmmanuelMacron), TWITTER (June 1, 2017, 2:46 PM), https://twitter.com/
emmanuelmacron/status/870396270829084672
[https://perma.cc/6CC8-TEFY]
(posting President Macron’s remarks to his Twitter feed).
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He ended his statement with a not-so-subtle dig at Trump, declaring:
“[m]ake our planet great again.”163 Simultaneously, France joined with
Germany and Italy in a statement taking note “with regret of the
decision by the United States of America to withdraw from the
universal agreement on climate change,” and committing to “step up
efforts to support developing countries, in particular the poorest and
most vulnerable, in achieving their mitigation and adaptation goals.”164
The Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, expressed similar
frustration, stating that:
We are deeply disappointed that the United States federal
government has decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.
Canada is unwavering in our commitment to fight climate change
and support clean economic growth . . . . While the U.S. decision is
disheartening, we remain inspired by the growing momentum
around the world to combat climate change and transition to clean
growth economies.165

The Prime Minister of India joined the sentiment of his Canadian
and European counterparts, issuing a statement on Twitter stating that
the “Paris Agreement reflects our duty towards protecting the Earth
and our natural resources. For us, this is an article of faith . . . .”166
Perhaps, most importantly, preceding and following President
Trump’s announcement, the Chinese government has expressed
support for the Paris Agreement and disappointment in the United
States’ efforts to undermine the global pact. Prior to President
Trump’s June 2017 announcement, at a speech before the United
Nations, Chinese President, Xi Jinping, proclaimed that “[t]he Paris
Agreement is a milestone in the history of climate governance. We
must ensure this endeavor is not derailed . . . . All parties should work
together to implement the Paris [A]greement. China will continue to

163. Statement of Emmanuel Macron, President of France, supra note 162.
164. Statement by Italy, France, and Germany on the US Withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement on Climate, AMBASCIATA D’ITALIA, WASH. D.C. (June 1, 2017), https://
ambwashingtondc.esteri.it/ambasciata_washington/en/salastampa/dall_ambasciata/2017/06/dichiarazione-italia-germania-francia.html
[https://perma.cc/LB3Q-TBSW].
165. Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada in Response to the United States’ Decision to
Withdraw from the Paris Agreement, PRIME MINISTER CAN. (June 1, 2017),
https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/06/01/statement-prime-minister-canadaresponse-united-states-decision-withdraw-paris [https://perma.cc/5ECX-YE83].
166. PMO India (@PMO India), TWITTER (June 3, 2017, 5:29 AM),
https://twitter.com/PMOIndia/status/870980871720845312
[https://perma.cc/BP5Q-QZA8].
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take steps to tackle climate change and fully honor its obligations.”167
In the wake of President Trump’s announcement, China has
continued to demonstrate support for the Agreement and appears to
be exploring ways in which it can assert leadership in the vacuum
created by the United States’ abdication.168
President Trump’s emphatic rejection of the Paris Agreement
epitomized his emerging approach to climate policy at the domestic
level, which similarly has focused on tearing down the existing legal
architecture, undermining climate science, and juxtaposing climate
action as in direct conflict with American jobs and economic
development. While the President has great power to deconstruct and
re-direct State action,169 his ability to dismantle and undermine the
emerging legal architecture and slow the momentum for climate law
and policy has been hindered by systemic and social resistance at every
level.170 That is, President Trump has used executive authority to cease
implementation of the Paris Agreement and to direct the EPA to
repeal the regulatory foundations that President Obama put in place;
however, he has not been able to wield that authority to undermine
the cooperative momentum motivating international negotiations and
167. See Tom Phillips, China’s Xi Jinping says Paris Climate Deal Must not be Allowed to
Fail, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/
19/chinas-xi-jinping-says-world-must-implement-paris-climate-deal
[https://perma.cc/3E6Q-N34X] (emphasis added) (quoting Xi Jinping).
168. See, e.g., Benjamin Haas, China Sees an Opportunity to Lead as Trump Withdraws
from Paris. But Will It?, GUARDIAN (June 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2017/jun/02/china-sees-an-opportunity-to-lead-as-trump-withdraws-from-paris-butwill-it [https://perma.cc/YNS9-G7QB]; see also Hai-Bin Zhang et al., U.S. Withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement: Reasons, Impacts, and China’s Response, 8 ADVANCES IN CLIMATE
CHANGE RES. 220 (2017) (analyzing the range of actions China could, and should, take
in response to the United States’ declared withdrawal).
169. For a reminder of the cumulative nature of law and a discussion the resilience
of law across changes in radical leadership, see Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the
Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2008). Waldron reminds us:
A legal system builds on itself. Though it is always possible for a law to be
amended or revoked, it is not usual for each new legislature to wipe the slate
clean of the work of its predecessors. Instead, what legislators do—and what
courts also do in their law-making capacity—is add to the laws already in
existence. . . . Even when there is a radical change of personnel in the political
system—with liberals replacing conservatives—indeed, even when there is a
revolution, we hardly ever see a return to “Year Zero” so far as the law is
concerned. Instead, law grows by accretion, so that new liberal legislation takes
its place alongside old conservative legislation—or at least alongside the old
conservative legislation that has not been explicitly repealed.
Id.
170. See infra Part IV.
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domestic efforts to respond to climate change. President Obama was
unable to create iron-clad legal architecture, but he successfully
leveraged his authority to push forward international negotiations and
to advance international cooperation. His efforts facilitated the
creation of a robust international climate change agreement and a
firm foundation for international cooperation that has proved resolute
and able to withstand the Trump Administration’s reversal of course.
B. Gutting the Clean Air Act Regulatory Regime & Deregulating the Fossil
Fuel Industry
One of the focal points of Trump’s presidency has been fast-tracking
the move towards domestic energy independence. To this end, in
March 2017, Trump issued an executive order, Promoting Energy
Independence and Economic Growth.171 President Trump declared
that, “[i]t is in the national interest to promote clean and safe
development of our Nation’s vast energy resources, while at the same
time avoiding regulatory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy
production, constrain economic growth, and prevent job creation.”172
Accordingly, the order directed all executive departments and
agencies to “immediately review existing regulations that potentially
burden the development or use of domestically produced energy
resources and appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind those that
unduly burden the development of domestic energy resources . . . .”173
To jump start the process of reducing regulatory burdens on energy
production and begin the process of reversing course on climate
change, the order rescinds multiple Obama-era executive orders,
including his order related to Preparing the United States for the
Impacts of Climate Change and his memoranda related to Power
Sector Carbon Pollution Standards and Climate Change and National
Security.174 Further seeking to dismantle the core of President
Obama’s climate agenda, the executive order also rescinds the Climate
Action Plan and the Climate Action Plan Strategy to Reduce Methane
Emissions.175 The order also directs immediate review of the CPP;
disbands the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gases and withdraws its reports on the social cost of
171. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 3 C.F.R. 314 ( 2017).
172. Id. at 314–15.
173. Id. at 315.
174. Id. at 316 (revoking Exec. Order No. 13,653, 3 C.F.R. 330 (2013) (Climate
Change Preparedness), Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards,
and Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security).
175. Id.
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carbon declaring them “no longer representative of governmental
policy”; directs that “any and all moratoria on Federal land coal leasing
activities” be lifted; and charges that a suite of other Obama-era rules
regulating oil and gas development be reviewed with an eye towards
rescinding or revising the rules in order to unencumber energy
production.176 Hence, in one fell swoop, the Trump Administration sought
to undermine the foundations of the existing domestic climate regime.
Pursuant to this order, on October 16, 2017, the EPA proposed
repealing the CPP177 and subsequently, on August 21, 2018, issued its
proposed replacement, the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule.178
The CPP was finally repealed and replaced with the ACE on June 19,
2019.179 According to the EPA, the ACE replaces “the prior
Administration’s overly prescriptive and burdensome [CPP] and
instead empowers states, promotes energy independence, and
facilitates economic growth and job creation.”180
With the CPP, the Obama Administration sought to create an
enforceable legal backbone for reducing emissions from the largest
source of emissions in the United States—e.g., existing power plants.
Reducing emissions from existing coal-fired power plants is critical to
long-term efforts to reduce domestic emissions and central to the
United States’ ability to meet its commitments under the Paris
Agreement.181 Accordingly, the CPP was designed to ratchet down
emissions from power plants by 32% below 2005 levels by 2030.182
The EPA attests that the ACE will “reduce emissions of CO2,
mercury, as well as precursors for pollutants like fine particulate matter
and ground-level ozone” and “result in annual net benefits of $120

176. Id. at 318.
177. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16,
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
178. EPA Proposes Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, EPA (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-affordable-clean-energy-ace-rule
[https://perma.cc/ZH42-KCEY].
179. EPA, FACT SHEET: THE AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY RULE, https://www.epa
.gov/sites/production/files/2019-06/documents/bser_and_eg_fact_sheet_6.18.19
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN9V-Q2WZ].
180. EPA Proposes Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, supra note 178.
181. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (describing the United States’
commitment pursuant to the Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
26% to 28% below 2005 levels by 2025).
182. See
Fact
Sheet:
Overview
of
the
Clean
Power
Plan,
EPA,
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-cleanpower-plan [https://perma.cc/VBE2-9ML7].
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million to $730 million, including costs, domestic climate benefits, and
health co-benefits.”183 In contrast to the CPP, which set out in a clear
and transparent manner the net emissions reductions that the plan
would achieve—i.e., reducing greenhouse gas emissions 32% below
2005 levels by 2030—with the ACE, the EPA states that “along with
additional expected emissions reductions based on long-term industry
trends” the rule could result in emissions reductions “as much as 35%
below 2005 levels” by the year 2030.184 What is key here is that the rule
does not seek to, or even attest to, achieve anything comparable to the
emissions reductions the CPP would have achieved. Instead, the rule
relies on ongoing industry trends—e.g., the shift from coal to natural
gas and the growth of renewable energy to achieve emissions
reductions.185 Notably, when the Trump administration issued the
proposed rule, estimates suggested that the ACE would “reduce[]
pollution only negligibly even from a no-CPP baseline.”186 The Trump
Administration’s own analysis demonstrates that it would actually allow
for an increase in particulate matter and ozone pollution, with dire
impacts for human health. The EPA’s estimates suggest that increases
in particulate matter and ozone pollution could lead to thousands of
premature deaths and increases in pollution-related illness, as
compared to the baseline under the CPP. In fact, the “EPA estimates,
for example, that in the year 2030 alone somewhere between 350 and

183. EPA Finalizes Affordable Clean Energy Rule, Ensuring Reliable, Diversified Energy
Resources While Protecting Our Environment, EPA (June 19, 2019), https://www.epa.gov
/newsreleases/epa-finalizes-affordable-clean-energy-rule-ensuring-reliable-diversifiedenergy [https://perma.cc/A3Z3-UYPE] (suggesting that ACE will reduce CO2
emissions by 11-million short tons—less than 1% of current U.S. emissions, SO2
emissions by 5700 tons, NOx emissions by 7100 tons, PM2.5 emissions by 400 tons, and
mercury emissions by fifty-nine pounds).
184. Id.
185. This argument has been undercut by recent trends, which reveal an increase
in greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector as “natural gas generation
increased to meet rising electricity demand, offsetting the emissions reductions
associated with coal plant retirements.” Benjamin Storrow, 2019 Power-Sector Trends
Point to a Continued Rise in U.S. Emissions, SCI. AM.: E&E NEWS (June 3, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/2019-power-sector-trends-point-to-acontinued-rise-in-u-s-emissions [https://perma.cc/TJ5L-6PKN].
186. Letter from Cara Horowitz & Ann Carlson, UCLA Sch. of Law, to EPA, Re:
Comment by Electricity Grid Experts Benjamin F. Hobbs, Brendan Kirby, Kenneth J.
Lutz, and James D. McCalley on Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355, Proposed
Affordable Clean Energy Rule (Oct. 30, 2018), https://legal-planet.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Grid-expert-commentletter_ACE_proposal_Oct_30_2018_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8BY-WAHX].
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over 1000 people will die from exposure to particulate matter and
ozone whose deaths would have been avoided under the CPP.”187
In contrast to the CPP, which set individualized emission caps for
each state, the ACE jettisons emissions caps of any kind and, instead,
“gives states broad latitude to determine how stringently they want to
control power plant emissions under their jurisdiction.”188 The rule
operates by mandating heat-rate efficiency improvements (“HRIs”) at
individual facilities; the rule does not mandate net emissions
reductions by state or even by facility.189 Because the rule does not set
cumulative or individual emissions caps, there is a significant risk that
“[d]ue to greater plant efficiency, such HRIs could lead to increased
generation and emissions, known as an emissions rebound effect.”190
Taking the rebound effect into account, one early study suggests that
while the ACE “only modestly reduces national power sector CO2
emissions” it could lead to increases in CO2 emissions “by up to 8.7%
in 18 states plus the District of Columbia in 2030 compared to no
policy” and increases in “SO2 and NOx emissions in 19 states and 20
states plus DC, respectively, in 2030 compared to no policy, with
implications for air quality and public health.”191
Furthermore, while one of President Trump’s repeated objectives
has been to remove the Obama Administration’s “overly prescriptive
and burdensome”192 rule and to adopt a new rule that would reduce
regulatory burden and minimize costs for industry, the ACE has been
critiqued on just this count. One such critique suggests that, according to

187. Nat Logar, The Affordable Clean Energy Rule Would Be Neither Affordable nor Clean,
LEGAL PLANET (Oct. 31, 2018), https://legal-planet.org/2018/10/31/the-affordableclean-energy-rule-would-be-neither-affordable-nor-clean
[https://perma.cc/5RPLHAAD] (quoting Cara Horowitz et al., Comment by Electricity Grid Experts Benjamin
F. Hobbs, Brendan Kirby, Kenneth J. Lutz, and James D. McCalley on Docket ID No. EPAHQ-OAR-2017-0355, Proposed Affordable Clean Energy Rule (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://legal-planet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Grid-expert-commentletter_ACE_proposal_Oct_30_2018_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK5A-KUWX]).
188. Niina H. Farah, Trump Admin Finalizes Clean Power Plan, E&E NEWS (June 19, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060631669 [https://perma.cc/EJ3A-W2UR].
189. See William C. Schillaci, Affordable Clean Energy Rule Puts States in Regulatory
Driver’s Seat, EHS DAILY ADVISOR (June 21, 2019), https://ehsdailyadvisor.blr.com
/2019/06/affordable-clean-energy-rule-puts-states-in-the-regulatory-drivers-seat
[https://perma.cc/RA45-CTPF].
190. See Amelia T. Keyes et al., The Affordable Clean Energy Rule and the Impact of
Emissions Rebound on Carbon Dioxide and Criteria Air Pollutant Emissions, 14 ENVTL. RES.
LETTERS 044018 (2019).
191. Id.
192. EPA Proposes Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, supra note 178.

2019]

U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LAW

431

a careful review of the EPA’s own models, the ACE is likely to “impose
similar, or perhaps even greater, compliance costs” on industry than the CPP.193
In sum, the ACE’s ability to bring about real emissions reductions or
to achieve the promised cost savings for the energy industry has been
called into question.194 Taking into account all of the different dimensions
of the rule, one group of legal commentators suggest that the ACE
would increase pollution of CO2 and other air pollutants; cost us
billions of dollars in forgone benefits; and harm public health,
resulting in thousands of premature deaths that the CPP would
prevent. At the same time . . . the ACE Rule is not likely to save
industry much in compliance costs.195

The core of the Obama Administration’s efforts to limit greenhouse
gas emissions under the umbrella of the CAA consisted of the CPP,
which provided the tool for limiting emissions from power plants, and
the “Tailpipe Rule,” which provided the tool for limiting emissions
from automobiles.196 Together, these two CAA regulatory programs
targeted the two largest sources of domestic greenhouse gas emissions.197
Replacing the CPP with the ACE deals a high-impact blow to the heart of
the Obama Administration’s efforts to use the CAA to limit emissions from
power plants. It is book-ended by the Trump Administration’s ongoing
efforts to limit regulatory constraints on automobiles.
The origins of both the CPP and the Tailpipe Rule rest in the
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. In this seminal
case, the Court ruled that the EPA possessed regulatory authority over
greenhouse gases under the CAA, and that the Agency’s decision on
whether to regulate these pollutants must be statutorily grounded and
based on scientific (not political) considerations.198 Following the
Court’s 2007 ruling, in 2009, the EPA issued the CAA section 202(a)(1)

193. Logar, supra note 187 (emphasis added) (quoting Horowitz et al., supra note 187).
194. See, e.g., Issue Brief: Final ACE Rule Raises State Concerns, GEO. CLIMATE CTR. (July
2, 2019), https://www.georgetownclimate.org/articles/issue-brief-final-ace-rule-raises
-state-concerns.html [https://perma.cc/LGY3-7J4P].
195. Horowitz & Carlson, supra note 186, at 1.
196. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (the CPP); Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings
for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496
(proposed Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (the Tailpipe Rule).
197. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,664; Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act,
74 Fed. Reg. at 66,517.
198. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–35 (2007).
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endangerment finding that triggered the EPA’s obligation to begin
regulating greenhouse gas emissions from new automobiles.199 That
same year, the EPA also granted a waiver of the CAA preemption to
California, allowing it to adopt its greenhouse gas emission standards
for motor vehicles.200 Subsequently, in May 2009, the EPA, the
Department of Transportation, state regulators, and the auto industry
established the first-ever nationwide greenhouse gas emission
standards for light-duty vehicles and the most progressive fuel
efficiency improvements in thirty years. The 2009 rule, known as the
Tailpipe Rule, applied to model years 2012 to 2016 and was followed
in 2012 by another rule requiring additional reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions and additional improvements in fuel economy for lightduty vehicles for model years 2017 to 2025.201 In 2014 and 2015, the
EPA continued to develop the regulatory regime, finalizing gasoline
standards that further contribute to vehicle efficiency for passenger cars,
light-duty trucks, medium-duty passenger vehicles, and some heavy-duty
vehicles.202 As a result of these rules, automakers were required to nearly
double the average fuel economy of new cars and trucks by 2025.203
Unlike the CPP, which was released late in President Obama’s
second term and remained in limbo even prior to President Trump
taking office, the regulatory regime for auto emissions came into effect
and was actively implemented and enforced during President Obama’s
first and second terms in office. Despite the established nature of the
regulatory regime and the proven environmental and human-health
benefits associated with the efficiency and emissions improvements,
the Trump Administration opposed the tightening standards arguing

199. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012).
200. Timeline of Major Accomplishments in Transportation, Air Pollution, and Climate Change,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/air-pollution-transportation/timeline-major-accomplishmentstransportation-air-pollution-and-climate [https://perma.cc/7FSU-XY8B].
201. Regulations for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Passenger Cars and Trucks, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulationsgreenhouse-gas-emissions-passenger-cars [https://perma.cc/9BAV-TBM2].
202. Timeline of Major Accomplishments in Transportation, Air Pollution, and Climate
Change, supra note 200.
203. See Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles-Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478 (proposed Oct. 25, 2016)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 534, 535, 538); see also Final Rule for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles - Phase
2,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/final-rulegreenhouse-gas-emissions-and-fuel-efficiency [https://perma.cc/L2LK-9XGW].
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that they were economically onerous and created safety concerns.204
Accordingly, on August 2, 2018, the EPA released a proposed rule—
the Safe Affordable Fuel Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles proposal—that would
freeze emissions and fuel-efficiency standards for cars after 2021, and
would revoke the waiver of CAA preemption the EPA granted California
to establish its greenhouse gas emissions standards.205 At the time of
writing, this rule is not yet final and is being challenged by
environmentalists, consumer groups, and auto-industry representatives.206
If the proposed rule comes into effect, it would deal a blow not only to
efforts to limit emissions from the transportation sector, but also to the
core remaining piece of President Obama’s CAA greenhouse gas
regulatory regime. Additionally, revoking California’s waiver would
challenge states’ rights to adopt more ambitious automobile standards
and interfere with the ability of states to meet their own environmental
objectives. As Carlson suggests, the proposed rule would deal a
significant blow to U.S. efforts to reduce GHG emissions from the
transportation fleet and hamper California’s ambitious climate goals and
air pollution policy.207 In so doing, the Administration’s actions may also
weaken California’s efforts to act as a global environmental policy and
technology leader, demonstrating the potential limits of Governor
Brown’s efforts to be the de facto leader of U.S. climate leadership. At the
end of the day, in a system of federalism, a state can provide only so much
global leadership in the face of national intransigence.208
Taken together, the repeal and replacement of the CPP and the
proposed freezing of the Tailpipe Rule erode the core of President
Obama’s efforts to develop a federal legal regime for limiting
204. See Timothy Cama & Miranda Green, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama Emissions
Standards, HILL (Aug. 2, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/
400036-trump-submits-rule-to-weaken-iconic-obama-car-efficiency-standards
[https://perma.cc/XQU6-UYZY].
205. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years
2021–26 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (proposed Aug. 24,
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86) (proposing to “retain the model year
2020 standards . . . for [cars and light trucks] through model year 2026”).
206. See, e.g., Academy Warns of Danger in Proposed SAFE Vehicles Rule, AM. ACAD. FAM.
PHYSICIANS (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.aafp.org/news/government-medicine
/20181107epaletter [https://perma.cc/Q867-PWFS]; Letter from Academy of
Integrative Health & Medicine et al., to Andrew Wheeler, Acting Administrator, EPA,
Public Health Organizations’ Opposition to the Proposed “Safer Affordable FuelEfficient Vehicles Rule” for Model Years 2021–26 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks
(Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.aafa.org/media/2221/aafa-sign-on-letter-opposingsafer-affordable-fuel-efficient-vehicles-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MGV-TCUK].
207. Carlson, supra note 15, at 271–72.
208. Id. at 272.
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greenhouse gas emissions. The Trump Administration’s climate and
energy related deregulatory efforts, however, are far more extensive and
include efforts to remove limits on all aspects of fossil fuel development
and to enable large-scale energy infrastructure development.
As just a few of examples of the steps taken to relieve regulatory
burdens on the energy industry,209 the Trump Administration has
removed requirements for oil and gas companies to report methane
emissions while also revising and partially repealing Obama-era rules
limiting methane emissions from the oil and gas industry;210 proposed
lifting an Obama-era coal leasing moratorium on public lands;211
proposed an expanded oil and gas leasing program in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge;212 issued an executive order seeking to expedite
approvals of energy infrastructure projects;213 proposed rolling back an
Obama-era rule aimed at preventing hydrofluorocarbon leaks from air
conditioners;214 rolled back regulatory limits on petroleum refineries;215
quickened the pace of approving onshore drilling permits;216 and proposed
to dramatically expand the areas open to offshore oil and gas leasing.217

209. See, e.g., Climate Deregulation Tracker, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE L., http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker
[https://perma.cc/U7VG-WPPT].
210. See Proposed Improvements 2016 New Source Performance Standards, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/controlling-air-pollution-oil-and-natural-gasindustry/proposed-improvements-2016-new-source [https://perma.cc/EV8Q-5PR3]
(last updated Dec. 19, 2018).
211. See BLM Publishes Draft Environmental Assessment for Lifting Coal Leasing
Moratorium, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. (May 22, 2019),
http://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/blm-publishes-draft-environmentalassessment-for-lifting-coal-leasing-moratorium [https://perma.cc/L496-8ZFT].
212. See Press Release, Bureau Land Mgmt., BLM Alaska Releases Draft
Environmental Impact Statement for the Coastal Plain Oil and Gas Leasing Program
(Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-alaska-releases-draft-eiscoastal-plain-oil-and-gas-leasing-program [https://perma.cc/QN4U-Q46P].
213. See Exec. Order No. 13,868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 15, 2019).
214. See Maxine Joselow, Trump Admin to Alter Rollback over HFC Concerns, E&E NEWS (Apr.
29, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060235551 [https://perma.cc /584W-PJBC].
215. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.100, 60.100a, 63.640, 63.1560 (2018); National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants and New Source Performance Standards:
Petroleum Refinery Sector Amendments, 83 Fed. Reg. 227, 60,696 (Nov. 26, 2018).
216. See Curt Devine et al., Interior Dep’t. Approved Far More Oil and Gas Permits During
Shutdown than Previously Known, CNN (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03
/27/politics/bernhardt-interior-approved-permits-shutdown/index.html
[https://perma.cc/SN6R-2B8T].
217. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Interior, Secretary Zinke Announces Plan for
Unleashing America’s Offshore Oil and Gas Potential (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-zinke-announces-plan-unleashing-
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Cumulatively, these ongoing and proposed changes loosen
environmental controls on the fossil fuel industry from the point of
extraction to the point of combustion, expand the range of areas
where extraction can take place, and facilitate the development of
large-scale energy projects. While it is too early to fully understand the
combined effect of all these changes, a new study prepared for state
attorneys general describe the Trump Administration’s actions as
amounting to a “virtual surrender to climate change” and suggest that
the plans to roll back climate and energy-related regulations could
drive up domestic greenhouse gas emissions by over two hundred
million tonnes a year CO2 Equivalent by 2025.218
Although the long-term impacts are unknown, the Trump
Administration’s policies have already facilitated increases in fossil fuel
production, greenhouse gas emissions, and energy exports. In 2018,
U.S. CO2 emissions rose by 3.4%; this spike represented the largest
increase in domestic emissions in eight years and the second largest
annual increase in more than two decades.219 Also, in 2018, the United
States surpassed Russia and Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest
crude oil producer.220 In addition, U.S. exports of fossil fuels continue to
increase. It is projected that, by 2020, “for the first time since the 1950s,
the United States will export more energy than it imports . . . .”221
americas-offshore-oil-and-gas-potential [https://perma.cc/K4KG-URM9] (“[T]he
National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program . . . proposes to make
over 90 percent of the total OCS acreage and more than 98 percent of undiscovered,
technically recoverable oil and gas resources in federal offshore areas available to
consider for future exploration and development. By comparison, the current
program puts 94 percent of the OCS off limits. In addition, the program proposes the
largest number of lease sales in U.S. history.”).
218. See STATE ENERGY & ENVTL. IMPACT CTR., NYU SCH. L., CLIMATE & HEALTH
SHOWDOWN IN THE COURTS: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL PREPARE TO FIGHT 5 (Mar.
2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/climate-and-health-showdown-inthe-courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE9Y-RMFC]; Valerie Volcovici, Trump Climate
Deregulation Could Boost CO2 Emissions by 200 Million Tonnes a Year: Study, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/201903-05/trump-climate-deregulation-could-boost [https://perma.cc/QK4T-GL43].
219. See Preliminary US Emissions Estimates for 2018, RHODIUM GROUP (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-emissions-estimates-for-2018
[https://perma.cc/M627-2HSU] (noting that the 2018 gain was “surpassed only by
2010 when the economy bounced back from the Great Recession”).
220. See The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil Producer, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37053
[https://perma.cc/F7UZ-2YT9].
221. The United States Is Expected to Export More Energy than it Imports by 2020, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ detail.php?id=38152
[https://perma.cc/4UM9-C4KV].
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At the same time that the Trump Administration’s energy policies
are facilitating increases in fossil fuel production, consumption, and
exports, the Administration is also taking steps to limit domestic efforts
to integrate climate change into policy planning, with the effect of
undermining Obama-era climate resiliency strategies. In 2017, for
example, the Trump Administration removed climate change from a
list of threats to national security,222 despite far-reaching concerns
among military leaders about the effects of climate change on national
security.223 The Administration has also sought to thin-out climate
change considerations from natural resource management strategies,
including revoking an Obama-era executive order promoting “climate
resilience” in the Bering Sea224 and rescinding an Obama-era policy
that integrates climate change into natural resource management
decisions in national parks.225 The Administration also rescinded an
Obama-era policy directing the Department of Interior to “integrate
climate change adaptation strategies into its policies, planning,
programs and operations”226 as well as the far-reaching National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) guidelines directing agencies to take
climate change into consideration when assessing the environmental

222. See Jean Chemnick, Trump Drops Climate Threats from National Security Strategy,
SCI. AM.: E&E NEWS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article
/trump-drops-climate-threats-from-national-security-strategy
[https://perma.cc/A6N4-EXTT].
223. Revealing fissions between the Administration and the Pentagon, in 2019, the
Department of Defense released a report declaring that “[t]he effects of a changing
climate are a national security issue with potential impacts to Department of Defense
missions, operational plans, and installations.” U.S. DEP’T DEF., REPORT ON EFFECTS OF A
CHANGING CLIMATE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 2 (Jan. 2019),
https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/sec_335_ndaareport_effects_of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB6L-CU4Y].
224. See Exec. Order No. 13,795, 3 C.F.R. 340 (2017).
225. See Rob Hotakainen, NPS Chief Scraps Climate-Focused Order, E&E NEWS (Aug. 31,
2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060059511 [https://perma.cc/9UFC-EEWH].
226. See Michael Doyle, Department Rescinds Obama-era Mitigation and Climate Docs,
E&E NEWS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060070247 [https://
perma.cc/C3RD-ZZB7].
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impacts of federal actions.227 The cumulative effect228 of the Trump
Administration’s roll-backs of resiliency and adaptation policies has
been to minimize the extent to which the federal government must and
even can take climate change into account when making short and
long-term planning decisions across a range of issues.229 These rollbacks undermine what was already a thin and experimental set of
strategies that President Obama had put in place to try to anticipate
and respond to the pervasive threats that climate change poses to the
United States. In common with efforts worldwide, U.S. adaptation planning
is still in its infancy. Eroding the emerging foundations for national
adaptation policy sets the United States back with the effect of minimizing
the federal government’s ability both to limit the negative effects and to
take advantage of any short-term positive effects of climate change.230

227. In 2019, the Council on Environmental Quality issued revised guidance
designed to “facilitate more timely environmental reviews and permitting decisions for
infrastructure projects” by limiting when, and to what extent the agency has to take
into account climate considerations. COUNCIL ENVTL. QUALITY, FACT SHEET: CEQ’S
DRAFT NEPA GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERATION OF GHG EMISSIONS (June 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/20190621-FINAL-GHGGuidance-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG22-8HA7]; Guidance on Consideration of
Greenhouse Gases, NAT’L ENVTL. POL’Y ACT, https://ceq.doe.gov/guidance/
ceq_guidance_nepa-ghg.html [https://perma.cc/2H3B-M42Y].
228. There are exceptions to the dominant trend towards rolling-back climate
resiliency efforts. The Trump Administration, for example, is overhauling the National
Flood Insurance Program in a way that many climate advocates view as necessary in
light of climate-related changes to flood-based risks. See As Risks Rise, an Overhaul
Announced for Federal Flood Insurance, YALE ENV’T 360 (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://e360.yale.edu/digest/as-risks-rise-an-overhaul-announced-for-federal-floodinsurance [https://perma.cc/C8JM-FPVY].
229. For more details on the Trump era roll backs, in this regard, see Climate Change,
Sustainable Development, and Ecosystems, in ABA SECTION ENV’T, ENERGY, & RESOURCES:
2017 ANNUAL REPORT 339–40 (Andrew Schatz et al. eds., 2017); STATE ENERGY & ENVTL.
IMPACT CTR., NYU SCH. L., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: 13 MONTHS OF CRITICAL ACTIONS
21–22 (Feb. 2018), https://gallery.mailchimp.com/8c3272f6ebbb6024dc1359725
/files/fdbd6457-5cff-4672-8bd7-5cae63ba69aa/Web_Report_StateImpactCenter
_Final.04.pdf [https://perma.cc/39LG-7LTQ].
230. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 206, 247, 269–70 (2012) (exploring the reality that, even if the global aggregate
impacts of climate change are negative, some people—and some groups of people—
stand to benefit from climate change in the near term, and discussing the complex
interplay between climate change winners and losers over time); see also Robin Kundis
Craig, The Social and Cultural Aspects of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1416,
1417, 1418, 1420 (2013) (cautioning that how we label people who benefit during
times of social turmoil “depends as much on cultural constructions of their meaning
and public relations as on actual differences in their motives and actions” and warning
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While it is beyond the ambit of this Article to explore the full range
of actions that President Trump has taken to unravel the Obama
Administration’s work on climate change, even examining these (very)
few examples reveals the extent to which the Trump Administration
not only has undermined efforts to limit the causes and consequences
of climate change, but also has set the United States on a course
towards increased fossil fuel dependency.
As Farber suggests:
Much of Trump’s damage to the environment is obvious: his efforts
to increase gas and oil production, his regulatory rollbacks, and his
efforts to gut the agencies charged with protecting the environment.
But he has also done deeper damage to the institutions we need to
address climate change and other daunting environmental
challenges.231

In addition to direct attacks on core components of the United States’
burgeoning climate law foundation, President Trump has undermined
the role of science in decision-making, deepened political polarization
around climate change, and damaged the role and reputation of the
United States in international climate negotiations.
Yet, as extensive as the Trump Administration’s efforts to undermine
climate policy are, they are meeting resistance at every step. Not only
does the sweeping nature of President Obama’s climate policies limit
the Trump Administration’s ability to dismantle the existing climate
strategy in one fell swoop,232 but the Administration has also faced

that “winners could come at the expense of ultimately disastrous long-term
consequences for the planet as a whole”).
231. Dan Farber, Helping Repair Our Broken Governance System, LEGAL PLANET (June 24,
2019),
https://legal-planet.org/2019/06/24/helping-repair-our-broken-governancesystem [https://perma.cc/MM2V-2AB2].
232. See Benjamin Hulac, Key Obama Climate Orders Still on the Books, E&E NEWS (May 2,
2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060080615 [https://perma.cc/YS8K-YM8C]
(discussing some of the climate-related executive orders that have not yet been revoked).
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significant losses in the courts233 and persistent push-back from the
public and private sector.234
President Trump will continue to chip away at President Obama’s
climate strategy and to erode the remaining components of its legal
core. President Obama’s overarching climate legacy, however, is
proving durable. The steps that President Obama took to mobilize
climate action at the international, national, and subnational levels
and across the public and private sectors has created a platform of
resistance and policy momentum that persists.235 Patterns of climate
litigation exemplify this trend.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF CLIMATE LITIGATION
Across the waxes and wanes of the Bush, Obama, and Trump
Administrations, the courts have been a steady driving force in shaping
the emerging rule of law around climate change. There is a rich and
varied body of scholarship exploring the role that climate change

233. See Ann Carlson, The Trump Administration Is on an Environmental Losing Streak,
LEGAL PLANET (Aug. 17, 2018), https://legal-planet.org/2018/08/17/the-trumpadministration-is-on-an-environmental-losing-streak [https://perma.cc/YC2W-6E9E].
As Carlson notes:
[C]ourts are continuing to hand the [A]dministration an impressive string of
losses that mean that, at least in the short term, the assault is much less
effective than the [A]dministration’s claims of deregulating the economy
would lead us all to believe. In just the last 8 days, the Administration has lost
four high profile environmental cases, adding to a string of losses over the past
18 months.
Id.
234. See Leading U.S. Businesses Call on Congress to Enact a Market-Based
Approach to Climate Change, WORLD RES. INST. (May 15, 2019),
https://www.wri.org/news/2019/05/leading-us-businesses-call-congress-enactmarket-based-approach-climate-change [https://perma.cc/YN2P-8WT4] (“The CEOs of
13 U.S. and Global Fortune 500 companies or their subsidiaries, in collaboration with four
leading environmental groups, today issued a call for action on climate change.”).
235. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of
Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. REG. 549, 587
(2018). Mashaw and Berke suggest that, “[o]ur look at climate policy highlights both
the power and perils of presidentialism. Bold action is possible, but it may not be durable.”
Id. This is true in terms of the durability of bold legal action, but arguably less true of the
lasting effect of the sweeping use of executive power in elevating the floor of the debate
and mobilizing subnational and non-state actors even when the “bold action” that formed
the centerpiece of a President’s strategy has been dismantled. Id.
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litigation has236 and continues237 to play in shaping climate change law and
policy. In the United States, in particular, climate litigation has been the
meatiest subject for legal academics given the dearth of primary law with
which to engage. It is well beyond the remit of this Article to review the
breadth and impact of past and present climate litigation in depth. Rather,
the goal here is to explore what patterns in domestic (and international)
litigation reveal about the evolving state of climate change law.
The number and variety of climate change-related lawsuits that have
been filed around the world is remarkable. A recent study of global
trends in climate litigation reveals that, as of May 2019, 1,328 climaterelated cases have been filed in twenty-eight countries around the
world, “in addition to cases brought to the Court of Justice of the
European Union . . . the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the UN Human
Rights Committee.”238 Of these 1328 global cases, “more than threequarters of cases identified globally have been filed in the US.”239
Globally, the number of cases filed has surged in recent years.240 The
cases target a variety of defendants, namely governments and
corporations, including the largest global greenhouse gas emitters,
collectively referred to as the “carbon majors.”241 These cases are being
236. See, e.g., Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government
in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011); David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An
Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as
Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012); Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Litigation’s Regulatory
Pathways and the Administrative State: Lessons from U.S. and Australian Climate Change
Governance, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 207 (2013); Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and
International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (2007).
237. See, e.g., Lisa Benjamin, The Road to Paris Runs Through Delaware: Climate
Litigation and Directors’ Duties, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3379848 [https://perma.cc/6GVL-737S?type=image];
Myanna Dellinger, See You in Court: Around the World in Eight Climate Change Lawsuits, 42 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 525 (2018); Jaqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, A Rights Turn
in Climate Change Litigation?, 7 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 37 (2018); Philippe Sands, Climate Change
and the Rule of Law: Adjudicating the Future in International Law, 28 J. ENVTL. L. 19 (2016).
238. JOANA SETZER & REBECCA BYRNES, GLOBAL TRENDS IN CLIMATE CHANGE
LITIGATION: 2019 SNAPSHOT 3 (2019), http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/GRI_Global-trends-in-climate-change-litigation-2019snapshot-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9BU-7CVG].
239. Id.
240. See id. at 1.
241. See Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions
to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 229 (2014). In his
influential 2013 study, Richard Heede provided a quantitative analysis of historic fossil
fuel and cement production records of 90 leading investor-owned, state-owned and
nation-state producers of oil, natural gas, coal and cement. This study revealed 90
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brought by non-profit organizations, states, cities, and, increasingly, by
corporate investors, shareholders, and employees.242
A. The First Wave
While characterizations of the patterns of climate litigation vary,
recent trends suggest that we have entered a second wave of litigation
both in terms of strategy and transnational diffusion of litigation
tactics. The first wave of climate litigation was driven by actions
brought in the United States, largely in the wake of federal inaction.
During this first wave of litigation, domestic claimants—largely
environmental organizations and subnational actors—sought to use
existing statutes and tort law claims first, to compel the federal
government to limit greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to existing
environmental laws and, second, to force large corporate actors to
reduce their emissions or provide compensation for the harms caused
by climate change.243 The most prominent examples of these two types
of cases, respectively, are Massachusetts v. EPA and American Electric
Power Company, Inc. v. Connecticut (“AEP”).244
Massachusetts v. EPA represents the height of domestic climate
litigation and provides the solid core for domestic climate change law.
In this pivotal case, a group of state and local governments, and
thirteen leading environmental organizations, sought to force the
Bush Administration’s hand in regulating greenhouse gas emissions
from new vehicles under the CAA.245 Specifically, they petitioned EPA
to regulate greenhouse gases under section 202(a)(1) of the CAA,
which applies to air pollution from new vehicles.246 The Court
ultimately concluded that the CAA plainly covers greenhouse gases
and tasked the EPA with determining whether, pursuant to the
entities—i.e., carbon majors—were responsible for 63% of cumulative worldwide
industrial emissions of CO2 and methane from 1854–2010. Of these 90 entities, the 20
largest investor- and state-owned energy corporations were responsible for 29.5% of
all global industrial emissions through 2010. This study has proved pivotal to the
recent round of lawsuits being brought against these heavy emitting entities, which
have come to be known as the “carbon majors.” Id. at 229, 234.
242. See generally Benjamin, supra note 237, at 4, 33–34, 36, 61–62.
243. A notable third category of cases during this first wave of litigation involved
treaty-based actions. See Carlarne, supra note 7, at 1400–05; see also William C.G. Burns, Belt
and Suspenders?: The World Heritage Convention’s Role in Confronting Climate Change, 17 SE. ENVTL.
L.J. 359, 362–64 (2009); Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Climate Change, Cultural Heritage & the Oceans:
Rethinking Regulatory Approaches to Climate Change, 17 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 290–93 (2009).
244. 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
245. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1); 549 U.S. at 505–06.
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language of the statute, greenhouse gas emissions constituted air
pollutants that cause or contribute to air pollution that endangers
human health or welfare.247 In tasking the EPA with making this
statutorily grounded determination, the Court limited the agency’s
ability to defer the decision to regulate greenhouse gas emissions based
on political considerations or general arguments of scientific
uncertainty.248 This was a key turning point in domestic climate law
because it provided the first viable avenue for developing a statutorily
grounded federal response to climate change. Ultimately, as discussed,
the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA led the EPA to issue the
Endangerment Finding, which triggered the EPA’s responsibility
under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
automobiles and, ultimately, formed the foundation for President
Obama’s climate law efforts.249 Although Massachusetts v. EPA is the
most high-profile CAA climate case, claimants pursued numerous
other statute- and regulation-based cases during the early and mid2000s in an effort to find footholds for forcing federal regulatory
action on climate change.
The primary complement to these regulatory cases were federal
common law cases that sought—largely unsuccessfully—to hold
corporations legally accountable for their contributions to climate
change. Plaintiffs in high profile examples of these cases unsuccessfully
sought compensation from large energy producers for property
damage associated with climate-exacerbated natural disasters such as
Hurricane Katrina250 as well as for the costs of relocating an entire
community of native Alaskans due to climate-induced threats to their
village.251 The Supreme Court’s decision in AEP is the most high profile
and decisive response to attempts to use federal common law to hold
large emitters accountable for their emissions.252 Here, eight states,
New York City, and three conservation organizations brought a
nuisance suit against four electric power companies and the Tennessee

247. 549 U.S. at 532–35.
248. Id. at 533–34.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 93–100, 198–203.
250. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285,
at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007). Murphy Oil was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, where
the panel initially reversed and remanded the case. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585
F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, 598 F.3d 208
(5th Cir. 2010), but ultimately dismissed the appeal because it lacked a quorum to
decide the issue. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
251. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
252. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011).

2019]

U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LAW

443

Valley Authority—the five largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the
United States—claiming that the defendants’ emissions contributed to
climate change and resulting harms to the plaintiffs and thus
constituted a public nuisance.253 The petitioners asked the court to cap
the defendants’ emissions and then require them to reduce their
emissions “by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade.”254
In AEP, the Court held that, pursuant to its decision in Massachusetts
v. EPA, “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace
any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide
emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”255 As a result of the
decision in AEP, very little room is left for climate litigation sounding
in federal common law.
While the decision in AEP provided a decisive obstacle to federal
common law causes of action, in the years leading up to the Court’s
2011 decision, various lower courts grappled with underlying
substantive challenges in these cases, including questions related to
standing, the political question doctrine, and causation. Questions of
causation proved particularly challenging for the courts given the
attenuated causal chain between particular sources of emissions,
patterns of global climate change, and the climate-related harms that
the plaintiffs suffered.256 Thus, as fast as climate science was evolving
during the mid-2000s, it remained factually difficult for plaintiffs to
demonstrate the requisite degree of causal connection between the
harms they suffered and the defendants’ emissions.
As a result of the decision in AEP and ongoing challenges relating to
climate science and harm attribution, by 2011, most of the first round
of common law cases had run aground. Similarly, by this time, the
primary pathways for challenging agency actions and inaction on climate
change under existing environmental law had been tried. Around this
same time, however, climate attribution science began to evolve rapidly,
climate litigation picked up around the world, and new classes of plaintiffs
began to emerge, prompting a new wave of climate litigation.

253. Id. at 418.
254. Complaint at 2, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 1:04-cv-05669-LAP).
255. 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011).
256. Geetanjali Ganguly et al., If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for
Climate Change, 83 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 846–47 (2018).
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B. The Second Wave
The ongoing wave of climate litigation includes a wide range of cases
and claims, but two dominant themes emerge: (1) litigants are refining
their approach to common law claims and expanding the scope of
claims outward to make greater use of private law claims; and (2)
litigants are seeking to situate state obligations to address climate
change as a matter of fundamental constitutional and human rights.257
First, domestic litigation is entering a second phase wherein judges
and litigants are more actively engaging with advanced climate research
such as Heede’s groundbreaking carbon majors study258 and
probabilistic event attribution science. Attribution science “increasingly
allows a quantitative assessment of the extent to which human-induced
climate change is affecting local weather events.”259 Together, these
data sources help establish causal links between specific sources of
emissions and climate-related harms.260 In addition, litigants are
learning from the first round of common law litigation and are
“becoming more creative, attempting to avoid federal displacement
arguments encountered in the first wave by focusing on state-based
common law and statutory claims . . . [and] moving beyond tort-based
claims to employ diverse causes of action, including corporate law.”261 The
combined effect of these trends is that litigants are employing a refined set
of causes of actions—drawing from common law claims and corporate law
claims—and using advanced research to help establish causal connections
between defendants’ emissions and specific climate-related injuries.
One of the most defining aspects of this trend is the focus on holding
the carbon majors legally accountable for their contributions to
climate change.262 Cities and municipalities around the United States,
as well as shareholders, investors, and employees, are bringing a flood

257. See DENA P. ADLER, COLUMBIA LAW SCH., SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW,
U.S. CLIMATE LITIGATION IN THE AGE OF TRUMP: YEAR TWO 19 (2019),
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2019/06/Adler-2019-06-US-Climate-ChangeLitigation-in-Age-of-Trump-Year-2-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUH9-KUAY].
258. See Heede, supra note 241.
259. FRIEDERIKE OTTO, RACHEL JAMES & MYLES ALLEN, ENVTL. CHANGE INST., THE
SCIENCE OF ATTRIBUTING EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION
TO ASSESSING LOSS AND DAMAGE ASSOCIATED WITH CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS,
https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/application/pd
f/attributingextremeevents.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG8D-2HG6]; see also Benjamin,
supra note 237, at 17–18.
260. Benjamin, supra note 237, at 17–18.
261. See id. at 1.
262. See Ganguly et al., supra note 256.
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of claims ranging from nuisance,263 to fraud,264 to allegations of
statutory violations265 against these large fossil fuel companies.266
For example, by July 2019, at least fourteen cities and counties, three
states, and one territory had filed tort suits or launched climate-based
fraud investigations267 against the carbon majors in the United States.
The entities bringing suit range from big actors such as the State of
Rhode Island, New York City, Oakland, and San Francisco to smaller
entities such as the cities of Boulder, CO; Santa Cruz, CA; and King
County, WA.268 In addition to these public entities, crab fisherman in
California and Oregon have also brought suits against the carbon
majors.269 Most of these lawsuits were filed between 2017 and 2018,
meaning that they are still in the early stages of litigation. Despite their

263. See, e.g., San Francisco and Oakland Sue Top Five Oil Companies Over Costs of Climate
Change, CITY ATT’Y S.F. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2017/09/19/
san-francisco-oakland-sue-top-five-oil-gas-companies-costs-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/5SQK-TYGQ].
264. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act at 2–3, 6, Fentress v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 304 F. Supp. 3d 569 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 30, 2018) (No. 4:16-CV-03484).
265. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 841 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
266. While the focus here is on domestic actions, it is important to note that similar
actions are being brought around the world. One of the most high-profile examples
of this is the ongoing Philippines Human Rights Commission carbon majors inquiry.
See National Inquiry on Climate Change, PHIL. COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS.,
https://chr.gov.ph/nicc-2 [https://perma.cc/E35P-9WQJ]. The inquiry is a response
to a petition that was filed with the Commission “seeking to establish how climate
change is related to the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters and how
human rights of the Filipinos are affected by them.” Id. The inquiry includes an
investigation of the responsibility of the “Carbon Majors” for human rights violations
resulting from climate impacts, drawing upon the abovementioned study by Richard
Heede and advancements in attribution science. See The Carbon Majors Inquiry Comes to
London, GRANTHAM RES. INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & THE ENV’T. (Oct. 30, 2018),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/news/the-carbon-majors-inquiry-comes-tolondon [https://perma.cc/97VE-TQR8].
267. See David Hasemyer, Fossil Fuels on Trial: Where the Major Climate Change Lawsuits
Today, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 22, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
04042018/climate-change-fossil-fuel-company-lawsuits-timeline-exxon-childrencalifornia-cities-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/493W-LZF9].
268. Id.
269. See David Hasemyer, Crab Fishers Sue Fossil Fuel Industry Over Climate Change
Damage, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 14, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news
/14112018/crab-fishermen-climate-change-lawsuit-fossil-fuel-companies-ocean-algaeneurotoxin-fishery-closure [https://perma .cc/NSL4-AEHU]; Erin McCormick, Claws
Outs: Crab Fishermen Sue 30 Oil Firms Over Climate Change, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2018, 5:58
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/14/crab-fishermensue-oil-firms-exxon-chevron [https://perma.cc/DW9U-EFUX].
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still emergent nature, litigants are already engaged in a process of
iterative learning and are refining their approaches in response to
each decision the courts make. This is particularly true with respect to
the state and city litigation.
The first wave of cities to bring suits against the carbon majors,
including New York City, Oakland, and San Francisco, suffered early
setbacks. These cases make similar arguments, claiming that the five
largest investor-owned producers of fossil fuels in the world270—who,
cumulatively are responsible for 11% of global greenhouse gas
emissions—have knowingly contributed to climate change, resulting in
injuries to the cities due to sea level rise and other climate-induced
harms.271 While New York City sought compensatory damages to cover
the costs that the City incurred as a result of climate impacts as well as
an equitable order requiring the defendants to abate the nuisance and
trespass to which their emissions give rise,272 San Francisco and
Oakland requested more limited relief in the form of an abatement fund
to pay for seawalls and other infrastructure needed to address rising sea
levels.273 In both jurisdictions, the plaintiff cities sought to avoid federal
preemption challenges by moving to remand their cases to the state level.274
In both cases, however, their motions to remand were denied and, in
summer 2018, both cases were dismissed based on a number of grounds,
including federal preemption and the political question doctrine.275
These early decisions reveal “how difficult a hurdle the federal
displacement issue is to overcome,”276 but they also demonstrate that
the courts are taking climate science seriously even as they struggle to
grapple with the appropriate judicial response to a problem of such
massive scale.277 U.S. District Court Judge William Alsup, who presided

270. These five are: Chevron Corp, Exxon Mobil Corp, British Petroleum Plc, Royal
Dutch Shell, and ConocoPhillips. These defendants are, respectively, the first, second,
fourth, sixth and ninth largest cumulative producers of fossil fuels worldwide.
Complaint at 1, 2, 31, New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. July 19,
2018) (No. 1:18-cv-00182-JFK).
271. See id. at 2.
272. Id. at 63.
273. See California v. BP P.L.C., No. C17-06011 WHA, No. C17-06012 WHA, 2018
WL 1064293, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018).
274. See Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court: Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, California v. BP P.L.C., No. C17-06011 WHA, No. C17-06012 WHA, 2018
WL 1064293 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018).
275. See City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1028–29 (N.D. Cal. June 25,
2018); California v. BP P.L.C., 2018 WL 1064293, at *5 (denying plaintiffs’ motion for remand).
276. Benjamin, supra note 237, at 22.
277. Id. at 22–23.
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over the combined Oakland and San Francisco cases, requested a
tutorial on climate change science.278 Following a five-hour tutorial, in
his decision to dismiss he declared that “[a]ll parties agree that fossil
fuels have led to global warming and ocean rise and will continue to
do so,” while also calling the scope of the plaintiffs’ theory
“breathtaking” and ultimately concluding that the “problem deserves
a solution on a more vast scale than can be supplied by a district judge
or jury in a public nuisance case.”279
In a strikingly similar decision dismissing New York City’s case, U.S.
District Judge John Keenan said “[c]limate change is a fact of life, as is not
contested by Defendants. But the serious problems caused thereby are not
for the judiciary to ameliorate. Global warming and solutions thereto
must be addressed by the two other branches of government.”280
As the appeals for these two cases make their way through the courts,
a host of other governmental actors have watched carefully and refined
their claims accordingly. As Benjamin describes:
The second group of cases brought by California cities and counties
attempted to avoid the federal displacement doctrine by making a
more diverse set of claims, . . . including public and private nuisance,
strict liability for failure to warn customers of the dangers of climate
change, design defect, negligence and trespass. These suits were
patterned more closely on tobacco and asbestos litigation.281

This novel climate litigation is just beginning to percolate, but the
litigants—including governmental entities from California, Colorado,
Washington, Rhode Island, and Baltimore—are drawing from the first
wave of climate litigation, the ongoing carbon majors litigation in the
U.S. and around the world,282 and the lessons offered from litigation
278. See Warren Cornwall, In a San Francisco Courtroom, Climate Science Gets Its Day on
the Docket, SCI. MAG. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/
03/san-francisco-court-room-climate-science-gets-its-day-docket
[https://perma.cc/GW7E-CRLU].
279. City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
280. City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
281. Benjamin, supra note 237, at 23.
282. In one of the most prominent examples of an international carbon major tortbased case, Lliuya v. RWE, a Peruvian farmer filed claims for declaratory judgment and
damages in a German court against German’s largest electricity producer, RWE,
alleging that RWE, having knowingly contributed to climate change by emitting
substantial volumes of greenhouse gases , bore some measure of responsibility for the
melting of mountain glaciers near his town of Huaraz, population 120,000. Lliuya v.
RWE: Summary, GRANTHAM RES. INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE & THE ENV’T.,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/lliuya-v-rwe
[https://perma.cc/7ACC-4B84]. This groundbreaking case used refined attribution
science to make one of the most precise causation-based arguments to date. The court
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successes on other complex public health challenges to continually
refine their litigation strategies.
Alongside this evolving body of common law-based litigation, there
are growing efforts to use corporate law to compel fossil fuel entities
to disclose information and modify their business practices.283
Together, the common law and corporate law litigation is bringing the
carbon majors under increased legal, ethical, and financial scrutiny.
These entities will continue to push back against efforts to hold them
legally liable for climate injuries or to force them to modify their
business practices. However, their ability to evade scrutiny over their
responsibilities and choices with respect to climate change is rapidly
eroding. Increasingly, the carbon majors will be forced to be more
transparent and accountable not only to their shareholders, investors,
and employees, but also to the general public.284
As litigants refine their common law and corporate law strategies, a
second litigation trend is emerging. In courts around the world,
litigants are drawing upon constitutional and human rights law to
assert that the state has a fundamental legal obligation to address climate
change.285 These cases are moving beyond the constraints of existing
statutory and regulatory regimes to try to situate state obligations to address
climate change as a matter of fundamental constitutional and human
rights. As Carlson suggests, these claims are driven by “the compelling
nature of climate change as an existential risk and the failure of our
institutions to address it, in the face of a mountain of evidence . . . .”286
dismissed the claim on the basis that “no linear causal chain” could be recognized
between RWE’s emissions and Lliuya’s injuries. Id. In one of the most surprising and
important international decisions thus far, however, the appeals court reversed the lower
court and has allowed the case to proceed to the evidentiary phase. For more in-depth
discussion of ongoing international litigation, see generally Michael Byers et al., The
Internationalization of Climate Damages Litigation, 7 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 264 (2017).
283. See generally Benjamin, supra note 237. See also How Corporate America Is Addressing
Climate Change Risks, NPR (July 9, 2019), https://www.nprillinois.org /post/howcorporate-america-addressing-climate-change-risks [https://perma.cc/ 9DZQ-U9VA];
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org
[https://perma.cc/ND7J-HZ4K].
284. For a discussion of other ways in which the energy sector is coming under
pressure in ways that could influence their behavior, see Hari M. Osofsky et al., Energy
Re-Investment, 94 IND. L.J. 595 (2019).
285. See, e.g., Rb.’s-Gravenhage 24 juni 2015, AB 2015, 336 m.nt. Ch.W. Backes
(Stichting Urgenda/Staat der Nederlanden),.
286. Sean Hecht, UCLA Law’s Ann Carlson Interviewed on CBS’s 60 Minutes Discussing Juliana
v. U.S., Landmark Climate Change Lawsuit, LEGAL PLANET (Mar. 6, 2019), https://legalplanet.org/2019/03/06/ucla-laws-ann-carlson-interviewed-on-cbss-60-minutes-discussingjuliana-v-u-s-landmark-climate-change-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/7NQD-WQ8H].
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The case that best embodies this new approach is the Children’s
Trust case in the United States.287 The Children’s Trust litigation seeks
to embed the responsibility to address climate change at the heart of
legal obligations the state owes to its citizenry.288
In this case—commonly referred to as “the Juliana case”—twentyone young people, represented by the non-profit organization, Our
Children’s Trust, filed suit against the United States289 claiming that
the federal government has violated their legal rights by knowingly
contributing to climate change and failing to take decisive steps to
reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions or otherwise address the
causes and consequences of climate change.290 Specifically, the
plaintiffs allege that the federal government has deprived them of their
right to a safe climate without due process of law and thereby violated
287. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016). The
complement to the Juliana case in the United States is the Urgenda case in the
Netherlands. In Urgenda, 886 citizens, represented by the NGO Urgenda, brought a
case in Dutch court claiming that the Dutch state is constitutionally obligated to
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25% to 49% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels
and that by failing to do so, the Dutch government had acted tortuously. In 2015, the
lower court ruled in Urgenda’s favor and ordered that the Dutch government must
ensure that it reduce is emissions at least 25% by 2020 in order to avoid being negligent
in its duties under the Dutch Constitution. See 7196 m.nt. (Urgenda
Foundation/Kingdom of the Netherlands). This case was groundbreaking; it was the
first case in which the courts found that the state is legally obligated to lower
greenhouse gas emissions. In 2018, the Dutch appellate court upheld the lower court’s
ruling and extended the decision even farther, finding that the failure of the Dutch
government to reduce its emissions to 25% by 2030 below 1990 levels would also
constitute a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Hof’s-Gravenhage
9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Veen, Ch.W. Backes (Staat der
Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.). The case is now on appeal to the Dutch
Supreme Court. Revealing the degree of transnational learning that is taking place,
the Urgenda case has inspired a burst of similar litigation in the European Union and
beyond, e.g., in the United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, Ireland, and Switzerland.
For further discussion of this case, see Benoit Mayer, Note, The State of the Netherlands
v. Urgenda Foundation: Ruling of the Court of Appeal of The Hague (9 October 2018), 8
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 167 (2019).
288. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 92–93, Juliana
v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2015) (Case No.: 6:15-cv-01517-TC)
(Sept. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Youth Complaint].
289. Id. at 6–36; see also Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, America’s Youth File
Landmark Climate Lawsuit Against U.S. Government and President (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/576c6e11ebb
d1aee23f5f77e/1466723857447/15.08.12FederalClimateLawsuitPressRelease+%281
%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HQX-DYHR] (describing Our Children’s Trust’s
representation of the Juliana plaintiffs).
290. Youth Complaint, supra note 288, at 56–57.
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their constitutional rights of due process,291 equal protection,292 and
unenumerated rights protected under the Ninth Amendment.293 In
addition, the plaintiffs allege that the federal government is the
sovereign trustee of the “country’s life-sustaining climate system” and,
pursuant to the public trust doctrine, has an affirmative duty to present
and future generations to “take affirmative steps to protect those trust
resources” and that they “have failed in their duty of care to safeguard
the interests of Plaintiffs as the present and future beneficiaries of the
public trust.”294 As the presiding district court judge summed up, the core
of the plaintiffs’ claim is that the federal government’s actions and
inactions—“whether or not they violate any specific statutory duty—have
so profoundly damaged our home planet that they threaten plaintiffs’
fundamental constitutional rights to life and liberty.”295
As relief, the plaintiffs ask the court to declare that the United States’
current environmental policy infringes their fundamental rights and
direct the federal government to take affirmative, enforceable steps to
“swiftly phase out” greenhouse gas emissions and to take any other
actions necessary to keep concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions
in the atmosphere at a safe level.296
The constitutional and public trust claims driving this case have
been the subject of extensive debate.297 These plaintiffs’ claims test the
boundaries of constitutional law jurisprudence and propose a novel,
untested theory of the federal public trust doctrine. While it is beyond
the ambit of this Article to explore the nuances and likely success of
the plaintiffs’ claims in this case, the case teaches us (a lot) about the
progression of climate litigation. As Farber suggests, while the legal
prospects of the case are problematic, “at the core of the plaintiff’s case
is a powerful insight. The government really does have an obligation
291. Id. at 84–88.
292. Id. at 88–91.
293. Id. at 91–92.
294. Id. at 92–93. For one of the most important legal analyses on the public trust
doctrine as it applies to natural resources, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 477 (1970).
295. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1261 (D. Or. 2016).
296. Youth Complaint, supra note 288, at 4, 94–95.
297. See, e.g., Ann Carlson, Standing and the Juliana v. United States Plaintiffs, LEGAL
PLANET (June 3, 2019), https://legal-planet.org/2019/06/03/standing-and-thejuliana-v-united-states-plaintiffs [https://perma.cc/WBU2-M8HG]; see also Michael C.
Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and
the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017); Gerald Torres, No Ordinary Lawsuit:
The Public Trust and the Duty to Confront Climate Disruption-Commentary on Blumm and
Wood, 67 AM. U. L. REV. F. 49 (2018).
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to preserve our lands and sea for the benefit of all Americans—
including future generations. And climate change really is a dire threat
to the future.”298 This insight—that climate change poses an existential
threat to present and future generations and that the state must, in
some meaningful way, be accountable for addressing this threat
resounds throughout Juliana, through the political discourse pushing
back against President Trump’s erosion of domestic and international
climate law structures, through ongoing efforts to recognize that
climate change poses a risk to fundamental human rights,299 and
through subnational and non-state efforts to create upward pressure
on the state to fulfill its obligations to protect its citizens. This insight is a
product of nearly three decades of learning about the depth of the threat
climate change poses and the juxtaposition of that looming threat with
the persistent absence of an adequate state response. It is an insight that
began percolating during the Bush Administration, informed intensifying
efforts to reconceptualize the role of the state during President Obama’s
second term, and finally came to a boil in the face of the total abdication
of responsibility during the Trump Administration.
The harsh juxtaposition of such an extreme threat with the
continued absence of defined state responsibility comes to the surface
of legal consciousness in an emphatic way in the Juliana case. Not only
do the young plaintiffs highlight this insight throughout their
pleadings in visceral ways as they describe their climate injuries,300 but,
in her order denying the defendant’s motions to dismiss,301 U.S.
298. Daniel Farber, What’s Wrong with Juliana (and What’s Right), CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM: CPRBLOG (Jan. 22, 2019), http://www.progressivereform.org/
CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=A6644A55-9B8B-D096-2BF612F2E8FB772C
[https://perma.cc/6K5X-D7GM].
299. See, e.g., Human Rights and Climate Change, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS.,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/hrandclimatechange/pages/ hrclimatechangeindex.aspx
[https://perma.cc/PX7B-3JY6].
300. Youth Complaint, supra note 288, at 6–35.
301. This case has a complicated procedural history involving both the President
and the Supreme Court. In brief, in 2016, U.S. District Court Judge Anne Aiken denied
the federal government’s motion to dismiss, the Trump Administration’s Justice
Department then mounted repeated efforts in the appellate courts to stay or dismiss
the district court proceedings. After the Ninth Circuit rejected those attempts, the
government appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court. Justice
Anthony Kennedy initially rejected the government’s appeal as premature but,
subsequently, Chief Justice Roberts stayed all district court proceedings in the case and
ordered the plaintiffs to file a response to the Trump Administration’s petition to the
Supreme Court seeking to dismiss the case. Finally, in December of 2018, the Ninth Circuit
granted the federal government’s petition for permission to appeal Judge Aiken’s order
allowing the case to go to trial and, in June 2019, the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments
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District Court Judge, Anne Aiken, takes on this seemingly inexplicable
legal gap headlong. Breaking from her counterparts in San Francisco
and Manhattan who, when confronted with complex legal and political
questions in the carbon majors nuisance litigation expressed, at once,
deep concern over the implications of climate change and caution over
the role of the judiciary in shaping a response to climate change, Judge
Aiken adopts a distinctively different approach to the role of the courts.302
In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Judge Aiken declares this
case is “no ordinary lawsuit”303 and rebukes judicial diffidence in the face
of the overwhelming nature of the climate challenge, stating that the
“[f]ederal courts too often have been cautious and overly deferential in
the arena of environmental law, and the world has suffered for it.”304
Judge Aiken draws upon the words of Circuit Judge Alfred Goodwin,
to make her point:
The current state of affairs . . . reveals a wholesale failure of the legal
system to protect humanity from the collapse of finite natural
resources by the uncontrolled pursuit of short-term profits . . . .
[T]he modern judiciary has enfeebled itself to the point that law
enforcement can rarely be accomplished by taking environmental
predators to court . . . . The third branch can, and should, take
another long and careful look at the barriers to litigation created by
modern doctrines of subject-matter jurisdiction and deference to
the legislative and administrative branches of government.305

Bringing Judge Goodwin’s insight to bear in Juliana, Judge Aiken
concludes: “[e]ven when a case implicates hotly contested political
issues, the judiciary must not shrink from its role as a coequal branch
of government.”306
Throughout her decision, Judge Aiken carefully grapples with the
complex questions of law that the plaintiffs’ claims present for the court.
In doing so, she refuses to allow the sometimes novel and always

on the appeal. For a full procedural history and supporting documents, see Juliana v. United
States, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIG. DATABASES, http://climatecasechart.com/case/juliana-vunited-states [https://perma.cc/ET5X-FQ22].
302. In similar fashion to Judges Alsup and Keenan, however, Judge Aiken is careful to
note that climate science is not on trial, stating: “[t]his lawsuit is not about proving that climate
change is happening or that human activity is driving it. For the purposes of this motion, those
facts are undisputed.” Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1234 (D. Or. 2016).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1262.
305. Id. (quoting Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for Judges, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 785,
785–86, 788).
306. Id. at 1263.
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challenging nature of the legal conundrum that climate claims pose to be
a reason to punt the claims out of the court or defer to the legislature.
Ultimately, in determining the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to
the plaintiffs constitutional due process claims, Judge Aiken makes one
of the most critical judicial findings to date in domestic climate litigation,
holding that “the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human
life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”307 That is, she finds that
under U.S. constitutional law, the right to a climate system capable of
sustaining human life is a fundamental right.308 Recognizing the right to
a climate system capable of sustaining human life as a “new” fundamental
right309 breaks legal ground and affords the plaintiffs with a heightened
level of constitutional protection.
The future of this case is uncertain. Even its proponents recognize
that the case faces a long, uphill battle and that, as a necessary next
step, it will be a “heavy lift to have the 9th Circuit recognize a
constitutional right to a stable climate.”310 Despite the odds, the case
has been called “the [c]limate [t]rial of the [c]entury”311 for its
potential to profoundly reconfigure primary legal rights and
responsibilities with respect to climate change. A victory for the
plaintiffs in Juliana would allow the courts to compel governmental
307. Id. at 1250. Judge Aiken qualifies the recognition of a new fundamental right,
explaining:
In framing the fundamental right at issue as the right to a climate system
capable of sustaining human life, I intend to strike a balance and to provide
some protection against the constitutionalization of all environmental claims.
On the one hand, the phrase “capable of sustaining human life” should not
be read to require a plaintiff to allege that governmental action will result in
the extinction of humans as a species. On the other hand, acknowledgment of
this fundamental right does not transform any minor or even moderate act
that contributes to the warming of the planet into a constitutional violation.
Id. at 1250.
308. Id. (“To hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution affords no
protection against a government’s knowing decision to poison the air its citizens
breathe or the water its citizens drink.”).
309. Judge Aiken uses the Court’s recognition of a new constitutional right to samesex marriage in Obergefell as an analogy and jurisprudential lesson for finding a “new”
right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life, drawing upon the reminder
that Justice Kennedy offers in Obergefell that “[t]he identification and protection of
fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution”.
Id. at 1249 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015)).
310. Jennifer Hijazi, ‘All Eyes of the World Are on Juliana’, E&E NEWS (May 31, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/special_reports/juliana_v_us/stories/1060435539
[https://perma.cc/8887-Y57K] (quoting Professor Ann Carlson).
311. David Solnit, The Climate Trial of the Century, 350.ORG (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://350.org/youthvgov-juliana-climate-trial-of-century [https://perma.cc/4QNC-AGC6].
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action on climate change, thus redrawing the legal landscape of
domestic climate change law with sweeping effect.
Ultimately, Juliana may teach us a good deal about how the federal
judiciary views its role and responsibility with respect to climate change.
Regardless of how the courts decide the case, Juliana has already
demonstrated that, beyond the high-profile fluctuations of federal climate
policy across the past three presidential administrations, cultural
consciousness and resolve on climate change has solidified and is
driving increasingly ambitious efforts to find legal footholds for
compelling profound and durable state action.
The ongoing second wave of litigation seeks definitive outcomes that
recognize new fundamental rights and force governmental and
corporate actors to modify their behavior and provide compensation
for harms done. The litigation also forces state and private actors to
publicly disclose how their actions and inactions impact the planet and
its people, and to directly address what they see as their legal and moral
obligations in the face of these revelations. This forced transparency and
public grappling with legal roles and moral responsibilities highlights the
increasingly inexplicable gap between the threat climate change poses
and the legal responses offered. This public reckoning may not lead to
decisive legal victories in every case, but it provides critical insight and,
inevitably, strengthens the resolve of those fighting for climate action.
V. BEYOND THE STATE—THE EVOLVING ROLE OF SUB-FEDERAL AND
NON-STATE ACTORS
The cultural consciousness and resolve underpinning the second
wave of climate litigation mirrors and complements ongoing efforts by
subnational and non-state actors to develop legal infrastructure, social
capital, and private networks for addressing climate change. These
flourishing climate efforts emerged during the Bush Administration,312
but the movement builds on a long history of cooperative
environmental federalism and grassroots environmental movements.
The scale of the climate effort, however, is both unparalleled and of
unprecedented importance given the state’s inability to settle on a
course of action on climate change.

312. See generally JOSEPH E. ALDY ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, BEYOND
KYOTO: ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE (2003); Carlarne,
supra note 7, at 1365–83; Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, Policymaking Under
Pressure: The Perils of Incremental Responses to Climate Change, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (2008).
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A. From Complementary to Contradictory: The Evolving Impact of the
Executive on Non-State Climate Actions
With the shifts from the Bush to the Obama to the Trump
Administrations, the role that subnational and non-state actors have
played in shaping climate policy has varied, but the momentum and
influence of these cumulative efforts have steadily grown over time. In
key part, during the Obama-era, the Administration complemented
burgeoning subnational and non-state efforts by creating a parallel set
of federal initiatives and by minimizing federal obstructions to
subnational efforts.313 Moreover, President Obama’s leadership on
climate change largely obviated the need for defensive policy or
litigation efforts designed to force the federal government’s hand.
Instead, his leadership created an enabling environment for key actors,
such as California and New York, to develop increasingly sophisticated
subnational legal regimes and innovative public and private partnerships
that pushed the boundaries of federalism.314 Equally, with the President
leading efforts to develop an expansive federal regulatory regime to
limit emissions under the CAA, environmental NGOs could dedicate
greater resources to challenging federal policies in complementary
areas (e.g., fracking and the Keystone Pipeline).315 Similarly,
subnational governmental actors were able to focus on local
adaptation needs and mitigation opportunities.316 At the same time,
within the private sector, hundreds of companies began “taking action
313. Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, WHITE HOUSE,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/president-obama-climate-action-plan
[https://perma.cc/YS7T-FWMS] (discussing the Clean Power Plan, the Paris Agreement,
and federal cooperation with tribal, state, and local governments such as through the President’s
State, Local and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience).
314. See Farber & Carlarne, supra note 86, at 185; Climate Change Partnerships: Working
Across Agencies and Beyond Borders, CA.GOV, https://www.climatechange.ca.gov/
climate_action_team/partnerships.html [https://perma.cc/X6LG-AMXE].
315. See Rebecca Cohen, The Trump Administration Wants to Roll Back Fracking
Standards, So We’re Going to Court, EARTHJUSTICE (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://earthjustice.org/blog/2018-january/blm-fracking-rule-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/H36H-5J6T]; Betsy Lillian, EPA Slapped with Another Suit over Vehicle
Emissions Standards, NGTNEWS (May 16, 2018), https://ngtnews.com/epa-slapped-withanother-suit-over-vehicle-emissions-standards [https://perma.cc/Y3PJ-7AMU].
316. See Sharyn Stein, Groups Ask Court for Permission to Help Defend Colorado Clean Car
Standards, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.edf.org/media/groups-askcourt-permission-help-defend-colorado-clean-car-standards [https://perma.cc/FS8KFZEW]; Joshua Emerson Smith, Sierra Club, Others Sue San Diego County to Block Carbon
Credit Plan for New Development, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/environment/sd-me-sierra-lawsuit20180319-story.html [https://perma.cc/K355-2GAM].
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to reduce their exposure to the financial risks of climate change,
quantify and control their greenhouse gas emissions, and adapt to
impacts either now occurring or just over the horizon.”317 The
relationship between the Obama Administration and many of these
actors was mutually supportive. Burgeoning subnational and non-state
efforts to address climate change were enabled by a supportive
executive branch and, in turn, facilitated the Administration’s efforts
to structure domestic and international climate regimes.
This era of mutually reinforcing federal and subnational
development was not without its challenges, of course. While states
such as California and New York encouraged complementary federal
action on climate change and took advantage of the mutually
supportive environment to push for more aggressive climate efforts at
the state level, other powerful subnational actors—e.g., Texas, West
Virginia, and Alabama318—fought back aggressively against the
expansion of the federal climate regime, challenging key moves the
Obama Administration made to expand regulatory efforts. Equally
politically influential actors, representing the fossil fuel industry and
non-state actors, such as the Koch Foundation, continued to prove
powerful counterpoints to the President’s climate agenda.319
317. J. Kevin Healy & Bryan Keyt, The Case for Corporate Action on Climate Change, 48
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,381, 10,381–82 (2018).
318. See Petition for Review at 2, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363, 2019 U.S. App.
LEXIS (D.C. Cir. Sept. 17, 2019), ECF No. 2 (noting that twenty-six of the fifty states
joined in opposition to EPA’s CPP); see also Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(wherein Texas, Wyoming, and various industry groups petitioned for review of five
EPA rules designed to ensure that a permitting authority existed to issue greenhouse
gas permits under the CAA); Attorneys General of the States of Oklahoma, West
Virginia, Nebraska, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Nov. 24, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-25433
[https://perma.cc/K9VW-HKNM].
319. See Daniel A. Farber, The Conservatives as Environmentalists: From Goldwater and
the Early Reagan Era to the 21st Century, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 1005, 1042–43 (2017). Farber
explains that:
The Koch family, whose wealth derives from the oil industry, also created a
network of political groups to oppose climate change regulation. Moreover,
promotion of fossil fuels remains a key objective of the Kochs. For instance,
one of their groups, Fueling U.S. Forward, is “dedicated to educating the
public about the value and potential of American energy, the vast majority of
which comes from fossil fuels.”
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hiroko Tabuchi, Sensing Gains Ahead Under Trump,
the Kochs Court Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/
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Despite aggressive320 and, at times, effective321 push-back, President
Obama’s presidency was characterized by constructive efforts to
facilitate the growth of a polycentric governance system that
maximized federal, subnational, and non-state efforts to address
climate change. President Obama, perhaps most critically, removed
obstacles and provided momentum and incentives for change. This
enabled subnational and non-state actors committed to addressing
climate change to enact a diverse suite of climate laws and policies.
Moreover, it created room for the climate movement to grow and
solidify more easily than during both the preceding and following
periods of executive obstruction.322
With the election of President Trump, the era of mutually
reinforcing federal and subnational climate actions came to an abrupt
halt. In the Trump-era, subnational climate efforts now lack the
support and facilitation of the state and face greater pushback at every
step. This pushback includes challenges to the constitutionality of
subnational laws and regional or foreign partnerships, deep budget
cuts to climate-related programs, aggressive assaults on climate rules,
and the general diffusion of non-state actor resources as the suite of
unaddressed environmental challenges grows.
As discussed in Part I,323 the dramatic reversal in the state’s position
has been met with active resistance. Federal recalcitrance has
prompted a deluge of legal and extra-legal efforts to address climate
change. In key part, through initiatives such as We Are Still In324 and the
Climate Alliance,325 “more than 2,500 non-federal actors representing more
01/05/business/energy-environment/koch-brothers-fossil-fuels-minorities.html; see
also Robert J. Brulle, Institutionalizing Delay: Foundation Funding and the Creation of U.S.
Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 681 (2014)
(analyzing “the financial resource mobilization of the organizations that make up the
climate change counter-movement”); Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, How G.O.P.
Leaders Came to View Climate Change as Fake Science, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/us/politics/republican-leaders-climatechange.html.
320. See, e.g., Jean Galbraith, Two Faces of Foreign Affairs Federalism and What They Mean
for Climate Change Mitigation, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 274, 276 (2018) (describing
how some states went as far as to “pas[s] legislation signaling their disapproval of the
EPA’s attempts to regulate climate and urging maximum flexibility for states”).
321. See, e.g., Sobie, supra note 144 (discussing the Court’s stay of the CPP).
322. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 15, at 271; Hoshijima, supra note 69, at 174–75;
Michael B. Gerrard, Environmental and Energy Legislation in the 112th Congress, A.B.A.
TRENDS, Mar./Apr. 2011, at 5.
323. See supra Part I.
324. WE ARE STILL IN, supra note 21.
325. U.S. CLIMATE ALLIANCE, supra note 157.
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than half the U.S. economy . . . have pledged their support for the Paris
Agreement goals.”326 The scale of these commitments is significant: “the
combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of U.S. states and cities that have
stated they remain committed to action in line with the emissions
reductions goals of Paris Agreement would be larger than 195 out of 197
Parties to the Framework Convention . . . .”327 These commitments are
further bolstered by the “more than 1,300 businesses with U.S. operations,
representing $25 trillion in market capitalization and accounting for 0.9
gigatons (Gt) carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) of GHG [greenhouse gas]
emissions per year” that have voluntarily adopted GHG targets.328
Many of the actors driving these initiatives were active climate advocates
during the Obama Administration. However, President Trump’s
obstructionist approach to climate change triggered defiant efforts to
concentrate and mobilize burgeoning subnational and civil society
actions.329 In response to President Trump’s seeming attempts to race to
the bottom of international leadership on climate change, these entities
have worked collectively to create a counter-narrative of race to the top. Not
only have subnational and non-state actors proved willing to take on
voluntary commitments to address climate change, they have also adopted
some of the world’s most ambitious climate goals.330

326. Kristin Ugusky & Kevin Kennedy, By the Numbers: America’s Pledge Shows How US
Is Taking Climate Action Without Trump, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Nov. 11, 2017),
https://www.wri.org/blog/2017/11/numbers-americas-pledge-shows-us-movingforward-climate-action [https://perma.cc/J345-UZH8].
327. BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES, AMERICA’S PLEDGE: PHASE 1 REPORT-STATES, CITIES, AND
BUSINESSES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE STEPPING UP ON CLIMATE ACTION 14 (2017).
328. See id. at 14–15.
329. See Murthy, supra note 31, at 1.
330. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, It’s New York vs. California in a New Climate Race. Who Will
Win?, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/climate/newyork-california-climate-race.html.
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By 2019, for example, both New York331 and California332 had
embraced plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions down to nearly
zero by 2050, and Hawaii had passed a law committing to achieving the
goals of the Paris Agreement and becoming carbon neutral by 2045.333
The cumulative impact of the efforts to advance U.S. action on
climate change in defiance of the Trump Administration’s regressive
climate policies reveals the irrepressible nature of the domestic climate
consciousness. The strength of this countertrend has domestic and
international impact. At the domestic level, it advances both substantive
efforts to limit climate change and symbolic efforts to nurture and
advance the climate movement.334 At the international level, it helps
sustain U.S. climate leadership. As Galbraith describes:

331. See Jesse McKinley & Brad Plumer, New York to Approve One of the World’s Most
Ambitious Climate Plans, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
06/18/nyregion/greenhouse-gases-ny.html; see also Matt Stieb, New York to Enact One of
the Most Aggressive Climate Bills in the U.S., N.Y. MAG. (June 19, 2019),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/06/new-york-state-to-approve-impressiveambitious-climate-bill.html [https://perma.cc/6W5A-89G7]. The bill is, in essence, “a
legally binding legislative act to achieve an 85% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
by 2050 and a goal of net zero.” Michael B. Gerrard, The Heat Is On, New York: A New
Climate Law Is a Major Landmark, but Now Requires Work and Sacrifice, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(June 23, 2019), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-start-innovatingnew-york-20190623-3mucksnuazak3axgpggpygxtly-story.html
[https://perma.cc/PB7G-WJRM].
332. See Clean Energy Act of 2018, S.B. 100, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018). This
Bill, known as the Clean Energy Act of 2018, sets a state policy that eligible renewable
energy and zero-carbon resources supply 100% of all retail sales of electricity in
California by 2045. See also Exec. Order No. B-55-18 (Cal. 2018). In this executive
order, then Governor Jerry Brown set out a statewide goal “to achieve carbon neutrality
as soon as possible, and no later than 2045, and to achieve and maintain net negative
emissions thereafter.” Id.; see also David R. Baker, Gov. Brown’s New Climate Goal: Less
than Zero Global Warming Emissions, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/California-to-go-100-percent-cleanenergy-by-2045-13218236.php [https://perma.cc/RLX8-BKV9].
333. S.B. 559, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2017) (stating that the Bill “document[s]
the State’s commitment to combat climate change by systematically reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and improving our resiliency to climate change aligned with
the principles and contributing to the goals set by the Paris Agreement”); see also Vicki
Arroyo, From Paris to Pittsburgh: U.S. State and Local Leadership in an Era of Trump, 31
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 443, 454 (2019).
334. See, e.g., Murthy, supra note 31, at 2; see also About the Under2 Coalition, UNDER 2
COALITION, https://www.under2coalition.org/about [https://perma.cc/R355-BZ24].
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President Trump has done the impossible: he has made the
international community enthusiastic about U.S. federalism. Even as
they express dismay at Trump’s plan to abandon the Paris
Agreement, foreign leaders and internationalists have praised the
efforts of U.S. states and cities to combat climate change mitigation
in accordance with the Agreement’s goals.335

Thus, despite President Trump’s best efforts to roll back climate laws
and quell domestic demand for climate actions, subnational climate
leadership not only persists but flourishes. For more than two decades,
subnational and non-state actors have steadily increased their climate
related activities and incrementally influenced federal and international
climate policy. The Trump Administration’s approach to climate change,
however, has given rise to a renewed era of subnational climate leadership.
The “breadth and depth of engagement by leading states and cities”
has received significant attention in the academic literature.336 For the
purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to retrace this literature. It
will suffice to note that subnational actors are finding new and creative
ways to push the boundaries of the interstitial spaces within which they
operate in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, facilitate the
transition to clean energy,337 build resiliency and adaptive capacity,
demonstrate global leadership, and influence the federal government’s
willingness to respond to climate change in the long term.338 These
efforts are indispensable to addressing climate change. However, they
are not enough. The state remains an essential source of power and
arbiter of influence. Limiting dangerous anthropogenic climate
change requires state leadership or, at a minimum, the absence of state
obstruction. The United States is failing in both regards. Therefore,
the onus falls on subnational leaders to keep climate efforts alive
during the executive leadership drought. While this Article avoids a
discursive analysis of the myriad of subnational climate efforts afoot,
the next section looks briefly at the expanding role of cities as
important sites of climate governance and as microcosms for exploring
emerging trends and future opportunities.
335. Galbraith, supra note 320, at 274.
336. Arroyo, supra note 333, at 433; see also Sarah J. Adams-Schoen, Beyond Localism:
Harnessing State Adaptation Lawmaking to Facilitate Local Climate Resilience, 8 MICH. J.
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 185 (2018); Vicki Arroyo, State and Local Climate Leadership in the
Trumpocene, 11 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 303 (2017); Vicki Arroyo et al., State
Innovation on Climate Change: Reducing Emissions from Key Sectors While Preparing for a “New
Normal”, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 385 (2016).
337. See, e.g., Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of Decarbonization,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1097–99 (2018).
338. See Arroyo, supra note 336, at 437–40.
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B. Cities as Microcosms for Climate Challenges & Opportunities
Cities are critical sites of global innovation. They are also the “places
where humanity’s greatest challenges, from climate change to
migration to inequality, impact the most people.”339 Ongoing global
trends towards urbanization and the consequent growth of megacities
mean that today, “55% of the world’s population lives in urban areas”
with that number expected to increase to 68% by 2050.340 Moreover, by
2030, the UN estimates that forty-three cities around the globe will have
10 million or more inhabitants.341 Although much of the population
growth over the next half century will be highly concentrated in a few
339. Bloomberg Cities, The Future of City Innovation, MEDIUM (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://medium.com/@BloombergCities/the-future-of-city-innovation99a0950a76c3 [https://perma.cc/JA4J-PT84]; Richard Florida, The Geography of
Innovation, CITYLAB (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/life/2017/08/thegeography-of-innovation/530349 [https://perma.cc/SZD6-VP4E]; Miguel Marshall,
Why Cities Are the Key to Innovation, WORLD ECON. F. (Nov. 17, 2005),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/why-cities-are-the-key-to-innovation
[https://perma.cc/N5L6-J5RR].
340. 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects, U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF. (May
16, 2018), https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/2018-revision-ofworld-urbanization-prospects.html [https://perma.cc/6JGM-YLW4]; see also U.K.
HOUSE OF COMMONS ENVTL. AUDIT COMM., OUR PLANET OUR HEALTH, 2017-19, HC 1803, AT
42, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmenvaud/1803/1803.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AG8B-2FFS]. The House of Commons report states that:
The UN estimates around 55 per cent of the world’s population lived in urban
areas in 2018. This is expected to rise to 60 per cent by 2030 and 68 per cent
by 2050. Most of this increase in urban populations is expected to occur in
Asia and Africa, with India, China and Nigeria accounting for 35 per cent of
the projected growth of the world’s urban population by 2050. The number
of cities worldwide with one million or more inhabitants was 548 in 2018—by
2030 it is projected to be 706. The number of cities with over 10 million
inhabitants (“megacities”) is expected to rise from 33 in 2018 to 43 in 2030.
Id. (footnote omitted).
341. Id. Although it is not the focus of this Article, the fact that the majority of
population growth and urbanization is expected to be highly concentrated in a few
rapidly developing countries, including India, China, and Nigeria creates additional
concerns about resource stress, socio-economic inequality, and the impact of disasters
on heavily populated areas. These are critical areas of concern in the context of global
economic, development, human rights, and climate policy. With respect to megacities,
Glasow et al. emphasize that these areas
[a]re not only important drivers for socio-economic development but also
sources of environmental challenges. Many megacities and large urban
agglomerations are located in the coastal zone where land, atmosphere, and
ocean meet, posing multiple environmental challenges . . . .
Roland von Glasow et al., Megacities and Large Urban Agglomerations in the Coastal Zone:
Interactions Between Atmosphere, Land, and Marine Ecosystems, 42 AMBIO 13, 13 (2012).
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rapidly developing countries in Asia and Africa, North America is
currently the most urbanized region in the world, with 82% of its
population living in urban areas in 2018.342 In addition, many of the
most heavily concentrated urban areas are in coastal zones, which are
increasingly vulnerable to sea level rise and other climate impacts.343
As urbanization continues and cities grow, these areas become
increasingly important sites with respect to climate change for three
primary reasons.344 First, cities are vulnerable to climate impacts.345
Second, although cities occupy only 2% of the world’s land, they
consume more than two-thirds of global energy and produce
approximately 70% of global greenhouse gas emissions.346 Third, cities
possess “important human, economic and knowledge resources which
enable them to take action and design innovative solutions.”347
Critically, in the context of climate law and policy, “[t]hey’re also where
ambitious leaders are stepping up to think creatively, not only about
the catalytic role local government can play in solving these problems—
but how, in a time of rapid technological, social, and economic change,

342. 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects, supra note 340.
343. See Michael B. McElroy & D. James Baker, Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with
Implications for National Security, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 727, 733 (2014).
344. See Magali Dreyfus, Are Cities a Relevant Scale of Action to Tackle Climate Change?
Some Reflections to Inform the Debate on the Post-2020 Regime, 7 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV.
283, 284 (2013); see also Alejandra Borunda, This Is What Cities Need to Do by 2050 to Meet
Climate Goals, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic
.com/environment/2019/09/zero-carbon-cities-future.
345. See, e.g., Why Cities?, C40, https://www.c40.org/why_cities [https://perma.cc
/Q488-TBEY] (suggesting that “with 90 percent of the world’s urban areas situated on
coastlines, cities are at high risk from some of the devastating impacts of climate
change, such as rising sea levels and powerful coastal storms”). Although it is beyond
the scope of this Article to address in-depth, pervasive problems of climate justice
mean that certain residents will be more vulnerable and harder hit by climate impacts
than others. In coastal cities, for example, low-income communities are particularly
vulnerable to rising sea levels. It is predicted that by 2035, the number of American
communities that will experience “chronic inundation”—a sea level rise induced
flooding that occurs twenty-six times per year or more—will double and that 55% of the
communities expected to suffer from chronic inundation are home to
socioeconomically vulnerable neighborhoods. Inequality and climate justice challenges
are further compounded at the global level. See Courtney Lauren Anderson, Climate
Change and Infrastructure, 18 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2018).
346. See id.; UN HABITAT, HOT CITIES: BATTLE-GROUND FOR CLIMATE CHANGE (2011),
http://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/E_Hot_Cities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U8WX-ZG6Z]; see also U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS ENVTL. AUDIT
COMM., supra note 340, at 3.
347. Dreyfus, supra note 344, at 283.
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they can keep their communities ahead.”348 Cities, therefore, have a
significant role to play in mapping out how to live in a world indelibly
altered by climate change.
Many city leaders worldwide have proved eager to take on the
challenge.349 In the United States, cities have actively engaged in
climate politics since the Bush Administration350 with the extent of
activity picking up over time.351 As just two brief examples, more than
350 mayors in the United States have adopted the Paris Agreement
goals for their cities, and more than 400 cities are participating in the
“EV Purchasing Collaborative”—an agreement amongst “Climate
Mayors” to leverage their collective buying power and accelerate the
conversion of public fleets to electric vehicles.352
One of the most prominent advocates for city leadership has been
Michael Bloomberg,353 the former mayor of New York City turned vocal
348. Bloomberg Cities, supra note 339; see also Florida, supra note 339; Marshall,
supra note 339.
349. See, e.g., GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY,
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/about [https://perma.cc/8DMT-WVUS]
(providing that the alliance is the world’s largest cooperative effort among mayors and
city officials to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and climate risks in cities); CLIMATE
MAYORS, http://climatemayors.org [https://perma.cc/G5MX-C7UZ] (describing the
group as a “bipartisan peer-to-peer network of U.S. mayors working together to
demonstrate leadership on climate change through meaningful action in their
communities, and to express and build political will for effective federal and global policy
action”); C40, THE COMPACT OF MAYORS: GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND COMMITMENTS,
https://www.c40.org/researches/compact-of-mayors [https://perma.cc/2RVG-E5 MY]
(stating that C40 is a network of the world’s megacities committed to addressing climate
change that supports cities to collaborate effectively, share knowledge and drive
meaningful, measurable, and sustainable action on climate change).
350. See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 7, at 1380–81; Kirsten Engel, State and Local
Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a
Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law, 38 URB.
LAW. 1015, 1016 (2006).
351. See Arroyo, supra note 333, at 451–54.
352. See About the Climate Mayors Electric Vehicle Purchasing Collaborative, DRIVE EV
FLEETS, https://driveevfleets.org/what-is-the-collaborative [https://perma.cc/WQ9N36QP]; City Climate Policy, C2ES, https://www.c2es.org/content/city-climate-policy
[https://perma.cc/94NW-AEXS].
353. The initiatives that Bloomberg has contributed to include “We Are Still In,”
“America’s Pledge,” the “C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group,” and “The American
Cities Climate Challenge,” to which his philanthropy organization pledged $70 million
dollars; additionally, he served as the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special
Envoy for Climate Action. See Michael Bloomberg Contributes Additional $5.5 Million to
United Nations Climate Change Secretariat to Again Fill United States Federal Funding Gap,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.org/press/releases/michaelbloomberg-contributes-additional-5-5-million-united-nations-climate-change-
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climate advocate, who has suggested that “[a]lthough history is not
usually taught this way, one could argue that cities have played a more
important role in shaping the world than empires.”354 In the climate
context, cities have an especially important role to play both because
political power is increasingly concentrated at the local level and local
authorities may be motivated to act earlier than their state or national
counterparts because the effects of climate change will be felt earlier
and most acutely at the local level. Additionally, cities can often be
nimbler in adopting new legal and political strategies.355
Given their growing scale, nimbleness, and heavy carbon footprints,
climate action at the city level is not just possible, but vital. In fact, one
study suggests that city-level actions could reduce greenhouse gas
emissions associated with urban buildings, transport and waste disposal
by nearly half (47%) in 2050.356 Cities have ample tools at their disposal
to reshape urban consumption and energy patterns. These include
efficiency standards for residential and commercial buildings and
“green” building codes.357 For example, cities can use efficiency
standards and building codes to regulate everything from energy
efficiency, water consumption, and choice of materials, to storm water
management systems.358
In the realm of climate-focused cities, New York City (“NYC” or “the
City”) stands out in every way. It is economically, socially, and politically

secretariat-fill-united-states-federal-funding-gap;
Board
of
Directors,
C40,
https://c40.org/board_of_directors [https://perma.cc/SZ4L-EH76].
354. Michael Bloomberg, City Century: Why Municipalities Are the Key to Fighting
Climate Change, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 116, 116 (2015).
355. Although cities are often nimbler than their state and federal counterparts,
their jurisdiction and capacity in the climate context, of course, has important limits
that demonstrate why it is so critical to focus on developing multi-level, multi-scalar,
polycentric governance approaches. See Bratspies, supra note 16, at 30–33; see also
SABRINA DEKKER, CITIES LEADING CLIMATE ACTION: URBAN POLICY AND PLANNING 66
(2019); Elinor Ostrom, Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions: Must We Wait for
Global Solutions to Climate Change before Taking Actions at Other Scales?, 49 ECON. THEORY
353, 356, 365, 366 (2012); Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance,
2 CLIMATE L. 395 (2011).
356. See Peter Erickson & Kevin Tempest, Advancing Climate Ambition: How City-Scale
Actions Can Contribute to Global Climate Goals 5 (Stockholm Envtl. Inst., Working Paper No.
2014-06, 2014), https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/ Climate/SEIWP-2014-06-C40-Cities-mitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6N4-BM78].
357. Andrea McArdle, Local Green Initiatives: What Local Governance Can Contribute to
Environmental Defenses Against the Onslaughts of Climate Change, 28 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 102, 105 (2016).
358. Id.
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influential on a global scale.359 It has a heavy carbon footprint.360 Moreover,
as Hurricane Sandy viscerally demonstrated, it is geographically vulnerable,
particularly to sea-level rise and coastal storms.361
New York City’s climate vulnerability is further compounded by the
fact that its infrastructure is amongst the “oldest in America”; the city’s
water infrastructure, subway systems, highway networks, and up to 3000
miles of roads, bridges, and tunnels are all in need of repair.362 As
Bratspies explains, the
combination of a large population at high vulnerability puts New
York City on the front lines of climate change. Fortunately, New York
City’s political leaders are well-aware of the vulnerability, and eager
to position the city to play a leadership role in driving national and
global action to combat climate change.363

With climate efforts dating back to 2007 and covering everything
from mitigation and adaptation to climate finance,364 New York City
has been on the front line of climate change for a number of years, but
those efforts intensified in the wake of Hurricane Sandy and, again

359. See Bratspies, supra note 16, at 10. Bratspies describes New York City’s
importance:
New York City stands alone as by far the most economically powerful city in
the world. New York City is the nation’s largest city, with more than 8.4 million
residents. The New York City metro area, which includes Newark, is the single
most populous urban area, with more than 18.3 million inhabitants. Thus, the
choices that New York City makes have the potential to shape the
environmental behaviors of roughly 17% of the United States population.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
360. See, e.g., N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY, INVENTORY OF NEW YORK CITY
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN 2015 (2017), https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/
administration_pdf/nycghg.pdf [https://perma.cc/K79S-SHXL]; see also YOSEF
JABAREEN, THE RISK CITY: CITIES COUNTERING CLIMATE CHANGE: EMERGING PLANNING
THEORIES AND PRACTICES AROUND THE WORLD 84 (2015).
361. While it is beyond the ambit of this Article, it is important to highlight that
deep equity challenges pervade climate responses in New York City. While everyone in
the City is at risk, low-income communities often face disproportionate risk with
respect to climate change impacts. See Roshanak Mehdipanah et al., Neighborhood
Context, Homeownership and Home Value: An Ecological Analysis of Implications for Health,
14 INT. J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1098 (2017).
362. See JABAREEN, supra note 360, at 84 (quoting CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC: A GREENER,
GREATER NEW YORK 7 (2007), http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/
pdf/publications/full_report_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8TQ-DYYJ]).
363. Bratspies, supra note 16, at 10.
364. E.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., New York City Climate Protection Act, Local Law No. 55
(Dec. 5, 2007). The Climate Protection Act amended the New York City Administrative Code
in Relation to Greenhouse Gases (although it was subsequently repealed and replaced by
N.Y.C. Local Law No. 22, which recodified the substantive provisions of Local Law 55).
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following the election of President Trump. The list of actions New York
City has taken to address climate change have been examined in detail
elsewhere and are too numerous to review here.365 Rather, the purpose
of this Section is to explore briefly some of the key steps that New York
City has taken in the wake of President Trump’s election to illustrate
the role that cities can play in shaping the state of play on climate
change during a period of federal neglect.
In June 2017, in the wake of President Trump’s announcement that
the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement, New York
City accelerated its climate change law and policymaking initiatives.
The city’s Mayor Bill De Blasio set the tone when he responded to the
President’s Paris announcement by declaring that:
This is a dagger aimed straight at the heart of New York City . . . We
have to understand that if climate change is not addressed, one of
the greatest coastal cities on the earth will be increasingly
threatened. It’s very painful to reflect the fact that Donald Trump is
from New York City. He should know better.366

The day immediately following President Trump’s condemnation of
the Paris Agreement, Mayor De Blasio issued a Climate Action Executive
Order.367 In the order, Mayor De Blasio condemned President Trump’s
decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as “put[ting] millions
of Americans at risk,” and placing the onus on cities such as New York
City to “step up to stop climate change,” before calling for collective
action based on a “moral, economic, public health, and security
imperative to act to protect our planet, fellow human beings, and
future generations.”368 Responding to this imperative, he declared the
city’s commitment to the Paris Agreement and reaffirmed the city’s
long-standing commitment369 to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
80% by 2050.
365. See generally Bratspies, supra note 16; Renee Cho, How New York City Is Preparing
for Climate Change, PHYS.ORG (Apr. 29, 2019), https://phys.org/news/2019-04-york-cityclimate.html [https://perma.cc/S8H9-CD9P].
366. See Oliver Milman et al., The Fight Against Climate Change: Four Cities Leading the
Way in the Trump Era, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/cities/2017/jun/12/climate-change-trump-new-york-city-sanfrancisco-houston-miami [https://perma.cc/6JPT-XXWF].
367. City of New York, Office of the Mayor, Exec. Order No. 26 (2017) [hereinafter
Climate Change Executive Order].
368. Id.
369. See Mayor de Blasio Commits to 80 Percent Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions by
2050, Starting with Sweeping Green Buildings Plan, NYC.GOV (Sept. 21, 2014),
https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/451-14/mayor-de-blasio-commits-80percent-reduction-greenhouse-gas-emissions-2050-starting-with
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Mayor De Blasio’s Climate Action Executive Order had both symbolic
and substantive impact.370 The order publicly denounced President
Trump’s decision and cast him as a moral and political failure while
juxtaposing New York City as a climate warrior, ready and able to step
in to protect its citizens—and the citizens of America—from the
inevitable threats climate change poses. The symbolic frame is backed
up with a viable, substantive commitment. Mayor De Blasio not only
reaffirms that the city will reduce its emissions by 80% by 2050, but also
commits to working with cities worldwide to develop further emissions
reductions strategies, underscoring that “climate action taken by cities in
the United States and around the world can result in 40% of the pollution
reduction needed globally to limit warming to only 1.5 degrees
Celsius . . . .”371 New York City, thus, both can and will step up to protect
its citizens and advance meaningful efforts to address climate change,
even as the President neglects his obligations in this regard.372
Three months later, Mayor De Blasio doubled down on these
commitments with the release of 1.5C: Aligning New York City with the
Paris Agreement, a “first of its kind” plan laying out in detail the work
that New York City must do to reduce emissions 80% by 2050 and
committing the city to working with cities worldwide to “develop a

[https://perma.cc/P8FY-E7K3]; see also CITY OF NEW YORK, ONE NEW YORK: THE PLAN
FOR A STRONG AND JUST CITY 166, http://www.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/downloads/
pdf/publications/OneNYC.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A9L-QSRG].
370. See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 7, at 1405–08; Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska,
Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q.
183, 215 (2005).
371. Climate Change Executive Order, supra note 367.
372. De Blasio’s actions mirror similar statements and efforts by subnational actors
during the Bush Administration. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of
California, Governor Schwarzenegger Issues Statement After U.S. EPA Rejects California’s
Tailpipe Emissions Waiver Request (Dec. 19, 2007), http://freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1941980/posts [https://perma.cc/J2SC-JAUQ]. In 2007, after the EPA denied
California’s petition for a CAA 202 waiver, Governor Schwarzenegger issued a
statement noting that:
It is disappointing that the federal government is standing in our way and
ignoring the will of tens of millions of people across the nation. We will
continue to fight this battle. California sued to compel the agency to act on
our waiver, and now we will sue to overturn today’s decision and allow
Californians to protect our environment.
Id. For further discussion of the substantive value of De Blasio’s commitments, see Milman et
al., supra note 366 (noting that, by this time, “New York City has already earmarked billions of
dollars to retrofit 1m buildings to make them more energy efficient, electrify its municipal
vehicle fleet, plant thousands of trees and coat rooftops in solar panels”).
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protocol to reduce our carbon footprint to zero.”373 Here, again, Mayor
De Blasio marries symbolism with substance. He situates New York
City’s efforts to address “the existential crisis of climate change” in
direct contrast to the President’s failures:
We had hoped we could depend on the federal government for
leadership. Now we know we cannot. President Trump’s decision to
pull the United States out of the Paris Climate Agreement has set us
on a dangerous path of denial. The City of New York was already taking
action to reduce emissions 80 percent by 2050. Now, we have to take
matters into our own hands and go further . . . . When our national
government falls down, local governments have to step up.374

To this end, focusing on two deadlines—in 2020 and 2050—the plan
lays out a detailed strategy for achieving deep and sustainable
emissions reductions.
Mayor De Blasio lays out a meaningful action plan for reducing
emissions and preparing the city for the impacts of climate change in
full acknowledgment that the task of addressing climate change
requires collective action at every level. New York City cannot achieve
the goals of the Paris Agreement alone. De Blasio knows this; the plan
acknowledges this. In the short-term, however, New York City and its
counterparts have no choice but to plow forward because, at least,
“[f]or the time being, the mantle of leadership in our country has
passed to cities and states to fight climate change.”375
Complementing the ongoing city-wide efforts to address climate
change, in January 2018, New York City became the first municipality
outside of California to bring an action against the carbon majors.376
As discussed above, New York City’s common law action seeks
compensatory damages for the costs the city incurs in its efforts to
protect its infrastructure and inhabitants from climate impacts.377

373. CITY OF NEW YORK, 1.5C: ALIGNING NEW YORK CITY WITH THE PARIS AGREEMENT 1
(2017), https://www.nyc.gov/assets/sustainability/downloads/pdf/publications/1point 5AligningNYCwithParisAgrmtFORWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX9E-BH7H].
374. Id.
375. Id. at 31.
376. Chris Mooney & Dino Grandoni, New York City Sues Shell, ExxonMobil and
Other Oil Companies over Climate Change, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/01/10/newyork-city-sues-shell-exxonmobil-and-other-oil-majors-over-climatechange/?noredirect=on.
377. See, e.g., Hilary Schein, New York City’s Curious Jurisdictional Choice in Its Fight
Against “Big Oil”, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2018), https://gielr.
wordpress.com/2018/03/09/new-york-citys-curious-jurisdictional-choice-in-its-fightagainst-big-oil [https://perma.cc/7PX9-P58R].
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Additionally, in a pivotal moment for global divestment campaigns,
Mayor De Blasio simultaneously announced that the city would divest
roughly five billion dollars of its pension investments from fossil fuel
investments within five years.378 Later that year, city officials announced
a “new goal to double the investments of the NYC Funds in climate
change solutions to $4 billion or 2% of the City’s $195 billion pension
portfolio over the next 3 years.”379
Thus, by fall 2018, New York City had reaffirmed its commitment to
fulfilling the goals of the Paris Agreement, laid out a comprehensive
plan to reduce the city’s emissions 80% by 2050, brought suit against
the carbon majors, and committed to divesting from fossil fuels and
investing in renewable energies and climate solutions. All these efforts
complement strategies dating back to the Bush Administration
designed to limit emissions, strengthen the resiliency of the city, and
demonstrate New York City’s national and global leadership on climate
change. President Trump’s intransigence on climate change merely
served to strengthen Mayor De Blasio’s resolve to lead the city in efforts
to do more faster, propelled by the dual goals of protecting the citizenry
and helping carry the mantel of leadership until such a time as to be able,
once again, to work hand-in-hand with the federal executive branch.
New York City does not stand alone in these efforts, of course. Cities
across the United States—from large cities such as Houston, Miami,
and San Francisco380 to smaller, regional leaders such as Georgetown,
TX381—have stepped up efforts to demonstrate climate leadership in
reaction to the Trump Administration’s efforts to unravel domestic
and international climate law. Moreover, closer to home, New York
City’s climate leadership is paralleled by the state. In 2019, New York
lawmakers, who have long been national leaders on climate change,382
agreed to pass an ambitious climate plan, the Climate Leadership and
378. See Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1238 (2018); William
Neuman, To Fight Climate Change, New York City Takes on Oil Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/nyregion/new-york-city-fossil-fueldivestment.html.
379. Press Release, Office of the N.Y.C. Comptroller, Mayor and Comptroller
Announce Pension Fund Goal to Invest $4 Billion in Climate Change Solutions By
2021 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/mayor-andcomptroller-announce-pension-fund-goal-to-invest-4-billion-in-climate-changesolutions-by-2021 [https://perma.cc/QQS3-TJGQ?type=image].
380. See Milman et al., supra note 366.
381. See, e.g., Tom Dart, This Is What America’s Eco-City of the Future Looks Like,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2017, 7:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2017/oct/16/texas-town-georgetown-energy-green [https://perma.cc/Y8QN-8PDL].
382. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
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Community Protection Act.383 This Act requires the state to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions 70% by 2030, and calls for the state to all but
eliminate its emissions by 2050.384 In addition, complementing the
city’s carbon major litigation, in 2018, the New York Attorney General
brought suit against ExxonMobil for shareholder fraud, alleging that
the company misled its investors with respect to the risk that climate
change regulations posed to its business.385
Across the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations, subnational
actors have incrementally expanded their influence on climate policy.
Subnational entities have long been environmental leaders in the
United States. The sudden and dramatic change in course at the
federal level, however, has prompted many of these entities, such as
New York City, to intensify their efforts to develop legal blueprints and
leadership models for addressing climate change and to do so in
collaboration with other subnational actors. New York City’s climate
efforts provide a model for urban climate action; the successes and
failures the city encounters as it works to reduce its emissions and
improve its resiliency will inform efforts worldwide to scale up climate
change strategies. These efforts also nurture climate consciousness and
signal to relevant constituencies—including citizens, the private sector,
and the federal government—that key subnational actors are fully
committed to addressing climate change regardless of the obstacles
that might arise along the way.
C. Extra-Legal Pressure Points: A Brief Hint of What’s to Come
Parallel to patterns in subnational climate leadership, the role that
the private sector and other extra-legal actors are playing in climate
governance is significant and growing. At the time of writing, 2,228
business and investors, 28 health care organizations, 50 faith groups,
353 colleges and universities, and 67 cultural institutions had joined the
287 cities and counties, 10 states, and 10 tribes that have signed onto the

383. S. 6599, A. 8429, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
384. Anne Barnard, Demise of Gasoline Cars? What We Know About N.Y.’s Ambitious
Climate Goals, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20
/nyregion/greenhouse-gases-ny.html.
385. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney Gen., A.G. Underwood Files Lawsuit Against
Exxonmobil for Defrauding Investors Regarding Financial Risk the Company Faces
from Climate Change Regulations (Oct. 24, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/ag-underwood-files-lawsuit-against-exxonmobil-defrauding-investorsregarding-financial [https://perma.cc/2W8R-3T9J].
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We Are Still In pledge.386 Businesses that have signed on include global
corporations such as Unilever, Mars Incorporated, Google Inc., Apple,
and Walmart.387 The scale of the We Are Still In Movement and parallel
calls for corporate action at the international level—including by the
World Economic Forum388—suggests that a growing number of “corporate
executives are recognizing the need to address the greenhouse gas
emissions of their companies and the business logic of strong
environmental, social, and governance practices more generally.”389
Although it is difficult to quantify the scale and dependability of corporate
support for climate action, an increasing number of business leaders are
integrating climate considerations into corporate practice and advocating
for more consistent and predictable climate governance.
As just a few examples of the steps that significant multinational
corporations are taking to address climate change: Kellogg has cut its
carbon emissions by 14% per metric ton of food produced since
2005;390 Maersk, the world’s largest shipping company, has committed

386. Who’s In, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/signatories
[https://perma.cc/FDS6-KZUD].
387. See id. Noticeably, but not surprisingly absent are the carbon majors and most
of the large auto manufacturers.
388. See These 79 CEOs Believe in Global Climate Action, WORLD ECON. F. (Nov. 23,
2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/open-letter-from-ceos-to-worldleaders-urging-climate-action [https://perma.cc/Y4RX-DGJ2]; see also Simon Jessop &
Nina Chestney, Exclusive: Investors with $34 Trillion Demand Urgent Climate Action, REUTERS
(June 25, 2019, 7:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-investmentletter-exclu/exclusive-investors-with-34-trillion-demand-urgent-climate-change-actionidUSKCN1TQ31X [https://perma.cc/YC8T-2SWF]; Ambitious Corporate Climate Action
Needed for Paris Goals, UNFCCC (Nov. 9, 2016), https://unfccc.int/news/ambitiouscorporate-climate-action-needed-for-paris-goals [https://perma.cc/X7DW-S6UQ].
389. Daniel C. Esty & Michelle L. Bell, Business Leadership in Global Climate Change
Responses, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S80 (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC5922211 [https://perma.cc/MV9D-VL5N]. Esty and Bell detail how:
More than 1000 companies joined the World Bank’s 2015 call for a carbon
charge. Hundreds of companies joined the Carbon Pricing Leadership
Coalition, a group of governments and businesses launched in 2014 at the UN
Climate Summit and led by the World Bank, which aims to grow the
application of carbon pricing to lower emissions of greenhouse gases, while
keeping economic advantages. Hundreds of US companies publicly
announced support for the Paris Agreement and commitments to reduce their
emissions.
Id. at S81 (footnotes omitted).
390. See Press Release, UNFCCC, Business Is Key Driver of Global Climate Action
(June 28, 2016), https://unfccc.int/news/business-is-key-driver-of-global-climateaction [https://perma.cc/RRL9-2PCJ].
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to going carbon neutral by 2050;391 IKEA has committed to going 100%
renewable;392 Walmart, the world’s largest retailer, has committed to
avoiding one billion metric tons (a gigaton) of greenhouse gases—an
amount roughly equivalent to the annual emissions of Japan—393 from
its supply chains by 2030394; Unilever has consistently advocated for
carbon pricing policies and, in 2016, began setting an internal price on
carbon,395 and has also been deemed the global company “most ready for
a low-carbon economy”.396 More than a 180 additional companies—
including Google, Apple, and Facebook—have committed to using 100%
renewable energy in their operations.397 These business are leading the
way for widespread change; however, pushback from powerful energy
lobbies, inconsistent regulatory signals, and contradictory federal and
subnational messaging limits the pace of progress. Nonetheless,
corporate climate activism and private climate governance will play an
increasingly important role in climate governance and is the subject of
extensive scholarly thought.398 Here, it will suffice to note that in an era of
federal recalcitrance, private sector support for climate action provides an
important counterpart to subnational climate leadership and another
backstop to ongoing efforts to roll back climate action in the United States.
Alongside the burgeoning private climate governance movement,
the global climate movement continues to grow and has been fed in
recent years by new and powerful voices. Globally, the youth climate

391. See Christian Weinberg, Shipping Giant Maersk Aims for Zero Net Carbon Emissions
by 2050, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-12-05/shipping-giant-maersk-aims-for-zero-net-carbon-emissions-by-2050
[https://perma.cc/YT7X-XJP5].
392. See Business Is Key Driver of Global Climate Action, supra note 390.
393. See Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, supra note 29.
394. See Project Gigaton, WALMART SUSTAINABILITY HUB, https://www.walmart
sustainabilityhub.com/project-gigaton [https://perma.cc/JAU6-XRGW].
395. See Global Climate Action, UNILEVER, https://www.unilever.com/sustainableliving/reducing-environmental-impact/greenhouse-gases/global-climate-action
[https://perma.cc/NE2K-BENB].
396. See Emily Chasan & Katie Linsell, Unilever and L’Oreal Deemed Most Ready for
Climate Change, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-02-25/unilever-l-oreal-danone-deemed-most-ready-for-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/B3XK-MNS4].
397. See Companies, RE100, http://there100.org/companies [https://perma.cc
/X35H-7QF9].
398. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Gilligan, Carrots and Sticks in Private Climate Governance, 6
TEX. A&M L. REV. 179 (2018); see also MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M.
GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
(2017); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Motivating Private Climate Governance: The Role of the
Efficiency Gap (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 18-35, 2018).
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movement has swelled in numbers and influence.399 Mobilized by the
raw, powerful messages of the likes of the plaintiffs in Juliana and Greta
Thunberg—the 16-year-old Swedish climate activist whose climate
strike outside the Swedish Parliament has inspired activists and
politicians worldwide—the youth message has changed the tone of the
climate movement.400 The message is simple and powerful: our future
is at stake and inaction is intolerable. Existing largely outside the tangled
realm of state politics, the youth movement has become a particularly
powerful vehicle for diffusing the message of the urgency of climate
change to a wider audience, and for finding new ways to make inroads
into the political conversations around climate change.401
At the level of domestic politics, in the mid-term elections of 2018,
the Democrats not only regained control of the House of
Representatives, but did so, in part, through the election of a new
group of younger, more diverse congresswomen, including the
democratic representative for New York’s fourteenth congressional
district, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the youngest woman ever to serve
in Congress.402 Buoyed by the new group of motivated and undaunted
representatives, on February 7, 2019, Representative Ocasio-Cortez
together with veteran climate advocate, Senator Ed Markey, proposed
a new approach to addressing a suite of climate, energy, and inequality
challenges. This proposal, The Green New Deal,403 reframed the
narrative around climate change in domestic politics. In key part, The
Green New Deal framed climate change not just as another
environmental problem, but as a challenge—intrinsically linked to
human health, well-being, and economic inequality—that should be

399. See, e.g., Angely Mercado, The Youth Climate Movement Is Just Getting Started, THE
NATION (June 13, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-youth-climatemovement-is-just-getting-started-global-warming-fridays-for-future
[https://perma.cc/W568-FQDD].
400. Leslie Hook et al., Greta Thunberg’s Influence Grows as Young Activist Heads for US, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/c1fc37b4-bce4-11e9-89e2-41e555e96722.
401. See, e.g., Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in the
Case of Sacchi v. Argentina (Sept. 23, 2019), https://childrenvsclimatecrisis.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/2019.09.23-CRC-communication-Sacchi-et-al-v.Argentina-et-al-Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ELM-RWLY]; Jonathan Watts, The
Greta Thunberg Effect: At Last, MPs Focus on Climate Change, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2019,
2:56 PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/apr/23/gretathunberg [https://perma.cc/2ES6-8AS7].
402. See Tara Law, Rep. Ocasio-Cortez Becomes Youngest Woman Ever to Preside over House
of Representatives, TIME (May 11, 2019), https://time.com/5587669/ocasio-cortezyoungest-woman-preside-house [https://perma.cc/VH2C-J8LS].
403. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Congress (2019).
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approached in much the same way as the federal government
approached the Great Depression.404 The objective behind The Green
New Deal is not only to prioritize action on climate change but also to
create a frame of action for climate change based on maximizing the
economic and social opportunities associated with transitioning justly
to a low-carbon economy.405 The roll-out of the proposal was plagued
by problems,406 and the proposal itself has been widely critiqued.407
However, the proposal has also garnered widespread support408 and
propelled the conversation around climate change into the political
arena in a way that has created new pressure on Democratic and
Republican politicians alike.409

404. See, e.g., Cinnamon Carlarne, Delinking International Environmental Law &
Climate Change, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 6 (2014) (arguing that framing climate
change in a narrow way as a conventional environmental law problem constrains
efforts to experiment and think more creatively about how to address a challenge that
defies classification as an environmental issue and demands more innovative, systemwide governance approaches).
405. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, What Is the Green New Deal? A Climate Proposal, Explained,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/climate/greennew-deal-questions-answers.html (reporting that the goal of the Green New Deal is “to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions . . . while also trying to fix societal problems like
economic inequality and racial injustice”); Joseph W. Kane, The Green New Deal Promises Jobs,
but Workers Need to be Ready to Fill Them, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/01/25/the-green-new-dealpromises-jobs-but-workers-need-to-be-ready-to-fill-them [https://perma.cc/2NK2-KZBZ]
(stating that “jobs are a central element in the shift toward a cleaner economy, and the
Green New Deal’s emphasis on this point serves as another reminder of that”).
406. See, e.g., Bill Scher, The Weak Rollout of the Green New Deal, Real Clear Pol.
(Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/02/11/the_weak_
rollout_of_the_green_new_deal_139426.html [https://perma.cc/87V5-KQ24] (criticizing
the Green New Deal’s “polarized reception,” lack of specificity or solutions, and
unintended release of additional drafted measures).
407. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, The Green New Deal Is a Bad Idea, Not Just a Botched
Rollout, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 12, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/greennew-deal-aoc-bad-idea.html [https://perma.cc/46K9-XX8R] (critiquing the Green New
Deal and referring to Ocasio-Cortez as a “radical outlier”).
408. See, e.g., The Guardian View on a Green New Deal: We Need it Now, GUARDIAN (May
12, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/ 12/theguardian-view-on-a-green-new-deal-we-need-it-now [https://perma.cc/NH5H-LL6Q]; Sean
McElwee, Opinion, People Actually Like the Green New Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/opinion/sunday/green-new-deal-mcconnell.html.
409. See, e.g., Justin Worland, How the Green New Deal Is Forcing Politicians to Finally
Address Climate Change, TIME (Mar. 21, 2019), https://time.com/5555721/green-newdeal-climate-change [https://perma.cc/RF34-BGMZ] (observing that the Green New Deal
unleashed a national conversation where Democrats jumped to endorse the resolution and
Republicans scrambled to come up with viable alternative positions on climate change).
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The fate of The Green New Deal is uncertain, but its effect on the
mainstream and political conversations is indelible.410 In a muchpublicized moment, when the voices of these two movements—Greta
Thunberg and Representative Ocasio-Cortez—came together to
discuss the future of climate action, the primary message that they
shared was hope. Facing the threat of climate change and the obstacles
to political action on climate change, Representative Ocasio-Cortez
responded to the budding sense of hope and motivation inspired by the
youth climate movement by suggesting that “[h]ope is something that you
create, with your actions. Hope is something you have to manifest into the
world, and once one person has hope, it can be contagious.”411
Together, the youth climate movement and the debate over The
Green New Deal have created a powerful counternarrative to President
Trump’s climate skepticism and, once again, demonstrated that
irrespective of the waxes and wanes of presidential policy, the
challenge of climate change cannot be ignored, and support for
climate action persists even amidst full-scale presidential blitzkrieg.
The principal lesson that the efforts of these varied subnational,
non-state, and political actions teach is that, even in an era when the
President is launching a full-out war on climate science and climate
politics, the march towards climate action moves forward undaunted,
perhaps even more emphatically as a result of the opposition it faces.
This is not to say that the actions of the Trump Administration are
ineffective. Quite the opposite. The Trump Administration’s approach
to climate change demonstrates the continuing power and importance
of the state. Yet, the widespread push back against the Trump
Administration’s approach also reveals the depth and diversity of
actors that are operating individually and collectively to effect change
in response to perceived deficiencies of the state.

410. See, e.g., Lisa Hymas, The Green New Deal Is Pushing Climate Change into the
Mainstream Media, GRIST (Apr. 3, 2019), https://grist.org/article/the-green-new-deal-ispushing-climate-change-into-the-mainstream-media [https://perma.cc/PZZ9-EUE5].
411. Emma Brockes, When Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Met Greta Thunberg: ‘Hope Is
Contagious’, GUARDIAN (June 29, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2019/jun/29/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-met-greta-thunberg-hopecontagious-climate [https://perma.cc/LYJ2-TCX2] (quoting Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez).
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CONCLUSION
Climate change is a defining feature of contemporary existence. It is
also a fundamental challenge to the rule of law as we know it. As the
scale of the climate crises swells, so too do efforts to develop innovative,
multi-dimensional strategies for addressing climate change. This
innovation is driven by necessity and is fueled by creative and
determined actors from across the public and private sectors. Climate
leaders run the gambit from teenagers, to philanthropists, to mayors,
to Congresswomen, to presidents. But the pace of legal innovation is
uneven, and the consistency of political leadership is erratic. Even in
the face of this existential threat, policymakers continue to stumble in
their efforts to develop an effective legal response. Nowhere is this
more evident than at the federal level in the United States where
presidential politics vividly demonstrate the degree to which we still
lack a collective national vision for how to respond to climate change.
The scale and drama of presidential climate politics is undeniable.
Over the past decade, U.S. presidents have led the construction and
demolition of climate law on a grand scale. Long-term efforts to stave
off catastrophic climate change and protect the American people, and
the American economy, from the negative impacts of climate change
requires more consistent federal leadership. However, as critical and
as disruptive as high-level federal climate politics are, and as much
attention as they deserve, they should not overshadow the larger
picture of domestic climate law and policy. Underneath the flickering
national vision and behind uneven national leadership, a clearer
picture of climate law and policy trends emerges. In scanning the past
decade to determine what is constant and what changes, we begin to
see that for all of the fluctuations at the federal level, across the past
three presidential administrations, subnational climate law and policy,
climate consciousness, and a resulting sense of determination has not
only developed consistently, but has deepened over time.
President Obama’s and President Trump’s respective abilities to
construct and demolish a system of federal climate law reveal the
extent of the underlying base of social capital and the evolving norms
that sustain climate action nationwide. President Obama successfully
leveraged, learned from, and relied on existing social capital to erect
the foundations for a system of climate law over a relatively short
period of time. Equally, that same climate base has limited President
Trump’s ability to demolish the foundations of federal climate law at
the speed, and to the extent that he desires, and that base has created
counterapproaches using every available legal and political tool.
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As extensive and persistent as the network of multi-level, multi-scale
climate responses are in the United States, the vagaries of presidential
climate politics demonstrate that these upward forces have not yet
reached the level of compelling decisive and predictable federal action
on climate change. Nevertheless, what this Article reveals is the depth,
sophistication, and intractability of efforts to develop an effective
response to climate change in order to preserve the integrity of the
rule of law in the United States.
In 2015, President Obama declared that “[n]o challenge—no
challenge—poses a greater threat to future generations than climate
change.”412 Half a decade later and the extent of the threat has only
grown. Just as the science of climate change is irrefutable, so too is the
necessity of legal and political action. The stability of the rule of law
and the well-being of U.S. citizens depends on developing effective
legal responses to climate change and doing so quickly.

412. Pres. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union
Address, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015
[https://perma.cc/759F-WAQK].

